Taxonomy and evolution of the Sinica group of macaques. 2, Species and subspecies accounts of the Indian bonnet macaque, Macaca radiata / Jack Fooden.

n.s. no.9(1981)

Summer wild flowers / by J. Francis Macbride, Asst. Curator, Taxonomy, Dept. of Botany

no.9(1924)

New information on the Holocystites fauna (Diploporita) of the Middle Silurian of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana / Terrence J. Frest --, Donald G. Mikulic -- and Christopher R. C. Paul --.

v.35:no.6(1977)

A contribution to the taxonomy of aquatic and humicolous beetles of the family Hydraenidae in southern Africa / Philip D. Perkins, J. Balfour-Browne.

n.s. no.77(1994)

On the taxonomy of Latonigena auricomis (Araneae, Gnaphosidae), with notes of geographical distribution and natural history

The male of Latonigena auricomis Simon, 1893 is described for the first time and the female is redescribed. New records are provided for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Notes on the natural history and a potential distribution model of the species are presented in the Neotropical Region.

Taxonomy, distribution and population structure of invasive Corbiculidae (Mollusca, Bivalvia) in the Suquía River basin, Córdoba, Argentina

Invasive species are one of the most significant causes of biodiversity loss and changes in ecosystem services, which underlines the importance of their detection and their study. The Asian clams (Corbiculidae) are invasive organisms that accidentally entered the La Plata River, Argentina, presumably in the 1960s. The objectives of the present study were to identify the corbiculid species and to determine their distribution at several locations along the Suquía River basin, an extended area in central Argentina. In addition, population structure was evaluated monthly during one year, at a site in the city of Córdoba that is characterized by high human influence. The presence of Corbicula fluminea (Müller, 1774) and Corbicula largillierti (Philippi, 1844) in the Suquía River basin is reported for the first time. The former species was found only in a lentic environment (San Roque reservoir), while the latter was also found along the tributary rivers and brooks of the basin. Corbicula largillierti showed variations in average density between the different sites and also in biomass and size classes throughout the study period at the site at Córdoba city. The relative composition of the sediments, flow fluctuation and human pollution may be responsible for the observed differences.

Taxonomy of the Brazilian firefly Cladodes illigeri (Coleoptera, Lampyridae): morphology and new records

ABSTRACT Cladodes illigeri (Kirby, 1818) is redescribed, and can be distinguished by the following features: color pattern overall black, paired spots and elytral margins pale yellow; pygidium bisinuate, posterior angles rounded, as long as median margin; and aedeagus with phallus 1/3 shorter than the parameres, which are sinuated apically. Cladodes lamellicornis (Motschulsky, 1854) is proposed as a junior synomym of C. illigeri. New records from the Atlantic Rainforest and illustrations for structural features are provided.

The Natural history of Enewetak Atoll / edited by Dennis M. Devaney ... [et al.] ; prepared by Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Department of Energy.

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Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.