Post-Crisis Economic Reform in Indonesia:Policy for Intervening in Ownership in Historical Perspective

Introduction : Economic reform in Indonesia after the Asian currency crisis is often discussed in parallel with Thailand and South Korea, which were alike hit by the crisis. It should however be noted that what happened in Indonesia was a change of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy, not just a change of government as seen in Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia’s post-crisis reform should be understood in the context of dismantling of the Soeharto regime to seek a new democratic state system. 　　　In the political sphere, dramatic institutional changes have occurred since the downfall of the Soeharto government in May 1998. In comparison, changes in the economic sphere are more complex than the political changes, as the former involve at least three aspects. The first is the continuity in the basic framework of capitalist system with policy orientation toward economic liberalization. In this framework, the policies to overcome the crisis are continued from the last period of the Soeharto rule, under the support system of IMF and CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The second aspect is the impact of the political regime change on the economic structure. It is considered that the structure of economic vested interests of the Soeharto regime is being disintegrated as the regime breaks down. The third aspect is the impact of the political regime change on economic policy-making process. The process of formulating and implementing policies has changed drastically from the Soeharto time. With these three aspects simultaneously at work, it is not so easy to identify which of them is the main cause for a given specific economic phenomenon emerging in Indonesia today. 　　　Keeping this difficulty in mind, this paper attempts to situate the post-crisis economic reform in the broader context of the historical development of Indonesian economic policies and their achievements. We focus in particular on the reform policies for banking and corporate sectors and resulting structural changes in these sectors. This paper aims at understanding the significance of the changes in the economic ownership structure that are occurring in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. Economic policies here do not mean macro economic policies, such as fiscal, financial and trade policies, but refer to micro economic policies whereby the government intervenes in the economic ownership structure. In Section 1, we clarify why economic policies for intervening in the ownership structure are important in understanding Indonesia. Section 2 follows the historical development of Indonesia’s economic policies as specified above, throughout the four successive periods since Indonesia’s independence, namely, the parliamentary democracy period, the Guided Democracy period under Soekarno, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period, and the Soeharto-regime transfiguration period2. Then we observe what economic ownership structure was at work in the pre-crisis last days of the Soeharto rule as an outcome of the economic policies. In Section 3, we examine what structural changes have taken place in the banking and corporate sectors due to the reform policies in the post-crisis and post-Soeharto Indonesia. Lastly in Section 4, we interpret the current reorganization of the economic ownership in the context of the historical transition of the ownership structure, taking account of the changes in the policy-making processes under democratization.

From supervision to resolution: next steps on the road to European Banking Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/04, February 2012

The European Council has outlined the creation of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), complementing the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The thinking on the SRM’s legal basis, design and mission is still preliminary and depends on other major initiatives, including the European Stability Mechanism’s involvement in bank recapitalisations and the Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRR) Directive. The SRM should also not be seen as the final step creating Europe’s future banking union. Both the BRR Directive and the SRM should be designed to enable the substantial financial participation of existing creditors in future bank restructurings. To be effective, the SRM should empower a central body. However, in the absence of Treaty change and of further fiscal integration, SRM decisions will need to be implemented through national resolution regimes. The central body of the SRM should be either the European Commission, or a new authority. This legislative effort should not be taken as an excuse to delay decisive action on the management and resolution of the current European banking fragility, which imposes a major drag on Europe’s growth and employment.

Europe's growth problem (and what to do about it). Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/03, April 2013

The issue: The European Union's pre-crisis growth performance was disappointing enough, but the performance has been even more dismal since the onset of the crisis. Weak growth is undermining private and public deleveraging,and is fuelling continued banking fragility. Persistently high unemployment is eroding skills, discouraging labour market participation and undermining the EU’s long-term growth potential. Low overall growth is making it much tougher for the hard-hit economies in southern Europe to recover competitiveness and regain control of their public finances. Stagnation would reduce the attractiveness of Europe for investment. Under these conditions, Europe's social models are bound to prove unsustainable. Policy Challenge: The European Union's weak long-term growth potential and unsatisfactory recovery from the crisis represent a major policy challenge. Over and above the structural reform agenda, which vitally important, bold policy action is needed. The priority is to get bank credit going. Banking problems need to be assessed properly and bank resolution and recapitalisation should be pursued. Second, fostering the reallocation of factors to the most productive firms and the sectors that contribute to aggregate rebalancing is vital. Addressing intra-euro area competitiveness divergence is essential to support growth in southern Europe. Third, the speed of fiscal adjustment needs to be appropriate and EU funds should be front loaded to countries in deep recession, while the European Investment Bank should increase investment.

The euro area's tightrope walk: debt and competitiveness in Italy and Spain. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/11, September 2013

Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.

Does the European Semester deliver the right policy advice? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/12, 20 September 2013

The July 2013 European Council recommendations to the euro area recognise a number of fiscal and macrostructural challenges, but do not fully exploit the options made possible by the European economic governance framework. There are particular problems with the Council's suggestions for the euro area as whole, which are not (or not adequately) reflected by the country-specific recommendations. A major drawback is that the Council recommendations do not give sufficient importance to symmetric intra-euro area adjustments. Reference to the euro area's ‘aggregate fiscal stance’ is empty rhetoric. Insufficient attention is paid to demand management. The most comprehensive recommendations are made on structural reforms. The July/August 2013 Article IV IMF recommendations on macroeconomic policies could also have been more ambitious, but they correspond better to the economic situation of the euro area than the Council’s recommendations. The President of the Eurogroup should continue discussions on the completion of the economic governance framework, including completion of the banking union and the setting-up of a euro-area institution responsible for managing the euro area’s aggregate fiscal stance.

The European Central Bank in the age of banking union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/13, 1 October 2013

During the crisis the European Central Bank’s roles have been greatly extended beyond its price stability mandate. In addition to the primary objective of price stability and the secondary objective of supporting EU economic policies, we identify ten new tasks related to monetary policy and financial stability. We argue that there are three main constraints on monetary policy: fiscal dominance, financial repercussions and regional divergences. By assessing the ECB’s tasks in light of these constraints, we highlight a number of synergies between these tasks and the ECB’s primary mandate of price stability. But we highlight major conflicts of interest related to the ECB’s participation in financial assistance programmes. We also underline that the ECB’s government bond purchasing programmes have introduced the concept of ‘monetary policy under conditionality’, which involves major dilemmas. A solution would be a major change towards a US-style system, in which state public debts are small, there are no federal bail-outs for states, the central bank does not purchase state debt and banks do not hold state debt. Such a change is unrealistic in the foreseeable future.

Ending uncertainty: recapitalisation under European Central Bank supervision. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/18, 17 December 2013

Estimates of the recapitalisation needs of the euro-area banking system vary between €50 and €600 billion. The range shows the considerable uncertainty about the quality of banks’ balance sheets and about the parameters of the forthcoming European Central Bank stress tests, including the treatment of sovereign debt and systemic risk. Uncertainty also prevails about the rules and discretion that will applyto bank recapitalisation, bank restructuring and bank resolution in 2014 and beyond. The ECB should communicate the relevant parameters of its exercise early and in detail to give time to the private sector to find solutions. The ECB should establish itself as a tough supervisor and force non-viable banks into restructuring. This could lead to short-term financial volatility, but it should be weighed against the cost of a durably weak banking system and the credibility risk to the ECB. The ECB may need to provide large amounts of liquidity to the financial system. Governments should support the ECB, accept cross-border bank mergers and substantial creditor involvement under clear bail-in rules and should be prepared to recapitalise banks. Governments should agree on the eventual creation of a single resolution mechanism with efficient and fast decision-making procedures, and which can exercise discretion where necessary. A resolution fund, even when fully built-up, needs to have a common fiscal backstop to be credible.

The Asset Quality Review and Capital Needs: Why re-capitalise banks with public money? CEPS Policy Brief No. 311, 19 December 2013

It is generally assumed that any capital needs discovered by the Asset Quality Review the ECB is scheduled to finish by the end of 2014 should be filled by public funding (= fiscal backstop). This assumption is wrong, however. Banks that do not have enough capital should be asked to obtain it from the market; or be restructured using the procedures and rules recently agreed. The Directorate-General for Competition at the European Commission should be particularly vigilant to ensure that no further state aid flows to an already oversized European banking system. The case for a public backstop was strong when the entire euro area banking system was under stress, but this is no longer the case. Banks with a viable business model can find capital; those without should be closed because any public-sector re-capitalisation would likely mean throwing good money after bad.

Policy Lessons for Macroeconomic and Financial Crisis Management in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. CEPS Policy Brief No. 308, 13 December 2013

This Policy Brief attempts to draw lessons from the combination of the global financial crisis and the Arab uprisings focusing on the domains related to fiscal, monetary and financial policies. It does so by answering the following questions: What has been the impact of the crisis and the uprisings on the fiscal, monetary and financial policies of the SEMCs? What have been the crisis management actions? And what policy lessons can be drawn for crisis management in the future? And how can the EU contribute to this within the Euro-Med Partnership?

In sickness and in health: protecting and supporting public investment in Europe. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/02, February 2014

The long-term decline in gross public investment in European Union countries mirrors the trend in other advanced economies, but recent developments have been different: public investment has increased elsewhere, but in the EU it has declined and even collapsed in the most vulnerable countries, exaggerating the output fall. The provisions in the EU fiscal framework to support public investment are very weak.The recently inserted ‘investment clause’ is almost no help. In the short term, exclusion of national co-funding of EU-supported investments from the fiscal indicators considered in the Stability and Growth Pact would be sensible. In the medium term, the EU fiscal framework should be extended with an asymmetric ‘golden rule’ to further protect public investment in bad times, while limiting adverse incentives in good times. During a downturn, a European investment programme is needed and the European Semester should encourage greater investment by member states with healthy public finances and low public investment rates. Reform and harmonisation of budgeting, accounting, transparency and project assessment is also needed to improve the quality of public investment.

Europe's social problem and its implications for economic growth. Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/03, 1 April 2014

The European Union faces major social problems. More than six million jobs were lost from 2008-13 and poverty has increased. Fiscal consolidation has generally attempted to spare social protection from spending cuts, but the distribution of adjustment costs between the young and old has been uneven; a growing generational divide is evident, disadvantaging the young. The efficiency of the social security systems of EU countries varies widely. Countries with greater inequality tended to have higher household borrowing prior to the crisis resulting in more subdued consumption growth during the crisis. The resulting high private debt, high unemployment, poverty and more limited access to education undermine long-term growth and social and political stability. Policymakers face three main challenges. First, addressing unemployment and poverty should remain a high priority not only for its own sake, but because these problems undermine public debt sustainability and growth. Second, bold policies in various areas are required. Most labour, social and fiscal policies are the responsibility of member states, requiring national reforms. But better coordination of demand management at European level is also necessary in order to create jobs. Third, tax/benefit systems should be reviewed for improved efficiency, inter- generational equity and fair burden sharing between the wealthy and poor.

Flexibility clauses in the Stability and Growth Pact: No need for revision. CEPS Policy Brief No. 319, 24 July 2014

This Policy Brief offers an in-depth review of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and looks at whether the margins of flexibility within existing rules are sufficient in the current climate of low growth, or whether there is a need to broaden them. The issue is especially relevant as the changing economic environment is raising fresh questions about whether the EU’s current common economic policies are able to manage dismal growth and low inflation. The fragile state of confidence in financial markets and the unresolved but inevitable questions of moral hazard linked to lax fiscal policies mean that no large-scale fiscal expansion to support the recovery of economic activity is feasible. The discussion may therefore only concern the scope within the SGP to accommodate an unexpected drop in economic activity and to provide room for the implementation of structural reforms. Here, we analyse the flexibility clauses of the Stability and Growth Pact under three headings; namely “exceptional circumstances”, “structural reforms and other relevant factors”, and the “investment clause”. Recommendation: Our main conclusion is that the SGP contains sufficient flexibility to accommodate an unexpected drop in economic activity and has the margins needed to finance structural reforms during the transition to the new regime. We therefore see no need to change the existing rules of the SGP. We believe that the ongoing debate about a fresh growth strategy for the eurozone and the European Union would greatly benefit from removing from the Council table ill-formulated and unnecessary demands for greater flexibility in the SGP.

Ukraine: Can meaningful reform come out of conflict? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/08, August 2014

Apart from threats to its national security and territorial integrity, Ukraine faces serious economic challenges. These result from the slow pace of economic and institutional reform in the previous two decades, the populist policies of the Yanukovych era and the consequences of the conflict with Russia. The new Ukrainian authorities have made pro-reform declarations, but these do not seem to be supported sufficiently by concrete policy measures, especially in the critical areas of fiscal, balance-of-payment and structural adjustment. Also, the international financial aid package granted to Ukraine has not been accompanied by sufficiently strong policy conditionality. Ukraine urgently needs a complex programme of far-reaching economic and institutional reform, which will include both short-term fiscal and macroeconomic adjustment measures and medium- to long-term structural and institutional changes. Energy subsidies and the low retirement age are the two critical policy areas that require adjustment to avoid sovereign default and a balance-of-payments crisis.

Policy recommendations for the new European Commission: priorities for stabilising EMU. EPC Discussion Paper, 30 September 2014

The euro area crisis exposed substantial structural flaws in the currency area’s architecture. Addressing these flaws this discussion paper explores the ways in which the European Institutions can re-evaluate and overcome challenges for a more positive European future. To do this, Janis A. Emmanouilidis, Jan David Schneider, and Fabian Zuleeg recommend that the coming European Commission should develop a new framework to assess the real returns to growth of public and social investment, which could open the path for more flexibility on deficits in future. In close coordination with the European Parliament, the Commission should also review the Country Specific Recommendations with a stronger focus on a smaller number of key priorities for each country. The construction of a fiscal capacity should be made a priority in the new political cycle to resolve the absence of a mechanism to provide effective ex ante fiscal risk sharing in the Eurozone. Furthermore, to boost growth, there is a need to encourage private, public and social investment through a European Investment Programme (EIP) in the short term. Finally, the Commission should ensure that the implementation of an EIP is compatible with the long term goals of a fiscal capacity.

Financial Transaction Tax (FTT): Why the EU needs the FTT but the FTT does not need the EU. EPC Policy Brief, 17 June 2014

Through an Enhanced Cooperation Procedure (ECP) 11 eurozone countries (ECP-11) – among them the four biggest; Germany, France, Italy and Spain – have aspired to go ahead with the introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax (EU-FTT). Apart from generating substantial revenues for tight fiscal budgets, an EU-FTT could also contribute to the reduction of transactions, which are harmful for the efficient functioning of financial markets and the real economy. However, the willingness to go forward with the finalisation of an ambitious proposal has lost some momentum recently; some of the envisaged compromises may even threaten the viability of the whole project.