Value creation : the recognition and use of scientific potential in entrepreneurship

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Univ., Dissertation, 2015

The dermal armor of the cyamodontoid placodonts (Reptilia, Sauropterygia) : morphology and systematic value / Olivier Rieppel --.

n.s. no.46(2002)

Financial development, labor and market regulations and growth

This paper investigates the importance that market regulation and financial imperfections have on firm growth. We analyse institutions af- fecting labor market as Employment Protection Laws (EP) and Product Market Regulation (PM). We show that together with the beneficial effects of financial development, a firm will get less financing, and thus investless, in a weak financial market (finance effect), the strictness of product and labor market regulations also affect firm growth (labor effect). In particular, we show that the stricter the rules the more detrimental the influence on growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. We also show that the labor effect overcomes the positive finance effect.

A Methodology to measure shareholder value orientation and shareholder value creation aimed at providing a research basis to investigate the link between both magnitudes

Does shareholder value orientation lead to shareholder value creation? This article proposes methods to quantify both, shareholder value orientation and shareholder value creation. Through the application of these models it is possible to quantify both dimensions and examine statistically in how far shareholder value orientation explains shareholder value creation. The scoring model developed in this paper allows quantifying the orientation of managers towards the objective to maximize wealth of shareholders. The method evaluates information that comes from the companies and scores the value orientation in a scale from 0 to 10 points. Analytically the variable value orientation is operationalized expressing it as the general attitude of managers toward the objective of value creation, investment policy and behavior, flexibility and further eight value drivers. The value creation model works with market data such as stock prices and dividend payments. Both methods where applied to a sample of 38 blue chip companies: 32 firms belonged to the share index IBEX 35 on July 1st, 1999, one company represents the “new economy” listed in the Spanish New Market as per July 1st, 2001, and 5 European multinational groups formed part of the EuroStoxx 50 index also on July 1st, 2001. The research period comprised the financial years 1998, 1999, and 2000. A regression analysis showed that between 15.9% and 23.4% of shareholder value creation can be explained by shareholder value orientation.

Measuring sustained superior performance at the firm level

This paper proposes a two-dimensional Strategic Performance Measure (SPM) to evaluate the achievement of sustained superior performance. This proposal builds primarily on the fact that, under the strategic management perspective, a firm's prevalent objective is the pursuit of sustained superior performance. Three basic conceptual dimensions stem from this objective: relativity, sign dependence, and dynamism. These are the foundations of the SPM, which carries out a separate evaluation of the attained superior performance and of its sustainability over time. In contrast to existing measures of performance, the SPM provides: (i) a dynamic approach by considering the progress or regress in performance over time, and (ii) a cardinal measurement of performance differences and its changes over time. The paper also proposes an axiomatic framework that a measure of strategic performance should comply with to be theoretically and managerially sound. Finally, an empirical illustration of the Spanish banking sector during 1987-1999 is herein provided by discussing some relevant cases.

Firm Size and Geographical Aggregation: An Empirical Appraisal in Industrial Location

This paper assesses empirically the importance of size discrimination and disaggregate data for deciding where to locate a start-up concern. We compare three econometric specifications using Catalan data: a multinomial logit with 4 and 41 alternatives (provinces and comarques, respectively) in which firm size is the main covariate; a conditional logit with 4 and 41 alternatives including attributes of the sites as well as size-site interactions; and a Poisson model on the comarques and the full spatial choice set (942 municipalities) with site-specific variables. Our results suggest that if these two issues are ignored, conclusions may be misleading. We provide evidence that large and small firms behave differently and conclude that Catalan firms tend to choose between comarques rather than between municipalities. Moreover, labour-intensive firms seem more likely to be located in the city of Barcelona. Keywords: Catalonia, industrial location, multinomial response model. JEL: C250, E30, R00, R12

A territorial approach to firm entry: The effect of city size

This paper concerns the effects of territorial factors on the processes involved in the creation of manufacturing firms in Spanish cities. Most contributions have focused on regional factors rather than urban ones. Here we assume that it is possible to identify certain urban factors that attract new firms. We use data for the entry of firms in Spanish manufacturing industries between 1994 and 2002. This paper contributes to the existing literature on market entry. Key words: cities, regions, firm entry and Spanish economy. JEL: R0, R12, L60

Firm Size and Short-Term Dynamics in Aggregate Entry and Exit

Much of the research on industry dynamics focuses on the interdependence between the sectorial rates of entry and exit. This paper argues that the size of firms and the reaction-adjustment period are important conditions missed in this literature. I illustrate the effects of this omission using data from the Spanish manufacturing industries between 1994 and 2001. Estimates from systems of equations models provide evidence of a conical revolving door phenomenon and of partial adjustments in the replacement-displacement of large firms. KEYWORDS: aggregation, industry dynamics, panel data, symmetry, simultaneity. JEL CLASSIFICATION: C33, C52, L60, L11

Implementation of the ordinal shapley value for a three-agent economy

We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version)

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Valuation of defaultable bonds and debt restructuring

In this paper we develop a contingent valuation model for zero-coupon bonds with default. In order to emphasize the role of maturity time and place of the lender’s claim in the hierarchy of debt of a firm, we consider a firm that issues two bonds with different maturities and different seniorage. The model allows us to analyze the implications of both debt renegotiation and capital structure of a firm on the prices of bonds. We obtain that renegotiation brings about a significant change in the bond prices and that the effect is dispersed through different channels: increasing the value of the firm, reallocating payments, and avoiding costly liquidation. Moreover, the presence of two creditors leads to qualitatively different implications for pricing, while emphasizing the importance of bond covenants and renegotiation of the entire debt.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Stakeholder activism, managerial entrenchment, and the congruence of interests between shareholders and stakeholders

We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressure groups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs. Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporate governance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. We show that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in the firm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful social activists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value. These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known social activists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders like CalPERS are showing a growing support for each other's agendas.