A critical study of John Hick's religious pluralism

This study examines the pluralistic hypothesis advanced by the late Professor John Hick viz. that all religious faiths provide equally salvific pathways to God, irrespective of their theological and doctrinal differences. The central focus of the study is a critical examination of (a) the epistemology of religious experience as advanced by Professor Hick, (b) the ontological status of the being he understands to be God, and further asks (c) to what extent can the pluralistic view of religious experience be harmonised with the experience with which the Christian life is understood to begin viz. regeneration. Tracing the theological journey of Professor Hick from fundamentalist Christian to religious pluralist, the study notes the reasons given for Hick’s gradual disengagement from the Christian faith. In addition to his belief that the pre-scientific worldview of the Bible was obsolete and passé, Hick took the view that modern biblical scholarship could not accommodate traditionally held Christian beliefs. He conceded that the Incarnation, if true, would be decisive evidence for the uniqueness of Christianity, but rejected the same on the grounds of logical incoherence. This study affirms the view that the doctrine of the Incarnation occupies a place of crucial importance within world religion, but rejects the claim of incoherence. Professor Hick believed that God’s Spirit was at work in all religions, producing a common religious experience, or spiritual awakening to God. The soteriological dimension of this spiritual awakening, he suggests, finds expression as the worshipper turns away from self-centredness to the giving of themselves to God and others. At the level of epistemology he further argued that religious experience itself provided the rational basis for belief in God. The study supports the assertion by Professor Hick that religious experience itself ought to be trusted as a source of knowledge and this on the principle of credulity, which states that a person’s claim to perceive or experience something is prima facie justified, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. Hick’s argument has been extensively developed and defended by philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga and William Alston. This confirms the importance of Hick’s contribution to the philosophy of religion, and further establishes his reputation within the field as an original thinker. It is recognised in this thesis, however, that in affirming only the rationality of belief, but not the obligation to believe, Professor Hick’s epistemology is not fully consistent with a Christian theology of revelation. Christian theology views the created order as pre-interpreted and unambiguous in its testimony to God’s existence. To disbelieve in God’s existence is to violate one’s epistemic duty by suppressing the truth. Professor Hick’s critical realist principle, which he regards as the key to understanding what is happening in the different forms of religious experience, is examined within this thesis. According to the critical realist principle, there are realities external to us, yet we are never aware of them as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us within our particular cognitive machinery and conceptual resources. All awareness of God is interpreted through the lens of pre-existing, culturally relative religious forms, which in turn explains the differing theologies within the world of religion. The critical realist principle views God as unknowable, in the sense that his inner nature is beyond the reach of human conceptual categories and linguistic systems. Professor Hick thus endorses and develops the view of God as ineffable, but employs the term transcategorial when speaking of God’s ineffability. The study takes the view that the notion of transcategoriality as developed by Professor Hick appears to deny any ontological status to God, effectively arguing him out of existence. Furthermore, in attributing the notion of transcategoriality to God, Professor Hick would appear to render incoherent his own fundamental assertion that we can know nothing of God that is either true or false. The claim that the experience of regeneration with which the Christian life begins can be classed as a mere species of the genus common throughout all faiths, is rejected within this thesis. Instead it is argued that Christian regeneration is a distinctive experience that cannot be reduced to a salvific experience, defined merely as an awareness of, or awakening to, God, followed by a turning away from self to others. Professor Hick argued against any notion that the Christian community was the social grouping through which God’s Spirit was working in an exclusively redemptive manner. He supported his view by drawing attention to (a) the presence, at times, of comparable or higher levels of morality in world religion, when contrasted with that evidenced by the followers of Christ, and (b) the presence, at times, of demonstrably lower levels of morality in the followers of Christ, when contrasted with the lives of other religious devotees. These observations are fully supported, but the conclusion reached is rejected, on the grounds that according to Christian theology the saving work of God’s Spirit is evidenced in a life that is changing from what it was before. Christian theology does not suggest or demand that such lives at every stage be demonstrably superior, when contrasted with other virtuous or morally upright members of society. The study concludes by paying tribute to the contribution Professor Hick has made to the field of the epistemology of religious experience.

Justice envers les enfants et légitimité politique en éducation

L’idée selon laquelle les enfants sont des sujets à part entière de considérations de justice n’est pas très contestée. Les enfants ont des intérêts qui leur sont propres et ont un statut moral indépendant de leurs parents : ils ne sont ni la propriété de ces derniers ni une simple extension de leur personne. Pourtant, les travaux des plus grands théoriciens de la justice en philosophie politique contemporaine ne contiennent pas de discussion systématique du statut moral et politique des enfants et du contenu de nos obligations à leur égard. Cette thèse contribue à remédier à cette omission à travers l’examen de quatre grandes questions principales. (1) Quelles sont les obligations de justice de l’état libéral envers les enfants ? (2) Quels types de politiques publiques en matière d’éducation des enfants sont moralement légitimes ? (3) Jusqu’à quel point est-il moralement acceptable pour les parents de délibérément forger la vision du monde de leurs enfants ? (4) Quels critères moraux devraient guider l’élaboration de politiques en matière d’éducation morale dans les écoles ? Cette thèse est constituée de quatre articles. Le premier, « Political Liberalism and Children’s Education », aborde les questions du fondement normatif et des implications du principe de ‘neutralité éducative’ ou ‘anti-perfectionnisme éducatif’. Selon ce principe, il n’est pas légitime pour l’État libéral de délibérément promouvoir, à travers ses politiques publiques en éducation, une conception particulière de la vie bonne. L’article défend les idées suivantes. D’abord, ledit principe est exclusivement fondé sur des raisons de justice envers les parents. Ensuite, l’anti-perfectionnisme libéral n’est pas, pour autant, ‘mauvais pour les enfants’, puisqu’une vaste gamme d’interventions politiques dans la vie familiale et l’éducation des enfants sont, de manière surprenante, justifiables dans ce cadre théorique. Le deuxième article, « On the Permissibility of Shaping Children’s Values », examine la question de savoir si les parents ont un droit moral de forger délibérément l’identité, la conception du monde et les valeurs de leurs enfants. L’article développe une critique de la conception anti-perfectionniste des devoirs parentaux et propose un nouvel argument libéral à l’appui d’un droit parental conditionnel de forger l’identité de leurs enfants. L’article introduit également une distinction importante entre les notions d’éducation compréhensive et d’« enrôlement » compréhensif. Le troisième article, « Common Education and the Practice of Liberal Neutrality: The Loyola High School Case », défend trois thèses principales à travers une analyse normative de l’affaire juridique de l’école Loyola. Premièrement, il est légitime pour l’État libéral d’adopter un modèle d’éducation commune fort. Deuxièmement, la thèse selon laquelle la neutralité comme approche éducative serait impossible est injustifiée. Troisièmement, il existe néanmoins de bonnes raisons pour l’État libéral d’accommoder plusieurs écoles religieuses qui rejettent le modèle de la neutralité. Le quatrième article, « Which Moral Issues Should be Taught as Controversial? », critique à la fois le critère ‘épistémique’ dominant pour déterminer quels enjeux moraux devraient être enseignés aux jeunes comme ‘controversés’, et à la fois la manière dont le débat sur l’enseignement des enjeux controversés fut construit au cours des dernières années, d’un point de vue substantiel et méthodologique. L’article propose une manière alternative d’aborder le débat, laquelle prend adéquatement en compte la pluralité des objectifs de l’éducation et un ensemble d’autres considérations morales pertinentes.

What can the philosophy of science contribute to the ethics of science and technology?

Nascida para permitir que seus criadores possam atender suas próprias necessidades, a técnica científica sempre desempenhou papel significativo na civilização humana. Este é o contexto em que podemos vislumbrar o advento da tecnociência moderna, que tem contribuído significativamente para o incremento do controle humano sobre a natureza. Este estudo tem por objetivo analisar, sob o enfoque da bioética, reflexões sobre como a filosofia da ciência entende a neutralidade da ciência e sua convergência com a racionalidade epistêmica, bem como relacionar essas reflexões ao processo de tomada de decisões na administração da tecnociência. O estudo levantou dúvidas sobre a capacidade do conhecimento tecnocientífico para legitimar e justificar as decisões no âmbito dos sistemas de ciência e tecnologia nacionais, sinalizando assim a necessidade de promover ligação entre a auto-regulação tecnocientífico e hetero-regulação bioética. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT

Visual Insight in Geometry

According to a traditional rationalist proposal, it is possible to attain knowledge of certain necessary truths by means of insight—an epistemic mental act that combines the 'presentational' character of perception with the a priori status usually reserved for discursive reasoning. In this dissertation, I defend the insight proposal in relation to a specific subject matter: elementary Euclidean plane geometry, as set out in Book I of Euclid's Elements. In particular, I argue that visualizations and visual experiences of diagrams allow human subjects to grasp truths of geometry by means of visual insight. In the first two chapters, I provide an initial defense of the geometrical insight proposal, drawing on a novel interpretation of Plato's Meno to motivate the view and to reply to some objections. In the remaining three chapters, I provide an account of the psychological underpinnings of geometrical insight, a task that requires considering the psychology of visual imagery alongside the details of Euclid's geometrical system. One important challenge is to explain how basic features of human visual representations can serve to ground our intuitive grasp of Euclid's postulates and other initial assumptions. A second challenge is to explain how we are able to grasp general theorems by considering diagrams that depict only special cases. I argue that both of these challenges can be met by an account that regards geometrical insight as based in visual experiences involving the combined deployment of two varieties of 'dynamic' visual imagery: one that allows the subject to visually rehearse spatial transformations of a figure's parts, and another that allows the subject to entertain alternative ways of structurally integrating the figure as a whole. It is the interplay between these two forms of dynamic imagery that enables a visual experience of a diagram, suitably animated in visual imagination, to justify belief in the propositions of Euclid’s geometry. The upshot is a novel dynamic imagery account that explains how intuitive knowledge of elementary Euclidean plane geometry can be understood as grounded in visual insight.

O Kwaryp de Kanutari : uma abordagem linguística e etnográfica

Tese (doutorado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Letras, Departamento de Linguística, Português e Línguas Clássicas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Linguística, 2015.

SAMPLING BIAS IN EVALUATING THE PROBABILITY OF SEISMICALLY INDUCED SOIL LIQUEFACTION WITH SPT & CPT CASE HISTORIES

Several deterministic and probabilistic methods are used to evaluate the probability of seismically induced liquefaction of a soil. The probabilistic models usually possess some uncertainty in that model and uncertainties in the parameters used to develop that model. These model uncertainties vary from one statistical model to another. Most of the model uncertainties are epistemic, and can be addressed through appropriate knowledge of the statistical model. One such epistemic model uncertainty in evaluating liquefaction potential using a probabilistic model such as logistic regression is sampling bias. Sampling bias is the difference between the class distribution in the sample used for developing the statistical model and the true population distribution of liquefaction and non-liquefaction instances. Recent studies have shown that sampling bias can significantly affect the predicted probability using a statistical model. To address this epistemic uncertainty, a new approach was developed for evaluating the probability of seismically-induced soil liquefaction, in which a logistic regression model in combination with Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic was used. This approach was used to estimate the population (true) distribution of liquefaction to non-liquefaction instances of standard penetration test (SPT) and cone penetration test (CPT) based most updated case histories. Apart from this, other model uncertainties such as distribution of explanatory variables and significance of explanatory variables were also addressed using KS test and Wald statistic respectively. Moreover, based on estimated population distribution, logistic regression equations were proposed to calculate the probability of liquefaction for both SPT and CPT based case history. Additionally, the proposed probability curves were compared with existing probability curves based on SPT and CPT case histories.

Contemplation as philosophical practice : "reason in the sphere of understanding"

This essay seeks to explore the practice of contemplation as a method to cultivate insight into some of the key concerns of philosophy. In our discussion, philosophical contemplation is understood as a phenomenological method that instigates dynamic patterns of understanding(s) of an issue or object. Seen in this light, contemplation involves the cultivation of certain introspective qualities that are central to widening the parameters of attention. It is the contention of this paper that a contemplative approach to philosophical inquiry generates a basis for multi-dimensional understandings that can facilitate the possibility of “doing conceptual justice to the world in all its variety” (Sanders 207). In line with the idea of philosophy as a way of life, contemplation as philosophical practice envisions philosophy not simply as a system of propositions but also as an existential practice that both offers ways of gathering knowledge and that can provide epistemic justification for multiplicity, diversity, and seemingly contradictory modes of thought. From the beginning it is important to note that we are not positing a philosophy of contemplation but, following Russell (1912) and Sherman (2014), we are exploring a contemplative conception of philosophy that is predicated on the classical understanding of philosophy as a way of life with an integral practice component that instigates a mutually enriching union of theory and praxis.

What Does a Domain Analysis Look Like in Form, Function, and Genre?

This article presents an inventory what theorists describe as the definition of domain analysis. Survey writings on and of domain analyses for their distinct attributes and arguments. Compile these components and attributes, linking them to their function, and from there. Describe a proposed ideal form of domain analysis. Evidence that while the debate about the substance and form of the epistemic and ontological character of domain analysis will continue, some might find it useful to give shape to their ideas using a particular form that follows function. If our purpose is to delineate and communicate what it is that we are analyzing when we engage in domain analysis, then I hope this small contribution can be of use.

Extending the Simple Knowledge Organization System for Concept Management in Vocabulary Development Applications

In this article, we describe the development of an exten- sion to the Simple Knowledge Organization System (SKOS) to accommodate the needs of vocabulary devel- opment applications (VDA) managing metadata schemes and requiring close tracking of change to both those schemes and their member concepts. We take a neo- pragmatic epistemic stance in asserting the need for an entity in SKOS modeling to mediate between the abstract concept and the concrete scheme. While the SKOS model sufficiently describes entities for modeling the current state of a scheme in support of indexing and search on the Semantic Web, it lacks the expressive power to serve the needs of VDA needing to maintain scheme historical continuity. We demonstrate prelimi- narily that conceptualizations drawn from empirical work in modeling entities in the bibliographic universe, such as works, texts, and exemplars, can provide the basis for SKOS extension in ways that support more rig- orous demands of capturing concept evolution in VDA.

Forms, Foundations, and the Ethos of Foremost: Zen Practice, Epistemology, and Ontology in Reflective Knowledge Organization

In reflecting on the practice of knowledge organization, we tacitly or explicitly root our conceptions of work and its value in some epistemic and ontological foundation. Zen Buddhist philosophy offers a unique set of conceptions vis-à-vis organizing, indexing, and describing documents.When we engage in knowledge organization, we are setting our mind to work with an intention. We intend to make some sort of intervention. We then create a form a realization of an abstraction (like classes or terms) [1], we do this from a foundation of some set of beliefs (epistemology, ontology, and ethics), and because we have to make decisions about what to privilege, we need to decide what is foremost in our minds. We must ask what is the most important thing?Form, foundation, and the ethos of foremost require evoke in our reflection on work number of ethical, epistemic, and ontological concerns that ripple throughout our conceptions of space, “good work”, aesthetics, and moral mandate [2,3]. We reflect on this.