The optimal behaviour of firms facing stochastic costs

This paper aims at assessing the optimal behavior of a firm facing stochastic costs of production. In an imperfectly competitive setting, we evaluate to what extent a firm may decide to locate part of its production in other markets different from which it is actually settled. This decision is taken in a stochastic environment. Portfolio theory is used to derive the optimal solution for the intertemporal profit maximization problem. In such a framework, splitting production between different locations may be optimal when a firm is able to charge different prices in the different local markets.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

Resum de la tasca realitzada al Center Biomedical Engineering (CBE) del Massachussets Institute of Technology (MIT). Juliol-Agost 2005

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada al Center Biomedical Engineering (CBE) del Massachussets Institute of Technology (MIT), durant els mesos de juliol i agost del 2005. S’investiga una metodologia amb l’objectiu d’obtenir biomaterials que puguin actuar de bastida en la interfície os/cartílag, afavorint la diferenciació i creixement cel·lular de cartílag ossificat que pugui actuar d’unió entre l’articulació i l’os. S’experimenta una metodologia per a establir quins són els péptids afavoridors de la formació de teixit ossi utilitzats en materials d’hidroxiapatita. Es conclou que la tecnologia desenvolupada permet disposar d’una plataforma per assajar l’estudi del signaling sobre cèl·lules embrionàries, que permeti desenvolupar materials amb més capacitat diferenciadora.

The third order Melnikov function of a quadratic center under quadratic perturbation

We study quadratic perturbations of the integrable system (1+x)dH; where H =(x²+y²)=2: We prove that the first three Melnikov functions associated to the perturbed system give rise at most to three limit cycles.

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.

Is sociality driven by the costs of dispersal or the benefits of philopatry? A role for kin-discrimination mechanisms.

The role of ecological constraints in promoting sociality is currently much debated. Using a direct-fitness approach, we show this role to depend on the kin-discrimination mechanisms underlying social interactions. Altruism cannot evolve under spatially based discrimination, unless ecological constraints prevent complete dispersal. Increasing constraints enhances both the proportion of philopatric (and thereby altruistic) individuals and the level of altruistic investments conceded in pairwise interactions. Familiarity-based discrimination, by contrast, allows philopatry and altruism to evolve at significant levels even in the absence of ecological constraints. Increasing constraints further enhances the proportion of philopatric (and thereby altruistic) individuals but not the level of altruism conceded. Ecological constraints are thus more likely to affect social evolution in species in which restricted cognitive abilities, large group size, and/or limited period of associative learning force investments to be made on the basis of spatial cues.

The entropy conjecture for partially hyperbolic diffeomorphisms with 1-D center

We prove that if f is a partially hyperbolic diffeomorphism on the compact manifold M with one dimensional center bundle, then the logarithm of the spectral radius of the map induced by f on the real homology groups of M is smaller or equal to the topological entropy of f. This is a particular case of the Shub's entropy conjecture, which claims that the same conclusion should be true for any C1 map on any compact manifold.

Does urban sprawl increase the costs of providing local public services? Evidence from Spanish municipalities

This paper examines the impact of urban sprawl, a phenomenon of particular interest in Spain, which is currently experiencing this process of rapid, low-density urban expansion. Many adverse consequences are attributed to urban sprawl (e.g., traffic congestion, air pollution and social segregation), though here we are concerned primarily with the rising costs of providing local public services. Our initial aim is to develop an accurate measure of urban sprawl so that we might empirically test its impact on municipal budgets. Then, we undertake an empirical analysis using a cross-sectional data set of 2,500 Spanish municipalities for the year 2003 and a piecewise linear function to account for the potentially nonlinear relationship between sprawl and local costs. The estimations derived from the expenditure equations for both aggregate and six disaggregated spending categories indicate that low-density development patterns lead to greater provision costs of local public services.

Why the EU does not Have an Independent Competition Agency: French Interests and Transaction Costs in Early European Integration

A major achievement of new institutionalism in economics and political science is the formalisation of the idea that certain policies are more efficient when administered by a politically independent organisation. Based on this insight, several policy actors and scholars criticise the European Community for relying too much on a multi-task, collegial, and politicised organisation, the European Commission. This raises important questions, some constitutional (who should be able to change the corresponding procedural rules?) and some political-economic (is Europe truly committed to free and competitive markets?). Though acknowledging the relevance of legal and normative arguments, this paper contributes to the debate with a positive political-scientific perspective. Based on the view that institutional equilibria raise the question of equilibrium institutions, it shows that collegiality was (a) an equilibrium institution during the Paris negotiations of 1950-51; and (b) an institutional equilibrium for the following 50 years. The conclusion points to some recent changes in the way that European competition policy is implemented, and discusses how these affect the “constitutional” principle of collegial European governance.

Who Ultimately Bears the Burden of Greater Non-Wage Labour costs?

We investigate the effect of a rise in non-wage labour costs (NWLC) on real anufacturing labour costs in OECD countries, taking into account the degree of coordination in the wage bargaining process. We find that, in countries in which wage bargaining is not highly coordinated, 55% of an increase in NWLC appears to be shifted to workers in the long run, whereas in countries operating under a highly coordinated bargaining regime, full shifting occurs. Overall, our results suggest that high NWLC can be associated with a high equilibrium unemployment rate, but only in those OECD countries that do not have highly coordinated wage bargaining.

Transaction Costs and Institutions

This paper proposes a simple framework for understanding endogenous transaction costs - their composition, size and implications. In a model of diversification against risk, we distinguish between investments in institutions that facilitate exchange and the costs of conducting exchange itself. Institutional quality and market size are determined by the decisions of risk averse agents and conditions are discussed under which the efficient allocation may be decentralized. We highlight a number of differences with models where transaction costs are exogenous, including the implications for taxation and measurement issues.

Distinct neurophysiological mechanisms mediate mixing costs and switch costs.

Using event-related potentials (ERPs), we investigated the neural response associated with preparing to switch from one task to another. We used a cued task-switching paradigm in which the interval between the cue and the imperative stimulus was varied. The difference between response time (RT) to trials on which the task switched and trials on which the task repeated (switch cost) decreased as the interval between cue and target (CTI) was increased, demonstrating that subjects used the CTI to prepare for the forthcoming task. However, the RT on repeated-task trials in blocks during which the task could switch (mixed-task blocks) were never as short as RTs during single-task blocks (mixing cost). This replicates previous research. The ERPs in response to the cue were compared across three conditions: single-task trials, switch trials, and repeat trials. ERP topographic differences were found between single-task trials and mixed-task (switch and repeat) trials at approximately 160 and approximately 310 msec after the cue, indicative of changes in the underlying neural generator configuration as a basis for the mixing cost. In contrast, there were no topographic differences evident between switch and repeat trials during the CTI. Rather, the response of statistically indistinguishable generator configurations was stronger at approximately 310 msec on switch than on repeat trials. By separating differences in ERP topography from differences in response strength, these results suggest that a reappraisal of previous research is appropriate.

Trade Costs, International Competition and Selection: The Effects of Unionisation on Market Size

Within a two-country model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms face firm-specific unions, we study the effects of different forms of trade liberalisation on market structure and competitive selection in the presence of inter-country asymmetries in size and labour market institutions. For given levels of trade openness, an increase in a country’s relative unions’ strength reduces the average productivity of its domestic producers but increases that of its exporters. Whilst an unfavourable union power differential, by increasing wages, weakens a country’s firms’ competitive position, the higher wages reinforce standard market access mechanisms to give rise to aggregate income effects. When the initial levels of trade openness are sufficiently low, this ‘expansionary’ aggregate effect can attract industry in the country with stronger unions and also result in an increase in the extensive margin of exports. For sufficiently large inter-country differences in the bargaining power of unions, trade liberalization can then result in a pro-variety effect, with an increase in the total availability of varieties to consumers in both countries, regardless of there being inter-country differences in size.