New Patterns of Democracy in the Countries of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

The chapter introduces a new database on political-institutional patterns of democracy used in the contributions to the book. It provides an update and extension of Lijphart’s (1999, 2012) measurement of consensus and majoritarian democracy for the countries of the second wave of the CSES during the period 1997–2006, using 11 partly improved indicators. The chapter explores patterns of democracy by the means of factor analysis, construct additive indices, and present the resulting country scores of consensus and majoritarian democracy graphically. Two variants are presented, one featuring Lijphart’s (1999) classic ‘executives–parties’ and ‘federal–unitary’ dimensions, and another incorporating direct democracy into the framework, yielding an additional ‘cabinets–direct democracy’ dimension

The geography of large-scale land acquisitions: Analysing socio-ecological patterns of target contexts in the global South

This paper analyses local geographical contexts targeted by transnational large-scale land acquisitions (>200 ha per deal) in order to understand how emerging patterns of socio-ecological characteristics can be related to processes of large-scale foreign investment in land. Using a sample of 139 land deals georeferenced with high spatial accuracy, we first analyse their target contexts in terms of land cover, population density, accessibility, and indicators for agricultural potential. Three distinct patterns emerge from the analysis: densely populated and easily accessible croplands (35% of land deals); remote forestlands with lower population densities (34% of land deals); and moderately populated and moderately accessible shrub- or grasslands (26% of land deals). These patterns are consistent with processes described in the relevant case study literature, and they each involve distinct types of stakeholders and associated competition over land. We then repeat the often-cited analysis that postulates a link between land investments and target countries with abundant so-called “idle” or “marginal” lands as measured by yield gap and available suitable but uncultivated land; our methods differ from the earlier approach, however, in that we examine local context (10-km radius) rather than countries as a whole. The results show that earlier findings are disputable in terms of concepts, methods, and contents. Further, we reflect on methodologies for exploring linkages between socioecological patterns and land investment processes. Improving and enhancing large datasets of georeferenced land deals is an important next step; at the same time, careful choice of the spatial scale of analysis is crucial for ensuring compatibility between the spatial accuracy of land deal locations and the resolution of available geospatial data layers. Finally, we argue that new approaches and methods must be developed to empirically link socio-ecological patterns in target contexts to key determinants of land investment processes. This would help to improve the validity and the reach of our findings as an input for evidence-informed policy debates.

What Type of Resources? Household Effects and Female Electoral Participation

Mechanisms behind partner effects are contingent on women's individual resource endowment. While low and medium educated women most strongly profit from higher educational partner resources, i.e. from a compensatory mechanism, the resource “time” seems to particularly confine political involvement of women with both high professional status or no employment.

Loyal to the Game? Strategic Policy Representation in Mixed Electoral Systems

In Germany's compensatory mixed electoral system, alternative electoral routes lead into parliament. We study the relationship between candidates' electoral situations across both tiers and policy representation, fully accounting for candidate, party and district preferences in a multi-actor constellation and the exact electoral incentives for candidates to represent either the party or the district. The results (2009 Bundestag election data) yield evidence of an interactive effect of closeness of the district race and list safety on candidates' positioning between their party and constituency.

Strategic Incentives in Unconventional Electoral Systems: Introduction to the Special Issue

The study of strategic behaviour and the impact of institutions on elections has mainly focused on simple and conventional electoral systems: list-proportional electoral systems (PR) and the plurality vote. Less conventional systems are not on the agenda of comparative studies, even though no less than 30% of countries use unconventional electoral systems for their national parliamentary elections, such as the Single Transferable Vote, PR with majority bonuses, or mixed electoral systems. Often, they provide for unusual combinations of different institutional incentives, and hence to particular actor strategies.

Electoral and Financial Bookkeeping: A Comparison of Pre-Electoral Pledges on Public Spending and the Outcome of Post-Electoral Budget Debates

In the wake of the financial crisis, budgetary discipline has taken centre stage in politics. More than ever a country's budget mirrors the true policy preferences of the legislative majority beyond all political discourse and cheap talk. The paper sheds light on mandate fulfilment in the field of public spending and fiscal policy in general. Based on previous work on pledge fulfilment in Switzerland the paper compares publicised pre-electoral statements of MPs on public spending and the development of the public finances with their post-electoral legislative behaviour during budget debates and votes. The findings of the paper confirm the results of the aforementioned earlier studies and point to the potential of budgetary statements for future mandate fulfilment research.

The Role of Corruption in Explaining the Electoral Success of New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This paper examines corruption as potential determinant of their electoral success. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: On the onehand, the historically-grown corruption level reduces the electoral success of new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase of the perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral success of new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2011 confirms these two counteracting effects.