Optimal taxation without state-contingent debt

To recover a version of Barro's (1979) `random walk'tax smoothing outcome, we modify Lucas and Stokey's (1983) economyto permit only risk--free debt. This imparts near unit root like behaviorto government debt, independently of the government expenditureprocess, a realistic outcome in the spirit of Barro's. We showhow the risk--free--debt--only economy confronts the Ramsey plannerwith additional constraints on equilibrium allocations thattake the form of a sequence of measurability conditions.We solve the Ramsey problem by formulating it in terms of a Lagrangian,and applying a Parameterized Expectations Algorithm tothe associated first--order conditions. The first--order conditions andnumerical impulse response functions partially affirmBarro's random walk outcome. Though the behaviors oftax rates, government surpluses, and government debts differ, allocationsare very close for computed Ramsey policies across incomplete and completemarkets economies.

Le code noir : opéra-comique en trois actes / paroles de M. E. Scribe, musique de M. Clapisson...

Collection : Répertoire dramatique des auteurs contemporains ; N° 212

Optimal information transmission in organizations: Search and congestion

We propose a stylized model of a problem-solving organization whoseinternal communication structure is given by a fixed network. Problemsarrive randomly anywhere in this network and must find their way to theirrespective specialized solvers by relying on local information alone.The organization handles multiple problems simultaneously. For this reason,the process may be subject to congestion. We provide a characterization ofthe threshold of collapse of the network and of the stock of foatingproblems (or average delay) that prevails below that threshold. We buildupon this characterization to address a design problem: the determinationof what kind of network architecture optimizes performance for any givenproblem arrival rate. We conclude that, for low arrival rates, the optimalnetwork is very polarized (i.e. star-like or centralized ), whereas it islargely homogenous (or decentralized ) for high arrival rates. We also showthat, if an auxiliary assumption holds, the transition between these twoopposite structures is sharp and they are the only ones to ever qualify asoptimal.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Report on applying agreed-upon procedures to the City of Protivin’s certification of compliance with Chapter 388.10 of the Code of Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2008

Report on applying agreed-upon procedures to the City of Protivin’s certification of compliance with Chapter 388.10 of the Code of Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2008

Report on applying agreed-upon procedures to the City of Protivin’s certification of compliance with Chapter 388.10 of the Code of Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2007

Report on applying agreed-upon procedures to the City of Protivin’s certification of compliance with Chapter 388.10 of the Code of Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2007

Iowa Department of Transportation Fiscal Year 2008 Report of Savings by Using Video Conferencing Through Iowa Communications Network to the Iowa General Assembly Pursuant to Iowa Code § II 84 Acts and Joint Resolutions Enacted at the 1994 Regular Session of the 75th General Assembly of the State of Iowa Iowa Code §8D.10 Report of Savings by State Agencies

Iowa Code § 8D.10 requires certain state agencies prepare an annual report to the General Assembly certifying the identified savings associated with that state agency’s use of the Iowa Communications Network (ICN). This report covers estimated cost savings related to video conferencing via ICN for the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT). In FY 2008, the DOT did not conduct any sessions utilizing ICN’s video conferencing system. Therefore, no cost savings were calculated for this report.

Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement

When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design of the object being procured affects the resulting degree of competition. This paper highlights the interaction between theoptimal procurement mechanism and the design choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the sponsor's design choice, instead of homogenizingthe market to generate competition, promotes heterogeneity.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.