Memory in contracts: the experience of the EBRD (1991-2003)

The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory as a screening device in repeated contracts with asymmetric information in financial intermediation. We use an original dataset from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We propose a simple empirical method to capture the role of memory using the client's reputation. Our results unambiguously isolate the dominant effect of memory on the bank's lending decisions over market factors in the case of established clients.

Aproximació a la figura dels Business Angels

Els business angels són persones físiques que inverteixen una part dels seus diners en empreses joves, tot just acabades de crear, en alguns casos fins i tot ajuden a crear-les. El nom d’àngels té el seu origen en els rics filantrops de Nova York que finançaven les obres que s’estrenaven a Broadway. Aquests filantrops invertien els seus diners en una obra de teatre, pel plaer de contribuir a la cultura, molt sovint no arribaven a recuperar mai aquests diners. Els business angels, no són filantrops, inverteixen esperant guanyar diners, però al igual que els àngels de Broadway, els mou alguna cosa més que els diners, ja que està àmpliament documentat que darrera d’aquestes inversions hi ha també raons no financeres, com ara fomentar l’esperit emprenedor o fins i tot la cerca de diversió. Podríem dir que el terme “business angel” es va encunyar a principis dels 80 als EUA, per tant aviat farà 30 anys, no obstant, encara avui, la majoria de catalans no coneixen el significat d’aquest terme. A Catalunya i Espanya anem terriblement retardats en l’estudi i la promoció d’aquesta figura en relació a països com els EUA i el Regne Unit, però també massa enrera en relació a països com Finlàndia, Suècia, Noruega i Alemanya. L’objectiu d’aquest treball és doncs oferir una complerta aproximació a aquesta figura del business angel, una figura que entenem clau en el desenvolupament empresarial i per tant una figura que cal potenciar a tots els nivells. Per tal de contextualitzar aquesta important figura, el treball parteix de l’anàlisi de la relació existent entre emprenedoria i creixement econòmic, s’endinsa després en el capital risc, per presentar finalment qui és i que fa el business angel. El treball intenta també mostrar l’abús d’usos i la inconsistència de les definicions que es donen del terme “business angel” i per tant la gran confusió que tot això genera.

"Periodic crises": Clément Juglar between theories of crises and theories of business cycles

Business cycle theory is normally described as having evolved out of a previous tradition of writers focusing exclusively on crises. In this account, the turning point is seen as residing in Clément Juglar's contribution on commercial crises and their periodicity. It is well known that the champion of this view is Schumpeter, who propagated it on several occasions. The same author, however, pointed to a number of other writers who, before and at the same time as Juglar, stressed one or another of the aspects for which Juglar is credited primacy, including the recognition of periodicity and the identification of endogenous elements enabling the recognition of crises as a self-generating phenomenon. There is indeed a vast literature, both primary and secondary, relating to the debates on crises and fluctuations around the middle of the nineteenth century, from which it is apparent that Juglar's book Des Crises Commerciales et de leur Retour Périodique en France, en Angleterre et aux États-Unis (originally published in 1862 and very much revised and enlarged in 1889) did not come out of the blue but was one of the products of an intellectual climate inducing the thinking of crises not as unrelated events but as part of a more complex phenomenon consisting of recurring crises related to the development of the commercial world - an interpretation corroborated by the almost regular occurrence of crises at about 10-year intervals.

Technology, business models and network structure in the airline industry

Network airlines have been increasingly focusing their operations on hub airports through the exploitation of connecting traffic, allowing them to take advantage of economies of traffic density, which are unequivocal in the airline industry. Less attention has been devoted to airlines? decisions on point-to-point thin routes, which could be served using different aircraft technologies and different business models. This paper examines, both theoretically and empirically, the impact on airlines ?networks of the two major innovations in the airline industry in the last two decades: the regional jet technology and the low-cost business model. We show that, under certain circumstances, direct services on point-to-point thin routes can be viable and thus airlines may be interested in deviating passengers out of the hub.

Did the cooperative start life as a Joint-Stock company? business law and cooperatives in Spain, 1869–1931

Studies of Spanish cooperatives date their spread from the Law on Agrarian Syndicates of 1906. But the first legislative appearance of cooperatives is an 1869 measure that permitted general incorporation for lending companies. The 1931 general law on cooperatives, which was the first act permitting the formation of cooperatives in any activity, reflects the gradual disappearance of the cooperative’s "business" characteristics. In this paper we trace the Spanish cooperative’s legal roots in business law and its connections to broader questions of the freedom of association, the formation of joint-stock enterprises, and the liability of investors in business and cooperative entities. Our account underscores the similarities of the organizational problems approach by cooperatives and business firms, while at the same time respecting the distinctive purposes cooperatives served.

Business plan: PARQUETS, S.A.

Aquest Treball Final de Carrera pretén desenvolupar un Pla de Viabilitat, que garanteixi una millora en la rendibilitat de PARQUETS S.A., una empresa amb més de 40 anys d’existència en el sector de la instal-lació de paviments per al terra. A partir de la realització inicial d’un estudi del mercat, s’ha elaborat un complet anàlisi sobre els punts principals que componen qualsevol Pla de Negoci: el Pla de Marketing, el Pla d’Operacions, el Pla d’Organització i el Pla Econòmic-Financer. A més, amb la realització d’aquest estudi, hem pogut verificar que al mercat hi ha importants economies d’escala que cal aprofitar, i que intervindrien amb èxit amb l’expansió geogràfica, organitzativa i operativa de l’empresa.

Technology, business models and network structure in the airline industry

Network airlines have been increasingly focusing their operations on hub airports through the exploitation of connecting traffic, allowing them to take advantage of economies of traffic density, which are unequivocal in the airline industry. Less attention has been devoted to airlines' decisions on point-to-point thin routes, which could be served using different aircraft technologies and different business models. This paper examines, both theoretically and empirically, the impact on airlines' networks of the two major innovations in the airline industry in the last two decades: the regional jet technology and the low-cost business model. We show that, under certain circumstances, direct services on point-to-point thin routes can be viable and thus airlines may be interested in deviating passengers out of the hub. Keywords: regional jet technology; low-cost business model; point-to-point network; hub-and-spoke network JEL Classi…fication Numbers: L13; L2; L93

Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics

This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively moderate …rst-best level of cronyism within a …firm. The institutional framework of the public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political appointments (such that the subordinate's reappointment is conditioned on the chief's re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme case. JEL classifi…cation: D72, D73, D86. Keywords: Cronyism; Meritocracy; Manager; Bureaucrat; Politician.

Macroeconomic shocks and the business cycle: evidence from a structural factor model

We use a dynamic factor model to provide a semi-structural representation for 101 quarterly US macroeconomic series. We find that (i) the US economy is well described by a number of structural shocks between two and six. Focusing on the four-shock specification, we identify, using sign restrictions, two non-policy shocks, demand and supply, and two policy shocks, monetary and fiscal. We obtain the following results. (ii) Both supply and demand shocks are important sources of fluctuations; supply prevails for GDP, while demand prevails for employment and inflation. (ii) Policy matters, Both monetary and fiscal policy shocks have sizeable effects on output and prices, with little evidence of crowding out; both monetary and fiscal authorities implement important systematic countercyclical policies reacting to demand shocks. (iii) Negative demand shocks have a large long-run positive effect on productivity, consistently with the Schumpeterian "cleansing" view of recessions.

No news in business cycles

This paper uses a structural, large dimensional factor model to evaluate the role of 'news' shocks (shocks with a delayed effect on productivity) in generating the business cycle. We find that (i) existing small-scale VECM models are affected by 'non-fundamentalness' and therefore fail to recover the correct shock and impulse response functions; (ii) news shocks have a limited role in explaining the business cycle; (iii) their effects are in line with what predicted by standard neoclassical theory; (iv) the bulk of business cycle fluctuations are explained by shocks unrelated to technology.

Optimal coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts in labor Markets

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers differ in ability and their competence is revealed after they have worked as juniors in the market. We study the length of the contractual relationships between firms and workers in an environment where the matching between firms and workers is the result of market interaction. We show that, despite in a one-firm-one-worker set-up long-term contracts are the optimal choice for firms, market forces often induce firms to use short-term contracts. Unless the market only consists of firms with very profitable projects, firms operating highly profitable projects offer short-term contracts to ensure the service of high-ability workers and those with less lucrative projects also use short-term contracts to save on the junior workers' wage. Intermediate firms may (or may not) hire workers through long-term contracts.

Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates a trade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificing managerial selection may be optimal at early stages of economic development and when access to information is limited. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increases the return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, where managerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Better institutions, in the form of a richer contracting environment and less severe informational frictions, speed up the transition to short-term relationships.

Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting

This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent. The principal’s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard.