929 resultados para Principle of authority
Resumo:
As the use of fracking has spread during the recent oil and gas boom, inevitable conflicts have arisen between industry and its neighbors, particularly as fracking has moved into densely populated urban and suburban areas. Concerned over the impacts of fracking – such as risks to health and safely, diminished property values, air and water pollution, as well as noise, traffic, and other annoyances – many people have demanded a government response. Government regulation of fracking has struggled to catch up, although in recent years many state and local governments have taken steps to reduce the impacts of fracking in their communities. This article focuses on government restrictions in New York and Colorado, two of the key battlegrounds in the fight over fracking. New York recently prohibited fracking across the entire state, after several towns had enacted their own bans. In Colorado, the people have used the ballot initiative process to enact restrictions on fracking directly. The industry has responded not only with public relations spending to improve the fracking’s damaged reputation, but also legal challenges to these efforts to rein in oil and gas development. In addition to suing local governments, often arguing they do not have authority to regulate fracking, industry threatens to bring costly takings claims for compensation due to alleged economic harms. This Article examines the numerous legal and factual issues that should make it difficult for industry to succeed on fracking/takings claims. First, regulation of fracking, even including outright bans, can almost always be defended as necessary to prevent a nuisance or other background principle of law that justifies government regulation. Even if a nuisance defense could be overcome, industry would have difficulty proving that regulation has destroyed all economic value in their property, unless courts take a narrow view of property that would highlight the arbitrary nature of the “denominator problem.” When fracking/takings claims are considered under the default balancing of the Penn Central case, takings are unlikely to be found except in rare outlier cases. Finally, because requiring governments to pay compensation in fracking/takings cases would likely create a windfall for industry, particularly if the oil and gas eventually is extracted in the future, courts should resist the temptation to rule against government restrictions to protect public health, safety, and the environment.
Resumo:
The strong presence of religious institutions in Latin America, especially the Roman Catholic Church, and their participation in the creation and implementation of public policy within a sovereign state can be counter-productive for the social development and progress of that specific country. Argentina and Uruguay and the social controversy of social issues of abortion and same-sex marriage are used as examples to establish the accuracy of the above statement. Historical, statistical, and legislative information about both topics in both countries show that the political power that the Roman Catholic Church has in the region is more an outdated influence than a reality, and the principle of secularization appears to be the most stabilizing philosophy for modern nations.
Resumo:
Whereas the recent UN resolution urges governments to accelerate progress towards universal access to affordable and quality health-care services, the Spanish Government, bypassing the parliamentary procedure, enacted a Royal Decree to limit access to free services at the point of delivery for all-undermining the principle of universal coverage. Spanish health and social service budgets have been subjected to large cuts (13,7% in 2012 and 16,2% in 2013) with some regions imposing additional budget cuts.
Resumo:
A novel polymer electrolyte membrane electrochemical reactor (PEMER) configuration has been employed for the direct electrooxidation of propargyl alcohol (PGA), a model primary alcohol, towards its carboxylic acid derivatives in alkaline medium. The PEMER configuration comprised of an anode and cathode based on nanoparticulate Ni and Pt electrocatalysts, respectively, supported on carbonaceous substrates. The electrooxidation of PGA was performed in 1.0 M NaOH, where a cathode based on a gas diffusion electrode was manufactured for the reduction of oxygen in alkaline conditions. The performance of a novel alkaline anion-exchange membrane based on Chitosan (CS) and Poly(vinyl) alcohol (PVA) in a 50:50 composition ratio doped with a 5 wt.% of poly (4-vinylpyridine) organic ionomer cross-linked, methyl chloride quaternary salt resin (4VP) was assessed as solid polymer electrolyte. The influence of 4VP anionic ionomer loading of 7, 12 and 20 wt.% incorporated into the electrocatalytic layers was examined by SEM and cyclic voltammetry (CV) upon the optimisation of the electroactive area, the mechanical stability and cohesion of the catalytic ink onto the carbonaceous substrate for both electrodes. The performance of the 4VP/CS:PVA membrane was compared with the commercial alkaline anion-exchange membrane FAA −a membrane generally used in direct alcohol alkaline fuel cells- in terms of polarisation plots in alkaline conditions. Furthermore, preparative electrolyses of the electrooxidation of PGA was performed under alkaline conditions of 1 M NaOH at constant current density of 20 mA cm−2 using a PEMER configuration to provide proof of the principle of the feasibility of the electrooxidation of other alcohols in alkaline media. PGA conversion to Z isomers of 3-(2-propynoxy)-2-propenoic acid (Z-PPA) was circa 0.77, with average current efficiency of 0.32. Alkaline stability of the membranes within the PEMER configuration was finally evaluated after the electrooxidation of PGA.
Resumo:
[Introduction.] It is generally believed that while the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order, in the sense of constitutional and institutional autonomy that is to say what concerns the autonomous decision-making of the EU, has been clearly strengthened by the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (eg. Moxplant3, Intertanko or the Kadi/Al Baraakat judgements or the Opinion 1/2009 of the CJEU etc.) as well as, in my opinion, in many aspects by the Treaty of Lisbon, it is still valid to add that the principle of a favourable approach, stemming from the Court jurisprudence, for the enhanced openness of the EU legal order to international law has remained equally important for the EU4. On the other hand, it should be also seen that in a globalized world, and following the increased role of the EU as an international actor, its indispensable and crucial role concerning the creation of world (legal) order in many policy fields ( for example let's think about the G20 issues, the global economic and financial crisis, the role of the EU in promoting and protecting human rights worldwide, the implementation of the multilateral or regional conventional law, developed in the framework the UN (e.g. in the field of agriculture or environment etc) or what concerns the Kyoto process on climate change or the conservation of marine biological resources at international level etc), it seems reasonable and justified to submit that the influence, for example, of the law-making activities of the main stakeholder international organizations in the mentioned policy-areas on the EU (especially on the development of its constantly evolving legal order) or vice-versa the influence of the EU law-making practice on these international organizations is significant, in many aspects mutually interdependent and more and more remarkable. This tendency of the 21st century doesn't mean, however, in my view, that the notion of the autonomy of the EU legal order would have been weakened by this increasing interaction between international law and EU law over the passed years. This contribution is going to demonstrate and prove these departuring points by giving some concrete examples from the most recent practice of the Council (all occuring either in the second half of 2009 or after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), and which relate to two very important policy areas in the EU, namely the protection of human rights and the Common Fishery Policy.
Resumo:
[Introduction.] Necessary reforms towards a deepened and increased European shaped economic, financial and budgetary policy, paraphrased with the term “fiscal union”, could possibly reach constitutional limits. In its EFSF judgment1, the German Constitutional Court, following the Lisbon judgment in which certain government tasks were determined as being part of the “constitutional identity”2, connected the budget right of the parliament via the principle of democracy to the eternity clause of Art. 79 para 3 Basic Law. A transfer of essential parts of the budget right of the German Bundestag, which would be in conflict with the German constitution, is said to exist when the determination of the nature and amount of the tax affecting the citizens is largely regulated on the supranational level and thereby deprived of the Bundestag’s right to disposition. A reform of the Economic and Monetary Union that touches the core of the budget right can, according to the German Federal Court, with regard to Art. 79 (3) of the Basic Law only be realized by way of Art. 146 of the Basic Law, thus with a new constitution given by the people that replaces the Basic Law.3
Resumo:
[From the Introduction]. The economic rules, or put more ambitiously, the economic constitution of the Treaty,1 only apply to economic activities. This general principle remains valid, even if some authors strive to demonstrate that certain Treaty rules also apply in the absence of an economic activity,2 and despite the fact that non-economic (horizontal) Treaty provisions (e.g. principle of nondiscrimination, rules on citizenship) are also applicable in the absence of any economic activity.3 Indeed, the exercise of some economic activity transcends the concepts of ‘goods’ (having positive or negative market value),4 workers (even if admitted in an extensive manner),5 and services (offered for remuneration).6 It is also economic activity or ‘the activity of offering goods and services into the market’7 that characterises an ‘undertaking’ thus making the competition rules applicable. Further, it is for regulating economic activity that Article 115 TFEU, Article 106(3) TFEU and most other legal bases in the TFEU provide harmonisation powers in favour of the EU. Last but not least, Article 14 TFEU on the distinction between services of general economic interest (SGEIs) and non-economic services of general interest (NESGIs), as well as Protocol n. 26 on Services of General Interest (SGIs) confirm the constitutional significance of the distinction between economic and non-economic: a means of dividing competences between the EU and the member states. The distinction between economic and non-economic activities is fraught with legal and technical intricacies – the latter being generated by dynamic technological advances and regulatory experimentation. More importantly, however, the distinction is overcharged with political and ideological significations and misunderstandings and, even, terminological confusions.8
Resumo:
[Introduction]. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it examines selectively the provisions of the draft Constitution pertaining to the Court of Justice and assesses the ways in which the draft Constitution is likely to affect the jurisdiction and the function of the Court. Secondly, it discusses the challenges faced by the Court in relation to the protection of human rights by reference to the recent judgment in Schmidberger.1 Both aspects of the discussion serve to underlie that the Court is assuming the function of the Supreme Court of the Union whose jurisdiction is fundamentally constitutional in character. It has a central role to play not only in relation to matters of economic integration but also in deciding issues of political governance, defining democracy at European and national level, and contributing through the process of judicial harmonisation to the emergence of a European demos. This constitutional jurisdiction of the ECJ is not new but has acquired more importance in recent years and is set to be enhanced under the provisions of the new Constitution. The paper is divided as follows: The first section provides an overview of the way the new Constitution affects the ECJ. The subsequent sections examine respectively Article 28(1) of the draft Constitution, the appointment and tenure of the judiciary, locus standi for private individuals, sanctions against Member States, jurisdiction under the CFSP and the Chapter on freedom, security and justice, preliminary references, other provisions o f the Constitution pertaining to the Court, the principle of subsidiarity, and the judgment in Schmidberger. The final section contains some concluding remarks.
Resumo:
A presente dissertação tem como objetivo analisar tematicamente a polémica de 1715/16 entre Leibniz e Clarke, não apenas, como é usual, no âmbito das conceções do espaço e do tempo, mas no conjunto dos seus temas metafísicos, teológicos, gnosiológicos e físicos. Na estruturação da dissertação, adquiriu um papel central o confronto dos autores em torno da noção de liberdade, cuja importância é evidente na utilização do princípio da razão suficiente e seus corolários, na distinção entre verdades de razão e verdades de facto, entre os diversos tipos de necessidade, nas conceções alternativas de espaço e de tempo, na alternativa entre átomos e mónadas, na questão dos limites do universo, na relação entre a alma e o corpo, nas teses relativas à providência divina, na forma como se concebe a relação de Deus com a sua máquina, na noção de milagre e nas próprias noções de força e de movimento, pelo menos no que respeita à sua relação com Deus, isto sem desprezar a abordagem direta da própria noção de liberdade. Com este enquadramento, pretende-se mostrar, através de um eloquente exemplo histórico, que as teorias científicas naturais se podem alicerçar em teorias metafísicas e que esses alicerces não têm que se esgotar, mesmo no seio da metafísica, nas questões estritamente cosmológicas, isto para lá de poderem existir influências nunca menosprezáveis de domínios não filosóficos, como é o caso da teologia dogmática. Apesar disto ser evidente na abordagem dos textos, existe uma sistemática menorização contemporânea desta determinação, como se fosse uma idiossincrasia da época ou uma deferência que a ciência tinha de ter numa época ainda obscurecida pela autoridade das igrejas e pela especulação filosófica. Esta abordagem pretende compreender todos os aspetos do pensamento expresso pelos autores na polémica, na sua integralidade, sem reservas de qualquer tipo.
Resumo:
The article describes and assesses the role of national parliaments in EU legislation considering the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. This is closely connected with the understanding and (political) application of the principle of subsidiarity. After an analysis of the possibilities and limitations of the relevant legal regulations in the post-Lisbon age, alternative ways for participation of national legislators on the European level are being scrutinized and proposed. The issue of democratic legitimization is also interconnected with the current political reforms being discussed in order to overcome the Euro Crisis. Finally, the authors argue that it does not make sense to include national parliaments in the existing legislative triangle of the EU, but instead to promote the creation of a new kind of supervisory body.
Resumo:
The paper analyzes the ECJ case law on fixed-term work, with specific regard to non-regression clause, measures to prevent abuses and the principle of non-discrimination. In particular, the Author points out that the principle of non-discrimination is to be regarded as being the core of the fixed-term work regulation; in this respect, especially in more recent judgments, the Court seems to maximize the scope of such principle.
Resumo:
From the Introduction. The European Court of Justice, partly followed in this by the European legislator, has regulated Community law and policy through a set of general principles of law. For the Community legal order in the first pillar, general legal principles have developed from functional policy areas such as the internal market, the customs union, the monetary union, the common agricultural policy, the European competition policy, etc., which are of great importance for the quality and legitimacy of Community law. The principles in question are not so much general legal principles of an institutional character, such as the priority of Community law, direct effect or Community loyalty, but rather principles of law which shape the fundamental rights and basic rights of the citizen. I refer to the principle of legality, of nulla poena, the inviolability of the home, the nemo tenetur principle, due process, the rights of the defence, etc. Many of these legal principles have been elevated to primary Community law status by the European Court of Justice, often as a result of preliminary questions. Nevertheless, a considerable number of them have also been elaborated in the context of contentious proceedings before the Court of Justice, such as in the framework of European competition law and European public servants law.
Resumo:
The EU has recently been pushing for legislation to strengthen the gender balance on company boards in its member states and indeed, the principle of gender equality is enshrined in the European treaties. Yet, as Vilde Renman points out, women are clearly underrepresented in top positions within EU institutions themselves. The upcoming European Parliament elections are an opportunity for the EU to appoint more women at the highest levels of administration and legislature, thereby setting an example for companies, member states and citizens alike.
Resumo:
Documenting the unwelcoming treatment extended by government officials to the poorest EU citizens from other member states, including denying them their EU rights, Elspeth Guild censures these officials for shattering the principle of equality of citizens and of disaggregating Europe into nationals of the member states who can be treated differently simply on the basis of their origins.
Resumo:
How much does European citizenship cost in the EU? This was the question that has raised so much controversy over the Maltese citizenship-for-sale programme. The outright selling of Maltese nationality to rich foreigners led to unprecedented responses by the European Parliament and European Commission. This paper examines the affair and its relevance for current and future configurations of citizenship of the EU. It studies the extent to which member states are still free to lay down the grounds for the acquisition and loss of nationality without any EU supervision and accountability. It provides a comparative overview of member state schemes and the exact price for buying citizenship and a residency permit in the EU. It is argued that the EU’s intervention on the Maltese citizenship-for-sale affair constitutes a legal precedent for assessing the lawfulness of passport-for-sale or golden migration programmes in other EU member states. The affair has also revealed the increasing relevance of a set of European and international legal principles limiting member states’ discretion over citizenship matters and providing a supranational constellation of accountability venues scrutinising the impact of their decisions over citizenship of the Union. The Maltese citizenship-for-sale affair has placed at the forefront the EU general principle of sincere cooperation in nationality matters. Member states’ actions in the citizenship domain cannot negatively affect in substance the concept and freedoms of European citizenship. That notwithstanding, the European institutions’ insistence on the need for Maltese nationality law to require a ‘genuine link’ in the form of an effective residence criteria for any rich applicants to benefit from the fast-track naturalisation poses a fundamental dilemma from the angle of Union citizenship: what is this genuine link really about? And what is precisely ‘habitual’, ‘effective’ or ‘functional’ residence? It is argued that by supporting the ‘real connections’ as the most relevant standard, the European institutions may be paradoxically fuelling nationalistic misuses by member states of the ‘genuine link’ as a way to justify restrictive integration policies on the acquisition of nationality.