Two-way communication costs and the boundaries of the firm

Casson and Wadeson (International Journal of the Economics of Business, 1998, 5, pp. 5-27) have modelled the dialogue, or conversation, which customers have with their suppliers in order to convey their requirements, while taking production implications into account. They showed that this has important implications for the positioning of the boundaries of the firm. Unfortunately, their model has the restriction that communication is only costly in the direction of customer to supplier. This paper extends their model by introducing two-way communication costs. It shows that the level of communication cost in the direction of supplier to customer is a key additional factor in determining the nature of the dialogue that takes place. It also shows that this has important additional implications for the positioning of the boundaries of the firm. Custom computer software development is used as an example of an application of the theory.

Communication costs and the boundaries of the firm

Much has been written about where the boundaries of the firm are drawn, but little about what occurs at the boundaries themselves. When a firm subcontracts, does it inform its suppliers fully of what it requires, or is it willing to accept what they have available? In practice firms often engage in a dialogue, or conversation, with their suppliers, in which at first they set out their general requirements, and only when the supplier reports back on how these can be met are their more specific requirements set out. This paper models such conversations as a rational response to communication costs. The model is used to examine the impact of new information technology, such as CAD/CAM, on the conduct of subcontracting. It can also be used to examine its impact on the marketing activities of firms. The technique of analysis, which is based on the economic theory of teams, has more general applications too. It can be used to model all the forms of dialogue involved in the processes of coordination both within and between firms.

Information strategies and the theory of the Firm

Information costs play a key role in determining the relative efficiency of alternative organisational structures. The choice of locations at which information is stored in a firm is an important determinant of its information costs. A specific example of information use is modelled in order to explore what factors determine whether information should be stored centrally or locally and if it should be replicated at different sites. This provides insights into why firms are structured hierarchically, with some decisions and tasks being performed centrally and others at different levels of decentralisation. The effects of new information technologies are also discussed. These can radically alter the patterns and levels of information costs within a firm and so can cause substantial changes in organisational structure.

The public choice sedition: variations on the theme of scientific warfare

Given a significant element of truth in "Public Choice", a modest element must be found when a similar approach is made to the behavior of economic scientists. Harry Johnson found this in "The Keynesian Revolution and the Monetarist Counter-Revolution". Following him, I find more in the Public Choice "Revolution" itself. The basic visions, assumptions and methods of the latter are appraised within its time-space stream. "Variations on a theme by Buchanan" or "The B- and F-Twist" could have been suggestive subtitles for this paper -- an embrycnic Economics of Knowledge, a complement to the Sociology of Knowledge.

The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.

Sports administration: an examination of the competitive balance concept through european and brazilian domestic soccer leagues comparison

A questão do Equilíbrio Competitivo é um tema importante da economia dos esportes profissionais nos Estados Unidos e na Europa. Muitas pesquisas foram feitas para estabelecer os critérios mais relevantes para avaliar a competitividade das ligas profissionais de futebol. Esta pesquisa analisou a relevância do Equilíbrio Competitivo como determinante da competitividade comparando o Brasileirão Série A com as nove principais ligas na Europa (Bélgica, Inglaterra, Alemanha, Holanda, França, Itália, Portugal, Escócia e Espanha). A competitividade é a capacidade de uma empresa (um clube) ou de uma indústria de enfrentar a concorrência efetiva ou potencial. A medida da competitividade deve levar em consideração uma série de fatores importantes como a qualidade e a relação qualidade/preço, a gestão de recursos humanos e a organização empresarial. Esse trabalho visa demonstrar que, apesar da incerteza do resultado ter sido considerado por muito tempo como um fator positivo de atratividade/interesse dos fãs nos esportes, um campeonato equilibrado poderia ter um efeito insignificante, para não dizer desprezível sobre a competitividade das ligas de futebol a longo prazo. Os resultados mostraram que o aumento do Equilíbrio Competitivo pode ser relevante para os campeonatos mais fracos (Bélgica, Holanda, Portugal, Escócia), mas nao dos cincos melhores (Alemanha, Espanha, França, Inglaterra, Itália). Consequentemente, o Equilíbrio Competitivo deve ser contemplado como uma variável desprezível quanto à competitividade das ligas de futebol, apesar do interesse crescente pelo conceito na literatura. Baseado principalmente em pesquisas de Dell'Osso e Symanski (1991) e de Oughton e Michie (2004), o índice HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman) tem sido utilizado para determinar o nível de concentração de 11 ligas de futebol estudadas. Uma revisão da literatura sobre administração de futebol e esportes foi realizada.

The effect of using claim confirming product cues on the product claim credibility: is seeing believing?

The Cue Utilization Theory establishes that all products are made of multiples cues that may be seen as surrogates for the intangible attributes that make up any given product. However, the results of many years of research have yet yielded little consensus as to the impact generated by the use of such cues. This research aims to contribute to the discussion about the importance of intrinsic cues by investigating the effects that the use of product cues that confirm the product claim may have on Claim Credibility (measured through Ad Credibility), and also on consumers’ Purchase Intention and Perceived Risk toward the product. An experiment was designed to test such effects and the results suggest the effects of the use of Claim Confirming Product Cues depend on consumer’s level of awareness about such cue, and that when consumers are aware of it, Ad Credibility and Purchase Intention increase, as Perceived Risk decreases. Such results may have implications to academicians and practitioners, as well as may provide insights for future research.

Ownership, control and corporate valuation of Brazilian companies

We study the direct and indirect ownership structure of Brazilian corporations and their market value and risk by the end of 1996 and 1998. Ownership is quite concentrated with most companies being controlled by a single direct shareholder. We find evidence that indirect control structures may be used to concentrate control even more rather than to keep control of the company with a smaller share of total capital. The greater the concentration of voting rights then less the value of the fmn should be due to potential expropriation ofrninority shareholders. We fmd evidence that when there is a majority shareholder and when indirect ownership structures are used without the loss of control, corporate valuations are greater when control is dilluted through the indirect ownership structure. This evidence is consistent with the existence of private benefits of control that can be translated as potential minority shareholder expropriation.

Electoral control in the presence of gridlocks

This article presents a game-theoretic partisan model of voting and political bargaining. In a two-period setup, voters ¯rst elect an executive incumbent and the legislators from a pool of candidates belonging to di®erent parties. Once elected, the executive and the legislature bargain over a budget. Party origin and a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world, in°uence the bargaining cost, such that political gridlocks may occur. At the end of the ¯rst period voters observe the outcome of bargaining but do not observe the true estate of the world, and decide whether or not to reelect the same parties for the Executive and the Legislature. The model con¯rms the very recent literature by showing that voters tend to have more °exible reelection criteria when they believe the true state of the world is likely to be unfavorable. On the other hand, when voters believe the true state of the world is likely to be favorable, they become more demanding in order to reelect the incumbents. In particular, there will be government shutdown with positive probability in equilibrium. Gridlocks occur due to the imperfect information of voters and they constitute indeed an information revelation mechanism that improves electoral control in the second period.

A Theory of voter experimentation in repeated elections

Nesse artigo, eu desenvolvo e analiso um modelo de dois perí odos em que dois polí ticos competem pela preferência de um eleitor representativo, que sabe quão benevolente é um dos polí ticos mas é imperfeitamente informado sobre quão benevolente é o segundo polí tico. O polí tico conhecido é interpretado como um incumbente de longo prazo, ao passo que o polí tico desconhecido é interpretado como um desa fiante menos conhecido. É estabelecido que o mecanismo de provisão de incentivos inerente às elei cões - que surge através da possibilidade de não reeleger um incumbente - e considerações acerca de aquisi cão de informa cão por parte do eleitor se combinam de modo a determinar que em qualquer equilí brio desse jogo o eleitor escolhe o polí tico desconhecido no per íodo inicial do modelo - uma a cão à qual me refi ro como experimenta cão -, fornecendo assim uma racionaliza cão para a não reelei cão de incumbentes longevos. Especifi camente, eu mostro que a decisão do eleitor quanto a quem eleger no per odo inicial se reduz à compara cão entre os benefí cios informacionais de escolher o polí tico desconhecido e as perdas econômicas de fazê-lo. Os primeiros, que capturam as considera cões relacionadas à aquisi cão de informa cão, são mostrados serem sempre positivos, ao passo que as últimas, que capturam o incentivo à boa performance, são sempre não-negativas, implicando que é sempre ótimo para o eleitor escolher o polí tico desconhecido no per íodo inicial.

Rhamnolipids and PHAs: Recent reports on Pseudomonas-derived molecules of increasing industrial interest

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Multiobjective optimization of economic balances of sugarcane harvest biomass

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

A bio-economic appraisal of pair trawl fisheries off southeastern Brazil

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

A comparative evaluation of open loop and closed loop drug administration strategies in the treatment of AIDS.

In recent years, many researchers in the field of biomedical sciences have made successful use of mathematical models to study, in a quantitative way, a multitude of phenomena such as those found in disease dynamics, control of physiological systems, optimization of drug therapy, economics of the preventive medicine and many other applications. The availability of good dynamic models have been providing means for simulation and design of novel control strategies in the context of biological events. This work concerns a particular model related to HIV infection dynamics which is used to allow a comparative evaluation of schemes for treatment of AIDS patients. The mathematical model adopted in this work was proposed by Nowak & Bangham, 1996 and describes the dynamics of viral concentration in terms of interaction with CD4 cells and the cytotoxic T lymphocytes, which are responsible for the defense of the organism. Two conceptually distinct techniques for drug therapy are analyzed: Open Loop Treatment, where a priori fixed dosage is prescribed and Closed Loop Treatment, where the doses are adjusted according to results obtained by laboratory analysis. Simulation results show that the Closed Loop Scheme can achieve improved quality of the treatment in terms of reduction in the viral load and quantity of administered drugs, but with the inconvenience related to the necessity of frequent and periodic laboratory analysis.