Direct electron communication between glucose oxidase and carbon electrode covered with polypyrrole

Glucose oxidase can be effectively adsorbed onto the polypyrrole(PPy) thin film electrochemically formed on an anodized galssy carbon electrode(GCEa). Direct electron communication between the redox of GOD and the modified electrode was successfully achieved, which was detected using cyclic voltammetry. GOD entrapped in PPy film still remained its biological activity and could catalyze the oxidation of glucose. As a third generation biosensor, GOD-PPy/GCEa responded linearly up to 20 mM glucose with a wider linear concentration range.

Femina (Trinity College, Cambridge MS B.14.40) : edited with an Introduction and Notes

Rothwell, W., Femina (Trinity College, Cambridge MS B.14.40); edited with an Introduction and Notes (The Anglo-Norman On-Line Hub, 2005) RAE2008

Etyczny profil "Familiaris consortio"

Artykuł koncentruje się na etycznym aspekcie „Familiaris Consortio”, zakładając równocześnie bogatą problematykę pastoralną. Pytanie etyczne, które pojawiało się wraz z ukazaniem się tego dokumentu wiązało się z nastrojami wahania i oczekiwania w wyniku ujawnienia się silnej opozycji wobec nauki zawartej w encyklice „Humanae Vitae” Pawła VI. Adhortacja nie podejmuje bezpośredniej polemiki z przeciwnikami nauki Kościoła, lecz przedstawia pozytywny wykład całościowej nauki na temat powołania małżeństwa i rodziny. Powołanie stanowi w tym dokumencie podstawową kategorię teologiczno-moralną, wyjaśniającą i uzasadniającą istotne wymogi moralne małżeństwa i rodziny i przenoszącą życie ludzkie na poziom świętości. Powołanie ma swe źródło w Boskim planie zbawienia i objawia się wraz z dokonaniem dzieła zbawienia w Jezusie Chrystusie. Tajemnica powołania uobecnia się w dziejach ludzkości jako ukryta a zarazem objawiona w misterium Chrystusa i Kościoła. Powołanie rzuca istotne światło na stworzenie mężczyzny i kobiety czyli stworzenie rodziny opartej na fundamencie małżeństwa. Odtąd prawda antropologiczna posiada wymiar sakramentalny. Powołanie przenikając wewnętrznie rzeczywistość stworzoną, umieszcza w samej głębi bytu „nie dające się stłumić wezwanie: rodzino, stań się tym, czym jesteś” (FC 17). Bóg Stwórca i Odkupiciel powierzył człowiekowi – mężczyźnie i kobiecie- zadanie budowania rodziny mocą tej samej Miłości, przez którą istnieje świat i człowiek, oraz tej samej Miłości, którą Objawił Syn Boży na Krzyżu, ustanawiając nowy porządek stworzenia. Odtąd prawda życia ludzkiego i prawda miłości musi być odczytywana wyłącznie w świetle tajemnicy Paschalnej. To wezwanie płynące z głębi sakramentu odzywa się mocą łaski w sercu małżeństwa, w sercu męża i żony, którzy są wezwani do miłowania się tą samą Miłością, która płynie z Misterium Krzyża. Ta koncepcja powołania, wypływająca z sakramentalnego charakteru chrześcijańskiego istnienia stanowi klucz do rozstrzygania szczegółowych pytań mogących się pojawić w kontekście życia małżeńskiego. Wizja przedstawiona przez „Familiaris Consortio” jest jednorodna i charyzmatyczna, jest teologiczna i antropologiczna zarazem, dotyczy bowiem człowieka jako człowieka, a nie tylko „pewnych jednostek” ludzkich uwikłanych w sidła małżeńskie. W „Familiaris Consortio” jest jedna norma małżeńska i jedna norma rodzicielska: to jest zawsze ta sama Miłość, która z Serca Boga poprzez sakrament przenika do serca małżonków. Dlatego miłość małżeńska jest miłością rodzicielską, czyli odpowiedzialną za świętość tajemnicy zrodzenia, to jest równocześnie za świętość Boga – Stwórcy i za godność człowieka powoływanego na świat. Zarówno miłość małżeńska jak miłość rodzicielska, nie mogą istnieć bez czystości małżeńskiej. Tu leży prawdopodobnie główna przyczyna powodująca opór wobec nauki „Humanae Vitae”. „Familiaris Consortio” odrzuca wszelką manipulację antykoncepcyjna, podkreślając sprzeczność postawy antykoncepcyjnej nie tylko z prawem Bożym, ale i z istotą człowieczeństwa. Zawiera się to w twierdzeniu, które głosi, że pomiędzy prawidłowym życiem małżeńskim a antykoncepcją zachodzi nie tylko różnica moralna, lecz także antropologiczna (FC 32). Jest to surowy osąd tej praktyki, ale prawdziwy: ci, którzy stosują antykoncepcję, staczają się na poziom poniżej-ludzki.

Antyk w prozie J. R. R. Tolkiena

Tolkien’s oeuvre and its problematic relationships with classical tradition serve in my paper as an illustration of the diverse approaches, methods, and styles of lecture concerning the nature of literary allusivity. As a point of departure in the paper has been taken the reflection on the common phrase about “antiquity in something” deployed broadly in the reception studies. T he questions raised here are as follows: what does precisely “in” mean in that metaphor? O r, to put it in more general terms, when an allusion to another text can be treated as an inherent part of interpretation? Answer to these questions was possible due to U mberto E co’s statements in the well-known dispute relating to the interpretation and overinterpretation; in conclusion I was trying to show that his criterion of textual economy in interpretation justifies somehow (as I believe) the new look on the essential T olkien’s symbol, i.e. the ring of power, as a symbol of the R oman imperial rule. This means (in the context of the translatio imperii and cultural change from pagan to Christian empire) that The Lord of the Rings can be seen in a way as a novelistic version of Augustine’s The City of God.

Prezbiter - świadek i sługa komunii. Aktualność przesłania Listu do moich kapłanów

Inspiracją dla autora artykułu stały się zebrane w Liście do moich kapłanów refleksje Prymasa Wyszyńskiego na temat tożsamości i misji prezbitera. Zawierają one wiele wątków, które niewątpliwie łączy przenikająca całe dzieło troska o jedność kapłanów w służbie eklezjalnej komunii. Dla Prymasa Tysiąclecia społeczna natura człowieka była czytelnym potwierdzeniem prawdy o jego powołaniu do życia we wspólnocie, nie tylko tej doczesnej, ale i tej nadprzyrodzonej. Należało tę naturalną zdolność do wchodzenia w relacje z innymi właściwie odczytać w świetle Bożego Objawienia. Bogate życie wewnętrzne pozwala kontemplować tajemnicę Trójcy Świętej i dostrzegać w Niej źródło eklezjalnej i międzyludzkiej komunii. Obdarowanie nadprzyrodzoną mocą wspólnoty z Bogiem w Kościele, uzdalnia wierzących w Chrystusa do nowych braterskich relacji, czyniąc z nich prawdziwą Bożą rodzinę. Proces ten dokonuje się dzięki pośrednictwu posługi kapłańskiej, dlatego też prezbiterzy są szczególnie wezwani, aby w ich wzajemnych relacjach jaśniał ten nowy, wspólnotowy styl życia. Osobista więź z Bogiem, relacja z ordynariuszem, pomiędzy prezbiterami, czy też z wiernymi świeckimi to podstawowe wymiary, w których kapłani mają jawić się jako świadkowie i słudzy komunii.

Interpretacja myśli Pseudo-Dionizego w wybranych dziełach Grzegorza Palamasa

Wydział Nauk Społecznych

Behind, Between, and Beyond Anthropomorphic Models

The plurality of models of ultimate reality is a central problem for religious philosophy. This essay sketches what is involved in mounting comparative inquiries across the plurality of models. In order to illustrate what advance would look like in such a comparative inquiry, an argument is presented to show that highly anthropomorphic models of ultimate reality are inferior to a number of competitors. This paper was delivered as a keynote address during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.

El Ser como mediación. Ontología, estética y analogía en la interpretación del ‘esse’ tomasiano de H. U. von Balthasar

El presente artículo expone los fundamentos de la interpretación que del esse tomasiano lleva a cabo Hans Urs von Balthasar. En ella ofrece von Balthasar, a partir de una interpretación en la línea de Siewerth, y como tal novedosa para la historia de la crítica, las directrices fundamentales de su propio pensamiento filosóficoteológico, cuyo eje lo constituye la diferencia entre esse y Dios como modelo para una hermenéutica no monista de la realidad. Con todo, la propuesta no está exenta de algunas dificultades y arbitrariedades que, desde una perspectiva crítica y aconfesional (por la que aquí se opta), conviene ineludiblemente subrayar.

Death Aesthetization in Contemporary Artistic Practices

Starting from the famous and enigmatic quotation of the Aristotle’s Poetics, who argues that the human has a natural desire and pleasure to see corpses if mediated by art, is intended to show the relationship between the attraction for the horror and some contemporary art practices surrounding the depiction of death, particularly with regard to the ultimate use of the human corpse as an artistic resource. Avoiding any kind of ethical approach or questioning of the limits of the artistic production, is meant to highlight the phenomenon through the examples brought out by the work of some contemporary artists such as Andy Warhol, Eric Fischl, Damien Hirst, Von Hagens, Andres Serrano, Joel-Peter Witkin and Teresa Margolles: From those who use the corpse in and turn it in something aesthetically pleasant, to others who turn human corpses in sculptures of scientific value, and further other kind of artists who assume the morbid and dramatic life of the corpse in their art production as something structural.

Eternity, knowledge, and freedom

This article addresses the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom by developing a modi?ed version of Boethius’ solution to the problem–one that is meant to cohere with a dynamic theory of time and a conception of God as temporal. I begin the article by discussing the traditional Boethian solution, and a defence of it due to Kretzmann and Stump. After canvassing a few of the objections to this view, I then go on to o?er my own modi?ed Boethian solution, according to which temporal reality is fundamentally dynamic, but truth is not. My claim is that there are eternally existing, tenseless propositions, with determinate truth values, but that these are made true by events that come into existence, and are not themselves eternal.

History and Salvation in Lebor na hUidre

This chapter argues that the scribes of Lebor na hUidre show a persistent concern with eschatology, and in particular with the salvation of souls and the Last Judgement. In some cases the texts are overtly religious, but in a substantial number of cases they are explicitly or implicitly historical. The pivotal event is the mission of St Patrick, which is identified in several of the texts examined here as the origin of Christianity in Ireland. Pagans are repeatedly brought into contact with Christians/saints or other representatives of God, revealing the victory of Christianity and the subjugation of paganism. It is argued that the stories are to be placed within the medieval western theory of history according to which God���s plan for humanity was revealed through a study of the events of the past.

A coroa, os mestres e os comendadores: as Ordens Militares de Avis de de Santiago (1330 - 1449)

Tese de Doutoramento , História, especialidade de História Medieval, Faculdade de Ciências Humanas e Sociais, Universidade do Algarve, 2006

Pensar e filosofar a partir do problema da existência de Deus

Relatório da Prática de Ensino Supervisionada, Mestrado em Ensino de Filosofia, Universidade de Lisboa, 2010

Vox Dei:metáfora(s) da espiritualidade

Tese de doutoramento, Belas-Artes (Pintura), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Belas-Artes, 2014

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.