Methodology in Economics: the Logic of Appraisal

This Paper Intends to Develop a Coherent Methodological Framework Concerned with the Appraisal of Scientific Theories in Economics, and Which Is Based on a Postulated Aim of Science. We First Define the Scope of a Methodological Inquiry (Precise Definition of What Is Meant by the Logic of Appraisal of Scientific Theories) and Review the Work of Popper and Lakatos in the Philosophy of Science. We Then Use Their Results to Develop a Rational Structure of Scientific Activity. We Identify and Analyse Both a Micro and Macro Framework for the Process of Appraisal and Single Out the Importance of So-Called 'Fundamental Assumptions' in Creating Externalities in the Appraisal Process Which Forces Us to Adop a Multi-Level Analysis. Special Attention Is Given to the Role and Significance of the Abstraction Process and the Use of Assumptions in General. the Proposed Structure of Scientific Activity Is Illustrated with Examples From Economics.

Workplace design in the knowledge economy : a case of the NetWorkPlace™©

This thesis explores a way to inform the architectural design process for contemporary workplace environments. It reports on both theoretical and practical outcomes through an exclusively Australian case study of a network enterprise comprised of collaborative, yet independent business entities. The internet revolution, substantial economic and cultural shifts, and an increased emphasis on lifestyle considerations have prompted a radical re-ordering of organisational relationships and the associated structures, processes, and places of doing business. The social milieu of the information age and the knowledge economy is characterised by an almost instantaneous flow of information and capital. This has culminated in a phenomenon termed by Manuel Castells as the network society, where physical locations are joined together by continuous communication and virtual connectivity. A new spatial logic encompassing redefined concepts of space and distance, and requiring a comprehensive shift in the approach to designing workplace environments for today’s adaptive, collaborative organisations in a dynamic business world, provides the backdrop for this research. Within the duality of space and an augmentation of the traditional notions of place, organisational and institutional structures pose new challenges for the design professions. The literature revealed that there has always been a mono-organisational focus in relation to workplace design strategies. The phenomenon of inter-organisational collaboration has enabled the identification of a gap in the knowledge relative to workplace design. This new context generated the formulation of a unique research construct, the NetWorkPlace™©, which captures the complexity of contemporary employment structures embracing both physical and virtual work environments and practices, and provided the basis for investigating the factors that are shaping and defining interactions within and across networked organisational settings. The methodological orientation and the methods employed follow a qualitative approach and an abductively driven strategy comprising two distinct components, a cross-sectional study of the whole of the network and a longitudinal study, focusing on a single discrete workplace site. The complexity of the context encountered dictated that a multi-dimensional investigative framework was required to be devised. The adoption of a pluralist ontology and the reconfiguration of approaches from traditional paradigms into a collaborative, trans-disciplinary, multi-method epistemology provided an explicit and replicatable method of investigation. The identification and introduction of the NetWorkPlace™© phenomenon, by necessity, spans a number of traditional disciplinary boundaries. Results confirm that in this context, architectural research, and by extension architectural practice, must engage with what other disciplines have to offer. The research concludes that no single disciplinary approach to either research or practice in this area of design can suffice. Pierre Bourdieau’s philosophy of ‘practice’ provides a framework within which the governance and technology structures, together with the mechanisms enabling the production of social order in this context, can be understood. This is achieved by applying the concepts of position and positioning to the corporate power dynamics, and integrating the conflict found to exist between enterprise standard and ferally conceived technology systems. By extending existing theory and conceptions of ‘place’ and the ‘person-environment relationship’, relevant understandings of the tensions created between Castells’ notions of the space of place and the space of flows are established. The trans-disciplinary approach adopted, and underpinned by a robust academic and practical framework, illustrates the potential for expanding the range and richness of understanding applicable to design in this context. The outcome informs workplace design by extending theoretical horizons, and by the development of a comprehensive investigative process comprising a suite of models and techniques for both architectural and interior design research and practice, collectively entitled the NetWorkPlace™© Application Framework. This work contributes to the body of knowledge within the design disciplines in substantive, theoretical, and methodological terms, whilst potentially also influencing future organisational network theories, management practices, and information and communication technology applications. The NetWorkPlace™© as reported in this thesis, constitutes a multi-dimensional concept having the capacity to deal with the fluidity and ambiguity characteristic of the network context, as both a topic of research and the way of going about it.

Encounters with the Virtual : The Experience of Art In Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy

My thesis concerns the notion of existence as an encounter, as developed in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (1925 1995). What this denotes is a critical stance towards a major current in Western philosophical tradition which Deleuze nominates as representational thinking. Such thinking strives to provide a stable ground for identities by appealing to transcendent structures behind the apparent reality and explaining the manifest diversity of the given by such notions as essence, idea, God, or totality of the world. In contrast to this, Deleuze states that abstractions such as these do not explain anything, but rather that they need to be explained. Yet, Deleuze does not appeal merely to the given. He sees that one must posit a genetic element that accounts for experience, and this element must not be naïvely traced from the empirical. Deleuze nominates his philosophy as transcendental empiricism and he seeks to bring together the approaches of both empiricism and transcendental philosophy. In chapter one I look into the motivations of Deleuze s transcendental empiricism and analyse it as an encounter between Deleuze s readings of David Hume and Immanuel Kant. This encounter regards, first of all, the question of subjectivity and results in a conception of identity as non-essential process. A pre-given concept of identity does not explain the nature of things, but the concept itself must be explained. From this point of view, the process of individualisation must become the central concern. In chapter two I discuss Deleuze s concept of the affect as the basis of identity and his affiliation with the theories of Gilbert Simondon and Jakob von Uexküll. From this basis develops a morphogenetic theory of individuation-as-process. In analysing such a process of individuation, the modal category of the virtual becomes of great value, being an open, indeterminate charge of potentiality. As the virtual concerns becoming or the continuous process of actualisation, then time, rather than space, will be the privileged field of consideration. Chapter three is devoted to the discussion of the temporal aspect of the virtual and difference-without-identity. The essentially temporal process of subjectification results in a conception of the subject as composition: an assemblage of heterogeneous elements. Therefore art and aesthetic experience is valued by Deleuze because they disclose the construct-like nature of subjectivity in the sensations they produce. Through the domain of the aesthetic the subject is immersed in the network of affectivity that is the material diversity of the world. Chapter four addresses a phenomenon displaying this diversified indentity: the simulacrum an identity that is not grounded in an essence. Developed on the basis of the simulacrum, a theory of identity as assemblage emerges in chapter five. As the problematic of simulacra concerns perhaps foremost the artistic presentation, I shall look into the identity of a work of art as assemblage. To take an example of a concrete artistic practice and to remain within the problematic of the simulacrum, I shall finally address the question of reproduction particularly in the case recorded music and its identity regarding the work of art. In conclusion, I propose that by overturning its initial representational schema, phonographic music addresses its own medium and turns it into an inscription of difference, exposing the listener to an encounter with the virtual.

On the Origin of Ideas : An Abductivist Approach to Discovery

The purpose of this study is to analyze and develop various forms of abduction as a means of conceptualizing processes of discovery. Abduction was originally presented by Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) as a "weak", third main mode of inference -- besides deduction and induction -- one which, he proposed, is closely related to many kinds of cognitive processes, such as instincts, perception, practices and mediated activity in general. Both abduction and discovery are controversial issues in philosophy of science. It is often claimed that discovery cannot be a proper subject area for conceptual analysis and, accordingly, abduction cannot serve as a "logic of discovery". I argue, however, that abduction gives essential means for understanding processes of discovery although it cannot give rise to a manual or algorithm for making discoveries. In the first part of the study, I briefly present how the main trend in philosophy of science has, for a long time, been critical towards a systematic account of discovery. Various models have, however, been suggested. I outline a short history of abduction; first Peirce's evolving forms of his theory, and then later developments. Although abduction has not been a major area of research until quite recently, I review some critiques of it and look at the ways it has been analyzed, developed and used in various fields of research. Peirce's own writings and later developments, I argue, leave room for various subsequent interpretations of abduction. The second part of the study consists of six research articles. First I treat "classical" arguments against abduction as a logic of discovery. I show that by developing strategic aspects of abductive inference these arguments can be countered. Nowadays the term 'abduction' is often used as a synonym for the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) model. I argue, however, that it is useful to distinguish between IBE ("Harmanian abduction") and "Hansonian abduction"; the latter concentrating on analyzing processes of discovery. The distinctions between loveliness and likeliness, and between potential and actual explanations are more fruitful within Hansonian abduction. I clarify the nature of abduction by using Peirce's distinction between three areas of "semeiotic": grammar, critic, and methodeutic. Grammar (emphasizing "Firstnesses" and iconicity) and methodeutic (i.e., a processual approach) especially, give new means for understanding abduction. Peirce himself held a controversial view that new abductive ideas are products of an instinct and an inference at the same time. I maintain that it is beneficial to make a clear distinction between abductive inference and abductive instinct, on the basis of which both can be developed further. Besides these, I analyze abduction as a part of distributed cognition which emphasizes a long-term interaction with the material, social and cultural environment as a source for abductive ideas. This approach suggests a "trialogical" model in which inquirers are fundamentally connected both to other inquirers and to the objects of inquiry. As for the classical Meno paradox about discovery, I show that abduction provides more than one answer. As my main example of abductive methodology, I analyze the process of Ignaz Semmelweis' research on childbed fever. A central basis for abduction is the claim that discovery is not a sequence of events governed only by processes of chance. Abduction treats those processes which both constrain and instigate the search for new ideas; starting from the use of clues as a starting point for discovery, but continuing in considerations like elegance and 'loveliness'. The study then continues a Peircean-Hansonian research programme by developing abduction as a way of analyzing processes of discovery.

Truth, Proof and Gödelian Arguments : A Defence of Tarskian Truth in Mathematics

One of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the relation between truth and formal proof. The position according to which the two concepts are the same is called deflationism, and the opposing viewpoint substantialism. In an important result of mathematical logic, Kurt Gödel proved in his first incompleteness theorem that all consistent formal systems containing arithmetic include sentences that can neither be proved nor disproved within that system. However, such undecidable Gödel sentences can be established to be true once we expand the formal system with Alfred Tarski s semantical theory of truth, as shown by Stewart Shapiro and Jeffrey Ketland in their semantical arguments for the substantiality of truth. According to them, in Gödel sentences we have an explicit case of true but unprovable sentences, and hence deflationism is refuted. Against that, Neil Tennant has shown that instead of Tarskian truth we can expand the formal system with a soundness principle, according to which all provable sentences are assertable, and the assertability of Gödel sentences follows. This way, the relevant question is not whether we can establish the truth of Gödel sentences, but whether Tarskian truth is a more plausible expansion than a soundness principle. In this work I will argue that this problem is best approached once we think of mathematics as the full human phenomenon, and not just consisting of formal systems. When pre-formal mathematical thinking is included in our account, we see that Tarskian truth is in fact not an expansion at all. I claim that what proof is to formal mathematics, truth is to pre-formal thinking, and the Tarskian account of semantical truth mirrors this relation accurately. However, the introduction of pre-formal mathematics is vulnerable to the deflationist counterargument that while existing in practice, pre-formal thinking could still be philosophically superfluous if it does not refer to anything objective. Against this, I argue that all truly deflationist philosophical theories lead to arbitrariness of mathematics. In all other philosophical accounts of mathematics there is room for a reference of the pre-formal mathematics, and the expansion of Tarkian truth can be made naturally. Hence, if we reject the arbitrariness of mathematics, I argue in this work, we must accept the substantiality of truth. Related subjects such as neo-Fregeanism will also be covered, and shown not to change the need for Tarskian truth. The only remaining route for the deflationist is to change the underlying logic so that our formal languages can include their own truth predicates, which Tarski showed to be impossible for classical first-order languages. With such logics we would have no need to expand the formal systems, and the above argument would fail. From the alternative approaches, in this work I focus mostly on the Independence Friendly (IF) logic of Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu. Hintikka has claimed that an IF language can include its own adequate truth predicate. I argue that while this is indeed the case, we cannot recognize the truth predicate as such within the same IF language, and the need for Tarskian truth remains. In addition to IF logic, also second-order logic and Saul Kripke s approach using Kleenean logic will be shown to fail in a similar fashion.

Poetics of Subjectivity : Existence and Expressivity in Simone de Beauvoir's Philosophy

In the last thirty years, primarily feminist scholars have drawn attention to and re-evaluated the philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir (1908 1986). Her philosophical practice has been described as non-systematic, and her literary writing has been viewed as part of her non-systematic mode of philosophising. This dissertation radically deepens the question concerning Beauvoir s philosophical motivations for turning to literature as a mode to express subjectivity. It explicates the central concepts of Beauvoir s philosophy of existence, which are subjectivity, ambiguity, paradox and temporality, and their background in the modern traditions of existential philosophy and phenomenology. It also clarifies Beauvoir s main reason to turn to literature in order to express subjectivity as both singular and universal: as a specific mode of communication, literature is able to make the universality of existence manifest in the concrete, singular and temporal texture of life. In addition, the thesis gives examples of how Beauvoir s literary works contribute to an understanding of the complexity of subjectivity. I use the expression poetics of subjectivity to refer to the systematic relation between Beauvoir s existential and phenomenological notion of subjectivity and her literary works, and to her articulations of a creative mode of using language, especially in the novel. The thesis is divided into five chapters, of which the first three investigate Beauvoir s philosophy of existence at the intersection of the modern traditions of thought that began with René Descartes and Søren Kierkegaard s intuitions about subjectivity. Chapter 1 interprets Beauvoir s notion of ambiguity, as compared to paradox, and argues that both determine her notion of existence. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the phenomenological side of Beauvoir s philosophy through a study of her response to early French interpretations of transcendental subjectivity, especially in the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. My analysis shows that Edmund Husserl s distinction between different levels of subjective experience is central to Beauvoir s understanding of subjectivity and to the different ego concepts she uses. Chapter 4 is a study of Beauvoir s reflections on the expression of subjective thought, and, more specifically, her philosophical conceptions of the metaphysical novel and the autobiography as two modes of indirect communication. Chapter 5, finally, compares two modes of investigating concrete subjectivity; Beauvoir s conceptual study of femininity in Le deuxième sexe and her literary expression of subjectivity in the novel L Invitée. My analysis reveals and explicates Beauvoir s original contribution to a comprehensive understanding of the becoming and paradox of human existence: the fundamental insight that these phenomena are sexed, historically as well as imaginatively.

Development of a structured program for conversion to prenex normal form

The method of structured programming or program development using a top-down, stepwise refinement technique provides a systematic approach for the development of programs of considerable complexity. The aim of this paper is to present the philosophy of structured programming through a case study of a nonnumeric programming task. The problem of converting a well-formed formula in first-order logic into prenex normal form is considered. The program has been coded in the programming language PASCAL and implemented on a DEC-10 system. The program has about 500 lines of code and comprises 11 procedures.

Constructions and situations : a constructivist reading of Hegel's System

The object of this work is Hegel's Logic, which comprises the first third of his philosophical System that also includes the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. The work is divided into two parts, where the first part investigates Hegel s Logic in itself or without an explicit reference to rest of Hegel's System. It is argued in the first part that Hegel's Logic contains a methodology for constructing examples of basic ontological categories. The starting point on which this construction is based is a structure Hegel calls Nothing, which I argue to be identical with an empty situation, that is, a situation with no objects in it. Examples of further categories are constructed, firstly, by making previous structures objects of new situations. This rule makes it possible for Hegel to introduce examples of ontological structures that contain objects as constituents. Secondly, Hegel takes also the very constructions he uses as constituents of further structures: thus, he is able to exemplify ontological categories involving causal relations. The final result of Hegel's Logic should then be a model of Hegel s Logic itself, or at least of its basic methods. The second part of the work focuses on the relation of Hegel's Logic to the other parts of Hegel's System. My interpretation tries to avoid, firstly, the extreme of taking Hegel's System as a grand metaphysical attempt to deduce what exists through abstract thinking, and secondly, the extreme of seeing Hegel's System as mere diluted Kantianism or a second-order investigation of theories concerning objects instead of actual objects. I suggest a third manner of reading Hegel's System, based on extending the constructivism of Hegel's Logic to the whole of his philosophical System. According to this interpretation, transitions between parts of Hegel's System should not be understood as proofs of any sort, but as constructions of one structure or its model from another structure. Hence, these transitions involve at least, and especially within the Philosophy of Nature, modelling of one type of object or phenomenon through characteristics of an object or phenomenon of another type, and in the best case, and especially within the Philosophy of Spirit, transformations of an object or phenomenon of one type into an object or phenomenon of another type. Thus, the transitions and descriptions within Hegel's System concern actual objects and not mere theories, but they still involve no fallacious deductions.

The Deve­lop­ment of Leibniz’s Con­si­de­ra­tions in John Yench’s Pro­ject

The purpose of the article is to present John Yench’s a priori language as a continuation of Leibniz’s idea. Before I proceed to show the project of the Inter-Disciplinary International Reference Language, I would like to discuss the development of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s view on artificial languages. I will try to show the evolution of Leibniz’s universal language: from its ideal conception to a tool which formalizes the whole of human knowledge. Also, I will show Leibniz’s influence on further ideas of artificial language. I will compare his projects with Yench’s language – Idirl. An analysis of Idirl’s main assumptions will be useful to show the degree of continuation of Leibniz’s ideas in the a priori language of John Yench.

Simultaneously multiply-configurable or superposed molecular logic systems composed of ICT (internal charge transfer) chromophores and fluorophores integrated with one- or two-ion receptors

Integrated "ICT chromophore-receptor" systems show ion-induced shifts in their electronic absorption spectra. The wavelength of observation can be used to reversibly configure the system to any of the four logic operations permissible with a single input (YES, NOT, PASS 1, PASS 0), under conditions of ion input and transmittance output. We demonstrate these with dyes integrated into Tsien's calcium receptor, 1-2. Applying multiple ion inputs to 1-2 also allows us to perform two- or three-input OR or NOR operations. The weak fluorescence output of 1 also shows YES or NOT logic depending on how it is configured by excitation and emission wavelengths. Integrated "receptor(1)-ICT chromophore-receptor(2)" systems 3-5 selectively target two ions into the receptor terminals. The ion-induced transmittance output of 3-5 can also be configured via wavelength to illustrate several logic types including, most importantly, XOR. The opposite effects of the two ions on the energy of the chromophore excited state is responsible for this behaviour. INHIBIT and REVERSE IMPLICATION are two of the other logic types seen here. Integration of XOR logic with a preceding OR operation can be arranged by using three ion inputs. The fluorescence output of these systems can be configured via wavelength to display INHIBIT or NOR logic under two-input conditions. The superposition or multiplicity of logic gate configurations is an unusual consequence of the ability to simultaneously observe multiple wavelengths.

Bright Molecules for Sensing, Computing and Imaging: A Tale of Two Once-troubled Cities

The circumstances in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and in Belfast, Northern Ireland, which led to a) the generalization of luminescent PET (photoinduced electron transfer) sensing/switching as a design tool, b) the construction of a market-leading blood electrolyte analyzer and c) the invention of molecular logic-based computation as an experimental field, are delineated. Efforts to extend the philosophy of these approaches into issues of small object identification, nanometric mapping, animal visual perception and visual art are also outlined.

The association of faculty's teaching philosophy and teaching behaviour, and critical thinking and self- direction in learning

The intent in this study was to investigate in what ways teachers· beliefs about education and teaching are expressed in the specific teaching behaviours they employ, and whether teaching behaviours, as perceived by their students, are correlated with students· critical thinking and self-directed learning. To this end the relationships studied were: among faCUlty members· philosophy of teaching, locus of control orientation, psychological type, and observed teaching behaviour; and among students· psychological type, perceptions of teaching behaviour, self-directed learning readiness, and critical thinking. The overall purpose of the study was to investigate whether the implicit goals of higher education, critical thinking and self-direction, were actually accounted for in the university classroom. The research was set within the context of path-goal theory, adapted from the leadership literature. Within this framework, Mezirow·s work on transformative learning, including the influences of Habermas· writings, was integrated to develop a theoretical perspective upon which to base the research methodology. Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies were incorporated. Four faCUlty and a total of 142 students participated in the study. Philosophy of teaching was described through faCUlty interviews and completion of a repertory grid. Faculty completed a descriptive locus of control scale, and a psychological type test. Observations of their teaching behaviour were conducted. Students completed a Teaching Behaviour Assessment Scale, the Self-Directed Learning Readiness Scale, a psychological type test, and the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal. A small sample of students were interviewed. Follow-up discussions with faculty were used to validate the interview, observation, teaching behaviour, and repertory grid data. Results indicated that some discrepancies existed between faculty's espoused philosophy of teaching and their observed teaching behaviour. Instructors' teaching behaviour, however, was a function of their personal theory of practice. Relationships were found between perceived teaching behaviour and students· self-directed learning and critical thinking, but these varied across situations, as would be predicted from path-goal theory. Psychological type of students and instructor also accounted for some of the variability in the relationships studied. Student psychological type could be shown as a partial predictor of self-directed learning readiness. The results were discussed in terms of theory development and implications for further research and practice.