Critical essays on a few subjects connected with the history and present condition of speculative philosophy /

Locke and the transcendentalists -- Kant and his philosophy -- Fichte's exposition of Kant : philosophy applied to theology -- The philosophy of Cousin -- Paley : the argument for the being of a God -- Subject continued : the union of theology and metaphysics -- Berkeley and his philosophy -- Elements of moral science -- Political ethics.

Studies in southern history and politics; inscribed to William Archibald Dunning, PH.D., LL.D., Lieber professor of history and political philosophy in Columbia university,

Deportation and colonization: an atempted solution of the race problem, by W.L. Fleming.--The literary movement for secession, by U.B. Phillips.--The frontier and secession, by C.W. Ramsdell.--The French consuls in the Confederate States, M.L. Bonham, jr.--The judicial interpretation of the Confederate constitution, by S.D. Brummer.--Southern legislation in respect to freedmen, 1865-1866, by J.G. de R. Hamilton.--Carpet-baggers in the United States Senate, by C. Mildred Thompson.--Grant's southern policy, by E.C. Woolley.--The federal enforcement acts, by W.W. Davis.--Negro suffrage in the South, by W.R. Smith.--Some phases of educational history in the South since 1865, by W.K. Boyd.--The new South, economic and social, by H. Thompson.--The political philosophy of John C. Calhoun, by C.E. Merriam.--Southern political theories, by D.Y. Thomas.--Southern politics since the civil war, by J.W. Garner.

Levinas and the defination of philosophy: An ethical approach

Emmanuel Levinas’ thought seems to be strictly neither rational, phenomenological nor ontological, and it thus intentionally exposes itself to the asking of the question ‘why call it philosophy at all’? While we may have trouble containing Levinas’ thought within our traditional philosophical boundaries, I argue that this gives us no reason to exclude him from philosophy proper as a mere poser, but rather provides the occasion for reflection on just what it means, in an ethical manner, to call something ‘philosophical’. Instead of asking whether or not philosophy can ‘contain’ Levinas’ thought, I contend that it would be more ethical to instead re-phrase the question in terms of ‘sociality’. When we do this, I argue, we can indeed justifiably call Levinas’ thought philosophy.

Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom

the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.

Being impolite while pretending to be polite. The rupture of politeness conventions in electoral debates

This paper is a part of a larger research that pursues a global understanding of impoliteness in face-to-face electoral debates. That research distinguishes three essential axes, three complementary analytical perspectives: functional strategies of impoliteness, linguistic-discursive mechanisms to implement them and social impacts of impolite acts. In this frame, the present work develops an in-depth analysis of a special category of mechanisms, namely the rupture of politeness conventions, a subgroup within postliteral implicit mechanisms. This subgroup acquires its identity by the fact of carrying out a linguistic action that is conventionally associated with a polite attitude, but doing it in a rhetorically insincere way: the consequence is that apparent politeness becomes impoliteness. Relevant aspects in the characterization of ruptures are isolated and, on this basis, it is developed a detailed analysis of three specific kinds of mechanisms in which ruptures take shape: using ironic statements, developing different forms of overpoliteness and adopting a falsely collaborative attitude toward the interlocutor. The analysis of that group of mechanisms takes into account, simultaneously, the other two axes of the main research, strategies and social impacts.

From physics to metaphysics: philosophy and style in the critical writings of T. S. Eliot (1913-1935)

This thesis considers Eliot's critical writing from the late 1910s till the mid-1930s, in the light of his PhD thesis - Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley - and a range of unpublished material: T S. Eliot's Philosophical Essays and Notes (1913- 4) in the Hayward Bequest (King's College, Cambridge University); T. S. Eliot's Family Papers in the T. S. Eliot Collection at the Houghton Library (Harvard University); and items from the Harvard University Archives at the Pusey Library. 'Me thesis offers a comprehensive view of Eliot's critical development throughout this important period. It starts by considering The Sacred Wood's ambivalence towards the metaphysical philosophy of F. H. Bradley and Eliot's apparent adoption of a scientific method, under the influence of Bertrand Russell. It will be argued that Eliot uses rhetorical strategies which simultaneously subvert the method he is propounding, and which set the tone for an assessment of his criticism throughout the 1920s. His indecision, in this period, about the label 'Metaphysical' for some poets of the seventeenth century, reveals the persistence of the philosophical thought he apparently rejects in 1916, when he chooses not to pursue a career in philosophy in Harvard. This rhetorical tactic achieves its fulfilment in Dante (1929), where Eliot finds a model in the medieval allegorical method and 'philosophical' poetry. Allegory is also examined in connection with the evaluation of Eliot's critical writings themselves to determine, for instance, the figurative dimension of his early scientific vocabulary and uncover metaphysical residues he had explicitly disowned but would later embrace. Finally, it is suggested that, the hermeneutics of allegory are historical and it is used here to test the relationship between Eliot's early and later critical writings, that is the early physics and the later metaphysics.

On the role of Computational Logic in Data Science: representing, learning, reasoning, and explaining knowledge

In this thesis we discuss in what ways computational logic (CL) and data science (DS) can jointly contribute to the management of knowledge within the scope of modern and future artificial intelligence (AI), and how technically-sound software technologies can be realised along the path. An agent-oriented mindset permeates the whole discussion, by stressing pivotal role of autonomous agents in exploiting both means to reach higher degrees of intelligence. Accordingly, the goals of this thesis are manifold. First, we elicit the analogies and differences among CL and DS, hence looking for possible synergies and complementarities along 4 major knowledge-related dimensions, namely representation, acquisition (a.k.a. learning), inference (a.k.a. reasoning), and explanation. In this regard, we propose a conceptual framework through which bridges these disciplines can be described and designed. We then survey the current state of the art of AI technologies, w.r.t. their capability to support bridging CL and DS in practice. After detecting lacks and opportunities, we propose the notion of logic ecosystem as the new conceptual, architectural, and technological solution supporting the incremental integration of symbolic and sub-symbolic AI. Finally, we discuss how our notion of logic ecosys- tem can be reified into actual software technology and extended towards many DS-related directions.

An alternative to the Pythagorean rule? Reevaluating Problem 1 of cuneiform tablet BM 34 568

The first problem of the Seleucid mathematical cuneiform tablet BM 34 568 calculates the diagonal of a rectangle from its sides without resorting to the Pythagorean rule. For this reason, it has been a source of discussion among specialists ever since its first publication. but so far no consensus in relation to its mathematical meaning has been attained. This paper presents two new interpretations of the scribe`s procedure. based on the assumption that he was able to reduce the problem to a standard Mesopotamian question about reciprocal numbers. These new interpretations are then linked to interpretations of the Old Babylonian tablet Plimpton 322 and to the presence of Pythagorean triples in the contexts of Old Babylonian and Hellenistic mathematics. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

von Wright`s Therapy to Jorgensen`s Syndrome

In his last papers about deontic logic, von Wright sustained that there is no genuine logic of norms. We argue in this paper that this striking statement by the father of deontic logic should not be understood as a death sentence to the subject. Rather, it indicates a profound change in von Wright`s understanding about the epistemic and ontological role of logic in the field of norms. Instead of a logical constructivism of deontic systems revealing a necessary structure of prescriptive discourse, which marked his earlier efforts, he adopted the view that such systems should be seem as mere objects of comparison, i.e. as providing practical standards of rationality for norm-giving activity. Within such view he proposed an interpretation of standard deontic logic in such a way to free deontic logicians from the philosophical difficulties related to the so-called Jorgensen`s dilemma and deontic paradoxes. This effort, as we claim in the present paper, is an application of Wittgenstein`s therapeutic method to dissolve philosophical difficulties caused by the use of logical tools to model relations between norms.

The evolutionary structure of scientific theories

David Hull's (1988c) model of science as a selection process suffers from a two-fold inability: (a) to ascertain when a lineage of theories has been established; i.e., when theories are descendants of older theories or are novelties, and what counts as a distinct lineage; and (b) to specify what the scientific analogue is of genotype and phenotype. This paper seeks to clarify these issues and to propose an abstract model of theories analogous to particulate genetic structure, in order to reconstruct relationships of descent and identity.

The conserved quantity theory of causation and chance raising

In this paper I offer an 'integrating account' of singular causation, where the term 'integrating' refers to the following program for analysing causation. There are two intuitions about causation, both of which face serious counterexamples when used as the basis for an analysis of causation. The 'process' intuition, which says that causes and effects are linked by concrete processes, runs into trouble with cases of misconnections', where an event which serves to prevent another fails to do so on a particular occasion and yet the two events are linked by causal processes. The chance raising intuition, according to which causes raise the chance of their effects, easily accounts for misconnections but faces the problem of chance lowering causes, a problem easily accounted for by the process approach. The integrating program attempts to provide an analysis of singular causation by synthesising the two insights, so as to solve both problems. In this paper I show that extant versions of the integrating program due to Eells, Lewis, and Menzies fail to account for the chance-lowering counterexample. I offer a new diagnosis of the chance lowering case, and use that as a basis for an integrating account of causation which does solve both cases. In doing so, I accept various assumptions of the integrating program, in particular that there are no other problems with these two approaches. As an example of the process account, I focus on the recent CQ theory of Wesley Salmon (1997).