Heteronom��a, articulaci��n de intereses y pr��cticas informales en el partido socialista de la provincia de Buenos Aires (2013)

Resumen: El objetivo de este trabajo analizar las pr��cticas de un partido sub-nacional y de oposici��n en una coyuntura electoral: el Partido Socialista de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (PSBA) de caras a las elecciones legislativas de 2013. Este art��culo se propone hacer un doble juego entre supuestos te��ricos y evidencia emp��rica. En ese sentido, intentaremos definir los problemas que se desprenden de tomar al partido pol��tico como unidad de* an��lisis: la heteronom��a normativa, econ��mica y funcional, y la compleja articulaci��n de intereses. Ofreceremos un contrapunto emp��rico para confrontar dichas discusiones y analizar la combinaci��n entre pr��cticas informales e instituciones formales en la toma de decisiones, conformaci��n de coaliciones y confecci��n de listas electorales. Nuestra hip��tesis es que el PSBA muestra un despliegue de pr��cticas informales muchas veces explicado por condicionantes tales como la heteronom��a y por la dificultad de articular eficientemente los intereses divergentes en su seno, las decisiones pol��ticas son fruto de la compleja interacci��n de todas esas variables.

Presidencialismo y relaciones ejecutivo-legislativo en la Argentina : (1983-2007)

Resumen: Este trabajo muestra que la din��mica Ejecutivo-Legislativo en la Argentina, para el per��odo 1983-2007, ha sido una de las causas de la inestabilidad institucional en ese pa��s (y, por ende, de los malos resultados econ��micos). Sin embargo, teniendo en cuenta que tanto el parlamentarismo como el semipresidencialismo, a priori, no ser��an opciones viables (seg��n las creencias y valores de la sociedad argentina), la soluci��n no ser��a cambiar de sistema de gobierno, sino reformarlo. La Argentina deber��a acotar la discrecionalidad presidencial, as�� como la influencia de los liderazgos partidarios provinciales sobre sus legisladores nacionales. La hip��tesis subyacente es que este tipo de propuesta ayudar��a a consolidar el cl��sico rol del Congreso bajo reg��menes presidencialistas, con la consiguiente ganancia en estabilidad institucional (y en desempe��o econ��mico). Concretamente, las futuras investigaciones deber��an estudiar la posible eliminaci��n de la prerrogativa presidencial de legislar mediante decretos de necesidad y urgencia, y la reducci��n de la magnitud de los distritos electorales m��s grandes para la elecci��n de diputados nacionales.

Turnout Intention and Social Networks

How can networking affect the turnout in an election? We present a simple model to explain turnout as a result of a dynamic process of formation of the intention to vote within Erd��s-Renyi random networks. Citizens have fixed preferences for one of two parties and are embedded in a given social network. They decide whether or not to vote on the basis of the attitude of their immediate contacts. They may simply follow the behavior of the majority (followers) or make an adaptive local calculus of voting (Downsian behavior). So they either have the intention of voting when the majority of their neighbors are willing to vote too, or they vote when they perceive in their social neighborhood that elections are "close". We study the long run average turnout, interpreted as the actual turnout observed in an election. Depending on the combination of values of the two key parameters, the average connectivity and the probability of behaving as a follower or in a Downsian fashion, the system exhibits monostability (zero turnout), bistability (zero turnout and either moderate or high turnout) or tristability (zero, moderate and high turnout). This means, in particular, that for a wide range of values of both parameters, we obtain realistic turnout rates, i.e. between 50% and 90%.

Fatores respons��veis pelo desequil��brio na proporcionalidade na C��mara Federal

Analisa propostas apresentadas para mudan��as no sistema de representatividade dos Estados e Distrito Federal na C��mara dos Deputados. O desequil��brio est�� relacionado aos votos e cadeiras obtidos pelos partidos nas elei����es e a distor����o entre a popula����o de determinadas unidades federativas e as cadeiras destinadas aos deputados. Esse desequil��brio gera consequ��ncias no parlamento e contradiz o princ��pio de um Estado democr��tico de direito apresente o mesmo valor do voto para todo cidad��o.

As constitui����es democr��ticas brasileiras e a representa����o pol��tica

A representa����o pol��tica �� essencialmente uma rela����o entre representante e representado. A natureza dessa rela����o variou ao longo do tempo e assumiu diferentes formatos pol��ticos e institucionais. Pitkin, ao abordar essas varia����es e sistematizar o tema da representa����o pol��tica, fornece instrumentos que permitem uma reflex��o sobre as experi��ncias de representa����o inscritas nas Cartas Constitucionais democr��ticas do Brasil de 1934, 1946 e 1988. Reflex��o essa que, complementada �� luz do pensamento de te��ricos da representa����o pol��tica como Guizot, Mill e Mano��lesco, permitem observar que a representa����o, al��m de ser uma rela����o entre representante e representado, �� tamb��m um fen��meno que envolve, no Estado Moderno, a quest��o do governo da na����o e da incorpora����o dos valores democr��ticos, materializados, em parte, sob a forma do voto, das elei����es, como participa����o indireta, e em parte, sob a forma da participa����o n��o-eleitoral, a partir de outros formatos institucionais.

Atua����o da C��mara dos Deputados na regulamenta����o das normas para elei����o dos membros do PARLASUL de 2014

O Brasil precisa definir sua situa����o da representa����o parlamentar no parlamento do MERCOSUL, o PARLASUL. Importantes quest��es n��o est��o sendo tratadas com a devida aten����o, pois atualmente os Parlamentares da Representa����o Brasileira do MERCOSUL s��o os pol��ticos em atividade no Congresso Nacional, indicados pelos partidos, de forma semelhante ��s outras comiss��es do Senado e da C��mara dos Deputados e dividem suas extensas atividades di��rias com os trabalhos desse novo parlamento e isso acaba comprometendo a atua����o perante esse bloco econ��mico. Para tal, est�� tramitando na C��mara dos Deputados o Projeto de Lei n�� 5279 de 2009, de autoria do Deputado Carlos Zarattini, que estabelece normas para as elei����es dos parlamentares do MERCOSUL. Por ser um projeto de grande relev��ncia, sua tramita����o est�� sendo longa. Al��m disto, apresenta pontos pol��micos que afetam diretamente outra grande discuss��o do ambiente pol��tico nacional, a reforma pol��tica, principalmente com sistema de listas preordenadas pelos partidos pol��ticos e o financiamento p��blico exclusivo de campanha. Analisa o comportamento dos parlamentares brasileiros na estrutura de escolha dos representantes para o PARLASUL, que tendem a aprovar o projeto. Para um maior entendimento desta elei����o e de todo processo da cria����o de um bloco econ��mico, a pesquisa aborda desde os prim��rdios das Rela����es Internacionais que originaram a cria����o de uma integra����o sul-americana, bem como um exame dos dados hist��ricos da evolu����o do MERCOSUL e do PARLASUL.

A escolha democr��tica dos representantes por meio do voto eletr��nico e a manuten����o e continuidade da democracia com aux��lio da urna eletr��nica

Apresenta a urna eletr��nica como agente essencial para a manuten����o da democracia. S��o apresentadas as origens do voto no Brasil, indo at�� a proposta e execu����o do ambicioso projeto de elei����es gerais com base em urnas eletr��nicas. Descreve como se deu o desenvolvimento do equipamento. Os requisitos de seguran��a da informa����o s��o apresentados no contexto da vota����o eletr��nica tendo como par��metro a norma ISO 27.002. Observa que h�� melhorias que devem ser continuamente realizadas a fim de garantir a efetiva realiza����o de um processo eleitoral seguro e confi��vel.

Sistema seguro de vota����o eletr��nica multi-c��lulas

Em uso desde a Gr��cia antiga e atualmente massificado na maioria dos pa��ses do mundo, o sistema de vota����o tradicional baseado em c��dulas de papel possui diversos problemas associados �� seguran��a, tais como dificuldades para evitar coer����o do eleitor, venda do voto e substitui����o fraudulenta do eleitor. Al��m de problemas de usabilidade que acarretam erros de preenchimento da c��dula e um processo de apura����o lento, que pode durar dias. Ao lado disso, o sistema tradicional n��o fornece a contraprova do voto, que permite ao eleitor conferir se o seu voto foi corretamente contabilizado na apura����o. Inicialmente acreditou-se que a informatiza����o do sistema de vota����o resolveria todos os problemas do sistema tradicional. Por��m, com a sua implanta����o em alguns pa��ses o sistema de vota����o eletr��nica n��o mostrou-se capaz de fornecer garantias irrefut��veis que n��o tivesse sido alvo de altera����es fraudulentas durante o seu desenvolvimento ou opera����o. A m�� reputa����o do sistema eletr��nico est�� principalmente associada �� falta de transpar��ncia dos processos que, em sua maioria, n��o proporcionam a materializa����o do voto, conferido pelo eleitor para fins de contagem manual, e nem geram evid��ncias (contraprova) da correta contabiliza����o do voto do eleitor. O objetivo deste trabalho �� propor uma arquitetura de vota����o eletr��nica que integra, de forma segura, o anonimato e autenticidade do votante, a confidencialidade e integridade do voto/sistema. O sistema aumenta a usabilidade do esquema de vota����o baseado em "Tr��s C��dulas" de papel, implementando-o computacionalmente. O esquema oferece maior credibilidade ao sistema de vota����o atrav��s da materializa����o e contraprova do voto, resist��ncia �� coer����o e ao com��rcio do voto. Utilizando esquemas de criptografia assim��trica e seguran��a computacional cl��ssica, associado a um sistema de auditoria eficiente, a proposta garante seguran��a e transpar��ncia nos processos envolvidos. A arquitetura de constru����o modular distribui a responsabilidade entre suas entidades, agregando-lhe robustez e viabilizando elei����es em grande escala. O prot��tipo do sistema desenvolvido usando servi��os web e Election Markup Language mostra a viabilidade da proposta.

To appove or not to approve: this is not the only question

This paper deals with electing candidates. In elections voters are frequently offered a small set of actions (voting in favor of one candidate, voting blank, spoiling the ballot, and not showing up). Thus voters can express neither a negative opinion nor an opinion on more than one candidate. Approval voting partially fills this gap by asking an opinion on all candidates. Still the choice is only between approval and non approval. However non approval may mean disapproval or just indifference or even absence of suffcient knowledge for approving the candidate. In this paper we characterize the dis&approval voting rule, a natural extension of approval voting that distinguishes between indifference and disapproval.

Elei����es na integra����o regional : desenvolvimento das proposi����es nacionais para as elei����es diretas do parlamento do Mercosul

Analisa o andamento das propostas legislativas para elei����es dos parlamentares do Mercosul em todos os Estados-Membros do bloco. Apresenta e avalia a situa����o das discuss��es sobre as elei����es diretas nos Estados que ainda n��o aprovaram as diretrizes para as elei����es mercosulinas, bem como a j�� aprovada e aplicada legisla����o eleitoral paraguaia.

Awakening a sleeping giant: The riddle of Latino political participation

<p>For some time now, the Latino voice has been gradually gaining strength in American politics, particularly in such states as California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas, where large numbers of Latino immigrants have settled and large numbers of electoral votes are at stake. Yet the issues public officials in these states espouse and the laws they enact often do not coincide with the interests and preferences of Latinos. The fact that Latinos in California and elsewhere have not been able to influence the political agenda in a way that is commensurate with their numbers may reflect their failure to participate fully in the political process by first registering to vote and then consistently turning out on election day to cast their ballots. </p> <p>To understand Latino voting behavior, I first examine Latino political participation in California during the ten general elections of the 1980s and 1990s, seeking to understand what percentage of the eligible Latino population registers to vote, with what political party they register, how many registered Latinos to go the polls on election day, and what factors might increase their participation in politics. To ensure that my findings are not unique to California, I also consider Latino voter registration and turnout in Texas for the five general elections of the 1990s and compare these results with my California findings. </p> <p>I offer a new approach to studying Latino political participation in which I rely on county-level aggregate data, rather than on individual survey data, and employ the ecological inference method of generalized bounds. I calculate and compare Latino and white voting-age populations, registration rates, turnout rates, and party affiliation rates for California's fifty-eight counties. Then, in a secondary grouped logit analysis, I consider the factors that influence these Latino and white registration, turnout, and party affiliation rates. </p> <p>I find that California Latinos register and turn out at substantially lower rates than do whites and that these rates are more volatile than those of whites. I find that Latino registration is motivated predominantly by age and education, with older and more educated Latinos being more likely to register. Motor voter legislation, which was passed to ease and simplify the registration process, has not encouraged Latino registration . I find that turnout among California's Latino voters is influenced primarily by issues, income, educational attainment, and the size of the Spanish-speaking communities in which they reside. Although language skills may be an obstacle to political participation for an individual, the number of Spanish-speaking households in a community does not encourage or discourage registration but may encourage turnout, suggesting that cultural and linguistic assimilation may not be the entire answer. </p> <p>With regard to party identification, I find that Democrats can expect a steady Latino political identification rate between 50 and 60 percent, while Republicans attract 20 to 30 percent of Latino registrants. I find that education and income are the dominant factors in determining Latino political party identification, which appears to be no more volatile than that of the larger electorate. </p> <p>Next, when I consider registration and turnout in Texas, I find that Latino registration rates are nearly equal to those of whites but that Texas Latino turnout rates are volatile and substantially lower than those of whites. </p> <p>Low turnout rates among Latinos and the volatility of these rates may explain why Latinos in California and Texas have had little influence on the political agenda even though their numbers are large and increasing. Simply put, the voices of Latinos are little heard in the halls of government because they do not turn out consistently to cast their votes on election day. </p> <p>While these findings suggest that there may not be any short-term or quick fixes to Latino participation, they also suggest that Latinos should be encouraged to participate more fully in the political process and that additional education may be one means of achieving this goal. Candidates should speak more directly to the issues that concern Latinos. Political parties should view Latinos as crossover voters rather than as potential converts. In other words, if Latinos were "a sleeping giant," they may now be a still-drowsy leviathan waiting to be wooed by either party's persuasive political messages and relevant issues. </p>

The Voting Rights Act, Shelby County, and Redistricting: Improving Estimates of Racially Polarized Voting in a Multiple-Election Context

<p>The Supreme Court���s decision in Shelby County has severely limited the power of the Voting Rights Act. I argue that Congressional attempts to pass a new coverage formula are unlikely to gain the necessary Republican support. Instead, I propose a new strategy that takes a ���carrot and stick��� approach. As the stick, I suggest amending Section 3 to eliminate the need to prove that discrimination was intentional. For the carrot, I envision a competitive grant program similar to the highly successful Race to the Top education grants. I argue that this plan could pass the currently divided Congress.</p> <p>Without Congressional action, Section 2 is more important than ever before. A successful Section 2 suit requires evidence that voting in the jurisdiction is racially polarized. Accurately and objectively assessing the level of polarization has been and continues to be a challenge for experts. Existing ecological inference methods require estimating polarization levels in individual elections. This is a problem because the Courts want to see a history of polarization across elections.</p> <p>I propose a new 2-step method to estimate racially polarized voting in a multi-election context. The procedure builds upon the Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner (2001) multinomial-Dirichlet model. After obtaining election-specific estimates, I suggest regressing those results on election-specific variables, namely candidate quality, incumbency, and ethnicity of the minority candidate of choice. This allows researchers to estimate the baseline level of support for candidates of choice and test whether the ethnicity of the candidates affected how voters cast their ballots.</p>

Abstention, null and blank votes in the Basque Autonomous Community

The objectives of this essay are twofold. First it reviews the reason for abstaining (or casting a null or blank vote) in elections. It also provides the data of abstention in the elections to the European Parliament. Fewer data are available on blank and null votes. These are provided for some countries. The second objective is to analyze the data of the elections in the Basque Autonomous Community since 1977. The evolution through time is commented. The main features are the low participation in the European elections on the one hand and the importance of the null vote in the 2003-2009 period.

Abstention, null and blank votes in the Basque Autonomous Community

The objectives of this essay are twofold. First it reviews the reason for abstaining (or casting a null or blank vote) in elections. It also provides the data of abstention in the elections to the European Parliament. Fewer data are available on blank and null votes. These are provided for some countries. The second objective is to analyze the data of the elections in the Basque Autonomous Community since 1977. The evolution through time is commented. The main features are the low participation in the European elections on the one hand and the importance of the null vote in the 2003-2009 period.

Essays on Correlated Equilibrium and Voter Turnout

<p>This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and game theory, unified by their focus on the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium outcomes.</p> <p>Communication is fundamental to elections. Chapter 2 extends canonical voter turnout models, where citizens, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining, to include any form of communication, and characterizes the resulting set of Aumann's correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because communication can coordinate behavior in such a way that citizens find it incentive compatible to follow their correlated signals to vote more. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs.</p> <p>In Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilibrium, which fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium, extending the latter to multiple mediators. Subcommunication equilibrium similarly extends communication equilibrium for incomplete information games. I explore the properties of these solutions and establish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication equilibria and Myerson's quasi-principals' equilibria. I characterize an upper bound on expected turnout supported by subcorrelated equilibrium in the turnout game.</p> <p>Chapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect of communication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting occurs, subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through computers. We study three communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public Communication, where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and Party Communication, where messages are exchanged only within one's own party. Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communication increases turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. The data are consistent with correlated equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public communication increases turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.</p>