Reflection of matter waves in potential structures

In this paper the behavior of matter waves in suddenly terminated potential structures is investigated numerically. It is shown that there is no difference between a fully quantum mechanical treatment and a semiclassical one with regards to energy redistribution. For the quantum case it is demonstrated that there can be substantial reflection at the termination. The neglect of backscattering by the semiclassical method brings about major differences in the case of low kinetic energies. A simple phenomenological model is shown to partially explain the observed backscattering using dynamics of reduced dimensionality.

Wickedness, Governance and Collective Sanctions: : Can Corruption be Tamed?

Tackling a problem requires mostly, an ability to read it, conceptualize it, represent it, define it, and then applying the necessary mechanisms to solve it. This may sound self-evident except when the problem to be tackled happens to be “complex, “ “ill-structured,” and/or “wicked.” Corruption is one of those kinds of problems. Both in its global and national manifestations it is ill-structured. Where it is structural in nature, endemic and pervasive, it is perhaps even wicked. Qualities of the kind impose modest expectations regarding possibilities of any definitive solution to this insidious phenomenon. If so, it may not suffice to address the problem of corruption using existing categories of law and/or good governance, which overlook the “long-term memory” of the collective and cultural specific dimensions of the subject. Such socio-historical conditions require focusing on the interactive and self-reproducing networks of corruption and attempting to ‘subvert’ that phenomenon’s entire matrix. Concepts such as collective responsibility, collective punishment and sanctions are introduced as relevant categories in the structural, as well as behavioral, subversion of some of the most prevalent aspects of corruption. These concepts may help in the evolving of a new perspective on corruption fighting strategies.

Corruption, governance and collective sanctions: : can a wicked problem be tamed?

Tackling a problem requires mostly, an ability to read it, conceptualize it, represent it, define it, and then applying the necessary mechanisms to solve it. This may sound self-evident except when the problem to be tackled happens to be “complex, “ “ill-structured,” and/or “wicked.” Corruption is one of those kinds of problems. Both in its global and national manifestations it is ill-structured. Where it is structural in nature, endemic and pervasive, it is perhaps even wicked. Qualities of the kind impose modest expectations regarding possibilities of any definitive solution to this insidious phenomenon. If so, it may not suffice to address the problem of corruption using existing categories of law and/or good governance, which overlook the “long-term memory” of the collective and cultural specific dimensions of the subject. Such socio-historical conditions require focusing on the interactive and self-reproducing networks of corruption and attempting to ‘subvert’ that phenomenon’s entire matrix. Concepts such as collective responsibility, collective punishment and sanctions are introduced as relevant categories in the structural, as well as behavioral, subversion of some of the most prevalent aspects of corruption. These concepts may help in the evolving of a new perspective on corruption fighting strategies.

Effect Of Different Hydrological Model Structures On The Assimilation Of Distributed Uncertain Observations

The reliable evaluation of the flood forecasting is a crucial problem for assessing flood risk and consequent damages. Different hydrological models (distributed, semi-distributed or lumped) have been proposed in order to deal with this issue. The choice of the proper model structure has been investigated by many authors and it is one of the main sources of uncertainty for a correct evaluation of the outflow hydrograph. In addition, the recent increasing of data availability makes possible to update hydrological models as response of real-time observations. For these reasons, the aim of this work it is to evaluate the effect of different structure of a semi-distributed hydrological model in the assimilation of distributed uncertain discharge observations. The study was applied to the Bacchiglione catchment, located in Italy. The first methodological step was to divide the basin in different sub-basins according to topographic characteristics. Secondly, two different structures of the semi-distributed hydrological model were implemented in order to estimate the outflow hydrograph. Then, synthetic observations of uncertain value of discharge were generated, as a function of the observed and simulated value of flow at the basin outlet, and assimilated in the semi-distributed models using a Kalman Filter. Finally, different spatial patterns of sensors location were assumed to update the model state as response of the uncertain discharge observations. The results of this work pointed out that, overall, the assimilation of uncertain observations can improve the hydrologic model performance. In particular, it was found that the model structure is an important factor, of difficult characterization, since can induce different forecasts in terms of outflow discharge. This study is partly supported by the FP7 EU Project WeSenseIt.

Anti-money laundering and governance in Latin America

This paper is designed to provide a first approach to some questions raised by the Global administrative Law Project concerning the anti money laundering system, as a global governance project, and how it works in Latin America. We address some interactions between actors at the global, regional and local level. So we have organized our presentation according to those three spaces: 1) global standards, 2) regional efforts and 3) national experiences, where we present the contrast between Brazil and Argentina.

Cooperação e multi-level governance: o caso do Grande Recife Consórcio de Transporte Metropolitano

As primeiras regiões metropolitanas brasileiras foram instituídas de maneira vertical e autoritária como parte da estratégia de desenvolvimento nacional promovida pelo governo militar. Percebidas como instituições não-democráticas e rejeitadas como possível quarto ente federativo, as regiões metropolitanas, desde a Constituição de 1988, foram gradualmente esvaziadas dos seus propósitos originais. Em sua orfandade, os problemas socioeconômicos proliferaram e foram acentuados, e passaram a predominar relações intergovernamentais competitivas em vez de cooperativas. Um dos principais desafios enfrentados pelo modelo federalista brasileiro, em especial quando se trata destas regiões, está relacionado à necessidade de estabelecer maior cooperação e coordenação, tidas como imprescindíveis para garantir um relacionamento mais equilibrado entre os entes federativos, assim como para a efetiva implementação de políticas de enfrentamento das desigualdades e exclusão social nas aglomerações urbanas. Este trabalho analisa o Grande Recife Consórcio Metropolitano de Transportes (CMT), empresa pública multifederativa estabelecida em 2008 entre os governos municipais e estadual da Região Metropolitana de Recife (RMR). Responsável pelo planejamento, gestão e implementação compartilhada da política de transporte público coletivo na RMR, o Grande Recife se tornou realidade com a aprovação e regulamentação da Lei Federal nº 11.107 de 2005, conhecida como a Lei de Consórcios Públicos. O Grande Recife é uma experiência pioneira e inovadora, demonstrando que é possível encontrar uma maneira de superar conflitos e desafios comuns e, ao mesmo tempo, garantir a preservação da autonomia de cada ente, bem como os direitos cidadãos. Neste trabalho consideramos essa experiência de cooperação intergovernamental como um exemplo de multi-level governance (MLG), uma vez que é ilustrativa de um novo arranjo institucional democrático entre distintas esferas governamentais para a gestão compartilhada de um serviço público.

O controle externo sobre as agências reguladoras de Estado : limites e (im)possibilidades

Com a criação das primeiras entidades reguladoras de infraestrutura, década de 90, surgiu uma nova maneira estratégica de o Estado atuar com intuito de melhorar a governança pública. O Estado brasileiro, que era responsável direto pelo desenvolvimento econômico e social, buscou se redefinir frente ao modelo de entidades reguladoras que emergia. Em decorrência dessa nova fisionomia estatal, a descentralização funcional ganhou ênfase resultando no aparecimento de estruturas mais flexíveis e autônomas sob a natureza de direito público com a finalidade de atuar em setores típicos de Estado. Assim, foram criadas as primeiras agências reguladoras brasileiras com objetivo de normatizar, incentivar e regular setores essenciais à sociedade. Por consequência de tais inovações, diversas áreas administrativas tiveram de serem adaptadas, sobretudo as relacionadas à atividade de controle no âmbito administrativo. Para tanto, tornou-se necessário conciliar, dentro de um escopo sistematizado, mecanismos capazes de atender as demandas oriundas do recente Estado regulador brasileiro. Com efeito, a função controle adquire relevo no sentido de evitar que tais agências reguladoras apartem-se de limites impostos por lei ou de que divirjam de suas missões institucionais. Assim, o presente trabalho investiga a atuação do controle externo exercido pelo Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU) no desempenho das agências reguladoras de Estado. Diante de o assunto permear várias áreas epistemológicas, entende-se que abordá-lo sob o enfoque interdisciplinar pode estender em contribuições sobre o objeto investigado. Nesse contexto, esta dissertação visa incorporar, também, outras áreas de conhecimento. Longe de defender um isomorfismo para o arranjo regulatório brasileiro ou de promover uma saída paradigmática, esta pesquisa busca, com amparo na metodologia qualitativa e sob os enfoques exploratórios e descritivos, reunir conhecimentos e constatações no sentido de propiciar maior aproximação acerca do assunto e concorrer para o delineamento de diretrizes futuras do controle externo sobre a regulação brasileira. Destaca-se que tanto a regulação como o controle sobre o ambiente regulatório são assuntos que se encontram em desenvolvimento no contexto brasileiro, o que enseja a pertinência desta pesquisa. Em face do exposto, esta dissertação visa investigar o estado atual do controle exercido pelo TCU sobre o desempenho nas agências reguladoras de Estado – infraestrutura - com intuito de analisar e promover um debate sobre limites e (im)possibilidades dessa atuação.

Análise dos aspectos envolvidos na condução de contratos de terceirização de tecnologia da informação

Terceirização de Serviços de Tecnologia da Informação (TI) é uma prática crescente entre organizações de diversos portes e setores, onde uma relação entre contratante e contratado usualmente regida por contratos. Contratos são dispositivos destinados a regular obrigações e direitos entre as partes. Em função da impossibilidade das partes preverem todas as contingências futuras e também devido à imprecisão da linguagem escrita, contratos são usualmente reconhecidos em Economia como sendo fundamentalmente incompletos. Disso se origina a possibilidade de classificar contratos como predominantemente formais, aqueles cuja estrutura escrita apresenta mecanismos de completude suficiente para conduzir o relacionamento entre as partes, e predominantemente relacionais, aqueles cuja estrutura formal é insuficiente para coordenar o relacionamento, e que demandam mecanismos adicionais de comunicação e interação para que o relacionamento entre as partes ocorra de adequadamente em torno do objeto contratado. Dentre os mecanismos usados em contratos formais para sinalizar às partes os comportamentos desejados, inclui-se a estrutura de incentivos. Pouco se estudou sobre o efeito que a combinação de estruturas de incentivos e mecanismos relacionais tem sobre o andamento dos contratos. Este estudo analisa os efeitos de mecanismos formais de estruturas de incentivos e os mecanismos relacionais sobre o andamento do contrato, usando como contexto o cenário de contratações de serviços de terceirização de Tecnologia da Informação (TI). Como resultados dos três capítulos principais deste estudo, configurados no formato de artigos acadêmicos, são apresentados altos poderes explicativos das interações entre estruturas de incentivos, governança relacional, comportamento do contratado e expectativa de sucesso dos contratos. Da mesma forma, antecedentes e resultantes são analisados e discutidos. Do ponto de vista da contribuição para a prática gerencial, o trabalho como um todo contribui para melhorar decisões de contratação de serviços de TI, formulação de contratos mais efetivos, e apoio na escolha dos mecanismos de contratação mais adequados ao contexto do contratante.

The implementation of corporate governance in Germany and Brazi l: a comparative case study

The recent promotion of best corporate governance standards by several different government institutions and non-for profit organizations resulted in the implementation of more sophisticated governance mechanisms. As consequence to the separation of ownership and control the concept of agency theory arose. Agency theory argues that without out proper control mechanism managers would behave exploit owners due to information asymmetry. Regulators have promoted corporate governance mechanisms in order to address this issue. This paper aims to contrast the implementation of best corporate governance practices in Germany and Brazil on the example of two practical examples. With this purpose in mind, this paper analyzed two companies listed in the main stock exchange in Germany and Brazil throughout a period of 5 years. In order to measure the degree of corporate governance practices implemented 3 different parameters have been chosen. In line with great part of the literature the parameters considered to be relevant are; composition, procedures and deviation from the local corporate governance code. The comparison of the data revealed that board composition in the two analyzed companies is similar regarding the proportion of independent representatives but does distinguish in size. While committees are related to the same topics it can be implied that Natura’s board is more involved in the actual management of the company. Lastly, Beiersdorf has been able to comply to a larger extend with the recommendations of the local German code than Natura to the recommendations published by Brazilian code of the IBGC.

Corporate governance development in privately held family businesses: a multiple case analysis

The objective of this study is to better understand and illustrate the process and the motivations for corporate governance implementation in Brazilian privately held family businesses. Three case companies were analyzed through an adapted developmental framework to illustrate the progression in corporate governance in response to changes in the ownership, investment and management dimensions over time. In this development, causal relationships between corporate governance and the three other framework dimensions were identified. It was found that the analyzed companies´ corporate governance implementation was motivated by the need to curb agency costs, whereas a cornerstone in this development was the first generational change. Only after the family businesses have reached the necessary maturity on all three dimensions, corporate governance practices were implemented. Put simply, the analyzed case companies developed formal systems as they grew more complex. This study complements the academic discussions on corporate governance in family businesses by offering Brazilian evidence on its underlying motivations and sequential implementation over time.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

Controles sobre o Judiciário geram governança e eficiência? Estudo sobre o CNJ e a Justiça Estadual

O objetivo desta tese é investigar a atuação do órgão de controle judicial no Poder Judiciário, focando na dimensão “Desempenho Administrativo Judicial”. Esta tese visa complementar o modelo de Taylor (2008) adicionando o CNJ como um elemento da melhoria do desempenho dos tribunais, por meio da implantação de ferramentas gerenciais e ocasionando impactos políticos e institucionais. O estudo se apoia no contexto político e organizacional do Judiciário para apresentar um complemento ao entendimento vigente sobre os mecanismos de mensuração de desempenho. Os impactos do CNJ foram analisados a partir de sete aspectos do processo de Reforma do Judiciário: 1. Padronização das estruturas; 2. Sistemas de gerenciamento centralizados; 3. Padronização de procedimentos internos; 4. Centralização orçamentária; 5. Financiamento de unidades judiciais; 6. Procedimentos disciplinar contra irregularidades e más condutas de magistrados; 7. Critérios meritocráticos e promoção de magistrados. Os dados foram coletados por meio de entrevistas estruturadas com ex-conselheiros e conselheiros atuais do CNJ e considerou os dez anos de existência do CNJ (2004-2013), fornecendo uma perspectiva longitudinal. A análise temática ou categorial foi escolhida como a principal da técnica de análise de conteúdo. Os dados foram segmentados por questões, por categorias prévias e por categorias estabelecidas posteriormente. Foi evidenciado que o CNJ apresenta um efeito direto de atuação no “Desempenho Administrativo Judicial”: i) usando ferramentas de gestão que permitem os tribunais aprimorar a organização interna e elevar o nível de maturidade de governança; ii) moralizando e fiscalizando os Tribunais por meio de inspeções frequentes realizadas pela Corregedoria Nacional de Justiça que objetiva a resolução das irregularidades e o afastamento dos magistrados com más condutas no exercício do cargo. As evidências identificaram também impactos indiretos: i) o CNJ como um coordenador de ações do Judiciário, articulando melhor as relações com os representantes do Executivo e do Legislativo na obtenção de mais recursos orçamentários e financeiros para os tribunais; ii) o CNJ aumenta a autonomia do Judiciário reconhecendo os esforços de gestão dos tribunais e compartilhando as melhores práticas com os outros tribunais, com impactos na melhoria de infraestrutura e no desempenho. O aumento de controle promovido pelo CNJ reforçou a governança e a eficiência dos tribunais, mas com perca de autonomia num primeiro momento. Por outro lado, num segundo momento, possibilitou uma mudança de perfil nas indicações de seus conselheiros numa tentativa de enfraquecer o controle e aumentar autonomia dos tribunais.

Financial governance: the Brazilian experience on prudential regulation and its impacts on the effects of the 2008 financial crisis

The Brazilian economy was severely hit by the 2008 crisis. In the beginning of the crisis, the vast majorities of the economic agents and authorities thought that Brazil could face some sort of decoupling since some macroeconomic fundamentals were very good. What we saw, however, was that the Brazilian economy was not decoupled, and expectations faced a huge deterioration soon after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 15th. Two aspects regarding the impact of crisis in Brazil, however, deserve a great deal of attention: (a) although deep, the impact did not last for a long time. Actually, the GDP growth experienced a good recovery in the second quarter of 2009, showing that the health of the Brazilian economy was good; (b) the Brazilian banking system performed very well during the crisis, although we cannot say the system was not in danger in the worst time of the crisis. In spite of the confidence crisis faced by the banking system 1, it showed a great deal of resilience. In this aspect, we argue that the restructure faced by the banking system in the aftermath of the Real Plan, as well as the development of a solid supervision regulation helped a lot the system to avoid the systemic crisis that was an open possibility to the Brazilian banking system in the end of 2008. These notes, thus, discusse why the Brazilian banking system performed pretty well in the 2008 financial crisis and how the Brazilian banking (and prudential) regulation can be taken as responsible for this good performance. More specifically, the paper back to the middle of the 1990s, when the Real Plan was implemented, in order to understand the role played by the restructuring of the Brazilian financial system in helping to pave the way to the great resilience experienced by the Brazilian banking system during the 2008 crisis. More specifically, the prudential regulation that was implemented in Brazil in the aftermath of the Real Plan seems to play a decisive role in the resilience of the system nowadays.

A note on Brazilian financial regulation and governance

The question posed by Theme 4 of this workshop is indeed a very broad one and would demand a thorough research on the topics involved. I am afraid I did not have the proper time to think it over and I would not be able to provide a wide ranging answer to this question. Thus, I will be selective and I will present the following issues that need to be addressed to support Brazilian development: i) competition among banks; ii) high rate of interest on liquidity; iii) approval by the Congress of a Complementary Law to regulate the financial sector as required by the 1988 Brazilian Constitution; iv) exploitation of workers through the governance of the Job Time Guarantee Fund (FGTS) and iv) state-owned versus government owned enterprises.

Direct Observation of Tetragonal Distortion in Epitaxial Structures through Secondary Peak Split in a Synchrotron Radiation Renninger Scan

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)