Políticas públicas de igualdad de género en Chile y Costa Rica. Un estudio comparado

La investigación tiene como objetivo central la confección de dos estudios de caso de las políticas de igualdad de Chile y Costa Rica, que enfatizan en sus concepciones de igualdad y estrategias, con el propósito de explicitar las bases conceptuales y programáticas de la igualdad entre mujeres y hombres como problema público. Las políticas de igualdad son relativamente recientes en América Latina y el Caribe. Su desarrollo toma fuerza en la década de los noventa del siglo pasado y son motivadas principalmente por un marco de compromisos y acuerdos supranacionales (mundiales y regionales) de carácter jurídico, que emanan de Convenciones y legislación nacional y político, que derivan de la IV Conferencia Mundial de la Mujer (Beijing 1995) y su Plataforma de Acción, Conferencias Mundiales y Conferencias Regionales. El énfasis se pone en la fase de formulación de las políticas de igualdad, que comprende la definición de su modelo causal y la formulación de su programa de actuación político– administrativo, en concreto el análisis de los objetivos, instrumentos y procesos que deberán ponerse en práctica para el logro de la igualdad entre mujeres y hombres. Para tal efecto y utilizando el estudio de casos como método de investigación, se construyen y analizan los casos de políticas de igualdad de Chile y Costa Rica, tomando como referente una estructura y orientaciones metodológicas similares. El marco conceptual de la investigación profundiza en las definiciones y elementos que caracterizan a las políticas públicas; el género como categoría de análisis; la delimitación y alcance de los conceptos de no discriminación, equidad e igualdad; las definiciones de políticas de igualdad de oportunidades, políticas de equidad de género y políticas de igualdad de género; y la transversalidad de género como estrategia de política pública...

Cambio, Poder y Justicia de Género en la Agenda 2030: Reflexiones para no perdernos en el camino

La igualdad de género como objetivo de desarrollo tiene hoy pleno reconocimiento en la agenda política global, reflejándose en numerosos compromisos pero también en una persistente retóri-ca. Los debates sobre una nueva Agenda 2030 para el desarrollo sostenible debería contribuir a una reflexión crítica sobre cómo acelerar los cambios necesarios para avanzar hacia una mayor justicia social y de género, reafirmando los derechos de las mujeres, y por otro, generar una opor-tunidad más que un riesgo para repensar las dimensiones económicas, sociales, culturales y políti-cas de la transformación hacia un desarrollo sostenible. Frente a estas aspiraciones, surgen una serie de interrogantes que sería necesario despejar. Este documento analiza los avances y desafíos para la realización de los derechos de las mujeres a 20 años de la aprobación e implementación de la Declaración y la Plataforma de Acción de Beijing, y hace un balance de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (ODM) en clave de género para introducirnos en las propuestas que hoy se plant-ean para los próximos 15 años. Finalmente, analiza desde una perspectiva crítica los resultados alcanzados hasta el momento en la definición de una Agenda 2030 de Desarrollo Sostenible, a ser aprobada por la Cumbre de Desarrollo Sostenible en septiembre de 2015. Por último, unas breves reflexiones finales dejan planteadas algunas pistas para no perderse en el camino.

Chinese plan of the city of Peking

T.B. Jervis; the chinese characters and explanations rendered into English were furnished by Mr. Samuel Birch, from a comparison of the above documents and the notes appended to the original by the students in the Missionary College at Naples.

China N-S

[drawn by Erwin Raisz].

The US-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change: Can the G2 make a difference? CEPS Commentary, 26 November 2014

This Commentary finds that the US-China joint declaration on climate change, issued following the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Beijing on November 12th, is undoubtedly an important announcement by the two global economic giants responsible for emitting over 30% of the world’s GHG emissions. As such, it needs to be seen as important and relevant – a very positive development towards a new global climate change agreement in Paris. It is a challenge to those that have announced their pledges and are seen as capable of doing more, as well as to those that have not yet announced their intentions. It shows the importance and success of the UN climate change conference in Warsaw last year, when the decision was made that all Parties should announce their commitments by the first quarter of 2015. It also represents a total breakdown of the Kyoto Protocol-style separation in climate change negotiations between countries into Annex 1 and non-Annex 1, with China signalling that it is taking on the leadership role that comes with being a great economic power. In broader terms, it shows that there is scope for cooperation between the two main economic actors, even in the face of competition in other spheres. It is also a challenge to the EU, which was a leader and needs to show that there is a benefit in maintaining its leadership. Finally, agreements are deemed historic only by history. This one is important, and a potential game-changer, on the face of it. But it needs to live up to its promise. There is sufficient uncertainty for us to withhold final judgement and see if its promise materialises through implementation. But, as sober a judgement as we must make on such important matters, this announcement certainly gives us great hope that it is possible to do what needs to be done, and we must wholeheartedly welcome and applaud it.

China vs. Central Asia. The achievements of the past two decades. OSW Study 45/2013

The collapse of the USSR brought about conditions conducive to the dynamic development of relations between Central Asia and China. These relations have evolved from deep mistrust to the continually growing Chinese presence primarily in the region’s economy but also increasingly in its politics. Central Asia is playing a growing role in those areas of the economy which China sees as strategic (in particular in energy and communications). China’s ambitions and capabilities with regard to new areas and its geopolitical competitors are also being tested here. For the time being, it can be said that China has achieved vast success: its offer is appealing for the region, and Beijing has outpaced its Western rivals and has seriously challenged Russia’s position in the region. It remains, however, an open question whether China will be able to maintain and secure its present achievements and trends, which will be a serious challenge given the eternal instability in the region and Russia’s reintegration ambitions.

Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova and the Chinese economic expansion in Eastern Europe. OSW Commentary No. 79, 2012-05-28

The countries of Eastern European and China have been increasingly interested in deepening bilateral contacts over the past few years. In the case of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova this has been caused by the bad economic situation which was in part caused by the consequences of the global economic crisis of 2008 and the desire to establish closer political relations with a country whose significance on the international arena is continually growing. Each of these countries has different expectations regarding the scale and the nature of co-operation with China. Chisinau wishes only to boost trade, whereas in Minsk and Kyiv, Beijing is also presented as a strategic partner whose investments may not only help the indebted economies recover but also strengthen the position of these countries in their dealings with the EU, and especially with Russia. Beijing sees co-operation with these countries in differently, and its offer is much more modest than Belarus and Ukraine are expecting. Eastern Europe is one of the last parts of the world with which China is activating its co-operation. This is not a priority region for Beijing. China wants to derive economic benefits and to diversify the markets on which it invests its financial surplus, and it does not intend to extend its political dialogue with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova beyond the framework which determines its economic interests. The main reason for this is the nature of relations between Russia and China. Beijing sees its partnership with Moscow as more beneficial, and will not offer these countries support in their relations with Russia since in its opinion they belong to Russia’s sphere of influence. Minsk and Kyiv are pinning too much hope on their co-operation with Beijing, while China offers no real counterbalance to the Russian and EU influences in these countries. Nevertheless, it should be expected that China will capitalise on the beneficial political climate in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova to reinforce its influence in a region whose location will facilitate its expansion to the EU and the Customs Union markets. In the medium term, Beijing may become a major economic player in Eastern Europe. In a decade’s time this may translate into political influence. Meanwhile, in the short term, China’s financial engagement in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova will contribute to increasing the debts and deepening the foreign trade deficits of these countries.

The turn to the East. The flawed diversification of Russian foreign policy. OSW Point of View Number 44, November 2014

The ‘turn to the East’ proclaimed by Russia in 2010 has failed to bring about a fundamental breakthrough in her relations with Asian countries, nor has it produced impulses for the economic modernization of Russia’s Far Eastern territories. Although the energisation of Russian policy towards Asia which has taken place under this slogan has diversified Russian foreign policy somewhat, this diversification has two weak points: Firstly, it has occurred only in the political sphere. The share of Asian countries in Russia’s foreign economic relations has not risen significantly in comparison with the share of European and North American countries. Secondly, the ‘turn to the East’ has turned out primarily to be a turn towards China. In all spheres – diplomatic, economic, energy and military – it is Beijing that has become the most important Asian partner for Moscow. The result is that the policy that aimed to limit the excessive – in the Kremlin’s view – dependence of Russia on the West is likely to turn Russia into a ‘junior partner’ of the People’s Republic of China.

Lessons for the EU from the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Crisis. IES Policy Brief Issue 2013/01 • February 2013

Summary. From April until October 2012, China witnessed a series of public protests against the Japanese purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Besides providing further evidence of growing Chinese nationalism, this unrest is interesting for other reasons relevant to EU policy. The Beijing leadership, which is traditionally perceived as the only source of foreign policy decisions in China, faces a changing domestic constellation. Domestic opinion increasingly constrains Chinese foreign policy, and it becomes obvious that foreign policy decision-making in Beijing is not insulated from larger social developments. Even if foreign policy decisions in China are still made without direct input from civil society, the influence of social forces on Chinese foreign policies has to be taken seriously. The EU thus might want to reconsider its approach to China: as long as EU concerns about human rights are met with a rather uncompromising attitude by the Chinese political elites, Brussels should double its efforts to reach Chinese civil society.

A partial success of trade cooperation within the ‘16+1’ formula: the case of food exports to China. OSW COMMENTARY #189, 2015-10-29

When in 2012 China approached the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with a proposal of cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula, it declared it was willing to meet the needs of CEE countries. Beijing had been aware of the political importance of the problem of trade deficit (which has been ongoing for years) and launched cooperation with the governments of 16 CEE countries to boost imports from these states. The years 2011–2014 brought an improvement in the balance of trade between China and: Hungary, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. The remaining ten CEE countries recorded an increase in their trade deficits. Changes in CEE countries’ balance of trade with China resulted only slightly from political actions. Instead, they were due to the macroeconomic situation and to a deterioration of the debt crisis in the EU which, for example, caused a decline in the import of Chinese goods in some of these countries. Multilateral trade cooperation was successfully developed in the entire region only in the agricultural and food production sector – the area of greatest interest to China. The pace of bilateral cooperation with specific countries varied, with the fastest being Poland, Latvia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Actions by governments of CEE countries resulted in Chinese market opening up to hundreds of local companies which, in turn, translated into an increase in the volume of foodstuffs sold by ‘the 16’ to China from US$ 137 million in 2011 to US$ 400 million in 2014. The success achieved in the agricultural and food production sector has demonstrated the effectiveness of trade cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula. It is, however, insufficient to generate a significant improvement of the trade balance. At present, the sector’s share in the total volume of goods sold to China by CEE states is a mere 3.7%, and any reduction of the trade deficit would require long-term and more comprehensive solutions still to be implemented by the governments of individual CEE states.

China on Russia’s intervention in Syria. OSW Commentary Number 193|19.01.2016

China has reacted positively to Russia’s military intervention in Syria. The Chinese government perceives it as an element of the global fight against terrorism, and has emphasised the fact that Russia was acting in response to a request by the Syrian government. At the same time, Beijing has argued that the Syrian conflict cannot be resolved by military means and that a political compromise is necessary.

Japan and China: Bitter Rivals and Close Partners. Asia Policy Brief 2013/03, June 2013

Japan and China trade a lot between each other. Unfortunately, however, they also argue a lot with each other. Since Tokyo’s purchase of three uninhabited Japanese-controlled islets in the East China Sea from their private owner in September 2012, the main subject of dispute has been that of sovereignty over maritime territories. While bilateral trade amounted to an impressive $333 billion in 2012 (slightly less than in 2011, when bilateral trade reached $345 billion), a bilateral territorial dispute over control and sovereignty of what Tokyo calls Senkaku and Beijing calls the Diaoyu Islands will most probably continue to remain at the very top of the agenda of Sino-Japanese relations in the months ahead.

An essential partner in the background. Europe in China's policy during the rule of Xi Jinping. OSW STUDIES 56 2016

Chinese elites do not treat Europe as an equal partner and are convinced that China holds the upper hand over Europe. They see a growing asymmetry in bilateral relations. China’s sense of its own potential is boosted by internal divisions within the European Union. At the same time, Europe is China’s key economic partner and an ‘economic pillar’ supporting China’s growth on the international stage. Beijing strives to maintain Europe’s open attitude towards the Chinese economy, in particular its exports, technology transfer to China, location of investments and diversification of China’s currency reserves. Cooperation with Europe and support from Europe are necessary to enable China to improve its position in the international economic and financial system, mainly in order to legitimise China’s actions in the area of multilateralism and global governance. Similarly, Beijing attaches great importance to maintaining Europe’s non-involvement in two issues: China’s core interests and Chinese-American relations.

Weishenme Zhongguo zai diyi ci shijie dazhan zhong juyou zhongyao zuoyong 为什么中国在第一次世界大战中具有重要作用 (Why China Played an Important Role in the First World War)

Aufbauend auf dem analytischen Tool des Totalen Krieges (vgl. den Artikel des Autors zu Controversy Total War in 1914-1918-Online) werden im vorliegenden Beitrag die Anstrengungen Chinas im Ersten Weltkrieg zu denjenigen anderer nicht europäischer Länder wie Australien, Südafrika oder Indien in Bezug gesetzt. Dabei wird das Ziel verfolgt, den globalen Charakter eines Konfliktes deutlich zu machen, der zurecht als erster Weltkrieg bezeichnet wird und in welchem China sicherlich eine weit bedeutsamere Rolle spielte, als es gemeinhin in der Historiographie dargestellt wird. Ursprünglich wurde der Beitrag als Antwort auf die Frage konzipiert, warum nicht nur China für eine Globalgeschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges von Bedeutung war. Im Verlauf der Übersetzung wurde der Titel dahingehend angepasst, dass stärker die Bedeutung von Chinas Rolle im Ersten Weltkrieg betont wurde.

Microsatellite genotypic data of Euptelea pleiospermum in STRUCTURE format

We sampled leaves from 678 individuals in 21 natural populations (30-36 individuals per population), covering the entire distribution of Euptelea pleiospermum in China.Total DNA was isolated from about 50 mg powdered leaf tissue following the protocol of a DNA extraction kit (Tiangen Biotech Co., LTD., Beijing, China). We used seven fluorescence-labeled microsatellite loci (EP036, EP059, EP081, EP087, EP091, EP278 and EP294; Zhang et al., 2008) to genotype our 678 DNA samples.