Campaign effects in direct-democratic votes in Switzerland

The purpose of this article is to analyse the conditions under which referendum campaigns have an impact on voting choices. Based on a model of opinion formation that integrates both campaign effects and partisan effects, we argue that campaign effects vary according to the context of the popular vote (size and type of conflict among the party elite and intensity and direction of the referendum campaign). We test our hypotheses with two-step estimations for hierarchical models on data covering 25 popular votes on foreign, European and immigration policy in Switzerland. Our results show strong campaign effects and they suggest that their strength and nature are indeed highly conditional on the context of the vote: the type of party coalition pre-structures the patterns of individual voting choices, campaign effects are higher when the campaign is highly intense and they are more symmetric when it is balanced.

The economic effects of a Spanish trade boycott against Catalan products

We study the potential consequences of a hypothetical trade boycott against Catalan products organized by some sectors of the Spanish society mainly for political reasons. A symmetric trade boycott would have two effects: a reduction of Catalan exports to Spain and a partial process of import substitution in Catalonia. In order to quantify the economic impact of the boycott, we compare the "actual" Catalan economy, as described in the input-output table for 2005, with a "simulated" Catalan economy that takes into account the effects of a boycott on the trade exchanges between Catalonia and Spain.

Two-sided learning in New Keynesian models: Dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank(two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economyhave asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. Weassume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct fordifferent sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model ofthe economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs througha statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study theshort-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularlywith respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learningcan generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behaviorof the variables in the model in a significant way. Our simulations do not convergeto a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source thatinvalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identifya novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communicationcan be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified.

Price increase and stability with new entries in Cournot markets

It is widely accepted in the literature about the classicalCournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked,in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stableunique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolistsas industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instabilityis proved false.

An adaptation of correspondence analysis for square tables

The application of correspondence analysis to square asymmetrictables is often unsuccessful because of the strong role played by thediagonal entries of the matrix, obscuring the data off the diagonal. A simplemodification of the centering of the matrix, coupled with the correspondingchange in row and column masses and row and column metrics, allows the tableto be decomposed into symmetric and skew--symmetric components, which canthen be analyzed separately. The symmetric and skew--symmetric analyses canbe performed using a simple correspondence analysis program if the data areset up in a special block format.

Correspondence analysis of raw data

Correspondence analysis has found extensive use in ecology, archeology, linguisticsand the social sciences as a method for visualizing the patterns of association in a table offrequencies or nonnegative ratio-scale data. Inherent to the method is the expression of the datain each row or each column relative to their respective totals, and it is these sets of relativevalues (called profiles) that are visualized. This relativization of the data makes perfect sensewhen the margins of the table represent samples from sub-populations of inherently differentsizes. But in some ecological applications sampling is performed on equal areas or equalvolumes so that the absolute levels of the observed occurrences may be of relevance, in whichcase relativization may not be required. In this paper we define the correspondence analysis ofthe raw unrelativized data and discuss its properties, comparing this new method to regularcorrespondence analysis and to a related variant of non-symmetric correspondence analysis.

Full insurance, asymmetric information and genetic testing

This paper extends previous resuls on optimal insurance trading in the presence of a stock market that allows continuous asset trading and substantial personal heterogeneity, and applies those results in a context of asymmetric informationwith references to the role of genetic testing in insurance markets.We find a novel and surprising result under symmetric information:agents may optimally prefer to purchase full insurance despitethe presence of unfairly priced insurance contracts, and other assets which are correlated with insurance.Asymmetric information has a Hirschleifer-type effect whichcan be solved by suspending insurance trading. Nevertheless,agents can attain their first best allocations, which suggeststhat the practice of restricting insurance not to be contingenton genetic tests can be efficient.

On the receiver pays principle

This paper extends the theory of network competition betweentelecommunications operators by allowing receivers to derive a surplusfrom receiving calls (call externality) and to affect the volume ofcommunications by hanging up (receiver sovereignty). We investigate theextent to which receiver charges can lead to an internalization of thecalling externality. When the receiver charge and the termination(access) charge are both regulated, there exists an e±cient equilibrium.Effciency requires a termination discount. When reception charges aremarket determined, it is optimal for each operator to set the prices foremission and reception at their off-net costs. For an appropriately chosentermination charge, the symmetric equilibrium is again effcient. Lastly,we show that network-based price discrimination creates strong incentivesfor connectivity breakdowns, even between equal networks.

Credit constraints, firms' precautionary investment and the business cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' investment composition choices in the presence of credit constraints. Following a negative andpersistent aggregate productivity shock, firms shift into short-term investments because they produce more pledgeable output and because they help alleviate futureborrowing constraints. This produces a short-run dampening of the effects of theshock, at the expense of lower long-term investment and future output, relativeto an economy with no credit market imperfections. The effects are exacerbatedby a steepening of the term structure of interest rates that further encourages ashift towards short-term investments in the short-run. Small temporary shocks tothe severity of financing frictions generate large and long-lasting effects on outputthrough their impact on the composition of investment. A positive financial shockproduces much stronger effects than an identical negative shock, while the responsesto positive and negative shocks to aggregate productivity are roughly symmetric.Finally, the paper introduces a novel explanation for the countercyclicality of financing constraints of firms.

Auctions of licences and market structure

This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to operate in amarket where those firms that obtain at least one licence then engage ina symmetric market game. I employ a new refinement of Nash equilibrium,the concept of {\sl Markovian recursively undominated equilibrium}.The unique solution satisfies the following properties: (i) when severalfirms own licences before the auction (incumbents), new entrants buylicences in each stage, and (ii) when there is no more than one incumbent,either the single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs inevery stage, depending on the parameter configuration.

On p-beauty contest integer games

In this paper we provide a full characterization of the pure-strategyNash Equilibria for the p-Beauty Contest Game when we restrict player schoices to integer numbers. Opposed to the case of real number choices,equilibrium uniqueness may be lost depending on the value of p and thenumber of players: in particular, as p approaches 1 any symmetric profileconstitutes a Nash Equilibrium. We also show that any experimental p-BeautyContest Game can be associated to a game with the integer restriction andthus multiplicity of equilibria becomes an issue. Finally, we show thatin these games the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies maynot lead to a single outcome while the iterated best-reply process alwaysdoes (though the outcome obtained depends on the initial conditions).

Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate

This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance \delta. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except under special conditions about \delta and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies.

An experimental study of discharge partitioning and flow structure at symmetrical bifurcations

Recent research has examined the factors controlling the geometrical configuration of bifurcations, determined the range of stability conditions for a number of bifurcation types and assessed the impact of perturbations on bifurcation evolution. However, the flow division process and the parameters that influence flow and sediment partitioning are still poorly characterized. To identify and isolate these parameters, three-dimensional velocities were measured at 11 cross-sections in a fixed-walled experimental bifurcation. Water surface gradients were controlled, and systematically varied, using a weir in each distributary. As may be expected, the steepest distributary conveyed the most discharge ( was dominant) while the mildest distributary conveyed the least discharge ( was subordinate). A zone of water surface super-elevation was co-located with the bifurcation in symmetric cases or displaced into the subordinate branch in asymmetric cases. Downstream of a relatively acute-angled bifurcation, primary velocity cores were near to the water surface and against the inner banks, with near-bed zones of lower primary velocity at the outer banks. Downstream of an obtuse-angled bifurcation, velocity cores were initially at the outer banks, with near-bed zones of lower velocities at the inner banks, but patterns soon reverted to match the acute-angled case. A single secondary flow cell was generated in each distributary, with water flowing inwards at the water surface and outwards at the bed. Circulation was relatively enhanced within the subordinate branch, which may help explain why subordinate distributaries remain open, may play a role in determining the size of commonly-observed topographic features, and may thus exert some control on the stability of asymmetric bifurcations. Further, because larger values of circulation result from larger gradient disadvantages, the length of confluence-diffluence units in braided rivers or between diffluences within delta distributary networks may vary depending upon flow structures inherited from upstream and whether, and how, they are fed by dominant or subordinate distributaries. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A model of market-making

The two essential features of a decentralized economy taken intoaccount are, first, that individual agents need some informationabout other agents in order to meet potential trading partners,which requires some communication or interaction between theseagents, and second, that in general agents will face tradinguncertainty. We consider trade in a homogeneous commodity. Firmsdecide upon their effective supplies, and may create their ownmarkets by sending information signals communicating theirwillingness to sell. Meeting of potential trading partners isarranged in the form of shopping by consumers. The questions to beconsidered are: How do firms compete in such markets? And what arethe properties of an equilibrium? We establish existenceconditions for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the firms'strategies, and analyze its characteristics. The developedframework appears to lend itself well to study many typicalphenomena of decentralized economies, such as the emergence ofcentral markets, the role of middlemen, and price-making.

Correspondence analysis of two transition tables

The case of two transition tables is considered, that is two squareasymmetric matrices of frequencies where the rows and columns of thematrices are the same objects observed at three different timepoints. Different ways of visualizing the tables, either separatelyor jointly, are examined. We generalize an existing idea where asquare matrix is descomposed into symmetric and skew-symmetric partsto two matrices, leading to a decomposition into four components: (1)average symmetric, (2) average skew-symmetric, (3) symmetricdifference from average, and (4) skew-symmetric difference fromaverage. The method is illustrated with an artificial example and anexample using real data from a study of changing values over threegenerations.