The experience of semi-formal infrastructure finance in developing countries: proposals for Brazil and Latin America

This paper has the purpose of analyzing the role of civil society in funding and providing nfrastructure projects in developing countries. Considering that local associations around the world have been directly engaged on some infrastructure projects – some scholars define it as “semi-formal finance” –, the intention is to demonstrate that the experiences on such arrangements in developing countries have been responsible for fostering infrastructure investments in the poorer regions where the government is more absent. Based upon legal, economic and social aspects, this paper aims to contribute to a broader debate for the development of infrastructure in emerging countries. The conclusion is that, under a more social approach, the legal and economic mechanisms in developing countries are able to consider such arrangements in the benefit of their development.

The role of the BNDES in the Brazilian development financing: contributions from the paper “towards a legal theory of finance” of Katharina Pistor

This paper aims to verify the main contributions and adjustments that the paper “Towards a Legal Theory of Finance” from Katharina Pistor may bring to the role of the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) in the Brazilian development financing. In order to do so, I work with two questions in this paper: (i) such theory presents elements which allow analyzing the role of the BNDES and from there, if it is required, adjustments can be made in the governance of the BNDES? and (ii) there are academics and scholars that, together with the theory, also contribute with the improvement of the BNDES role in the development of Brazil?

Probabilidade implícita de default em debêntures do mercado brasileiro

O trabalho busca através de um exercício empírico, extrair as curvas de probabilidade implícita de default em debêntures brasileiras. A construção ocorre em duas etapas. O primeiro desafio é obter as estruturas a termo das debêntures brasileiras. Foi utilizada a revisão proposta por Diebold e Li (2006) do modelo de Nelson Siegel (1987) para construç o das ETTJs. A segunda etapa consiste em extrair a probabilidade de default utilizado a forma reduzida do modelo de Duffie e Singleton (1999). A fração de perda em caso de default foi considerada constante conforme estudo de Xu e Nencioni (2000). A taxa de decaimento também foi mantida constante conforme proposto por Diebold e Li (2006) e Araújo (2012). O exercício foi replicado para três datas distintas durante o ciclo de redução de juros no Brasil. Dentre os resultados desse estudo identificou-se que os agentes do mercado reduziram a probabilidade de default dos emissores durante esse período. A redução nos vértices mais curtos foi mais significativa do que em vértices mais longos.

Asset pricing when risk sharing is limited by default: a theoretical framework

We study the asset pricing implications of an endowment economy when agents can default on contracts that would leave them otherwise worse off. We specialize and extend the environment studied by Kocherlakota (1995) and Kehoe and Levine (1993) to make it comparable to standard studies of asset pricillg. We completely charactize efficient allocations for several special cases. We illtroduce a competitive equilibrium with complete markets alld with elldogellous solvency constraints. These solvellcy constraints are such as to prevent default -at the cost of reduced risk sharing. We show a version of the classical welfare theorems for this equilibrium definition. We characterize the pricing kernel, alld compare it with the one for economies without participation constraints : interest rates are lower and risk premia can be bigger depending on the covariance of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Quantitative examples show that for reasonable parameter values the relevant marginal rates of substitution fali within the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.

Inglorious revolution : sovereign debt, tropical credibility, and financial underdevelopment in imperial Brazil

In 1824 the creation of institutions that constrained the monarch’s ability to unilaterally tax, spend, and debase the currency put Brazil on a path toward a revolution in public finance, roughly analogous to the financial consequences of England’s Glorious Revolution. This credible commitment to honor sovereign debt resulted in successful long-term funded borrowing at home and abroad from the 1820s through the 1880s that was unrivalled in Latin America. Some domestic bonds, denominated in the home currency and bearing exchange clauses, eventually circulated in European financial markets. The share of total debt accounted for by long-term funded issues grew, and domestic debt came to dominate foreign debt. Sovereign debt yields fell over time in London and Rio de Janeiro, and the cost of new borrowing declined on average. The market’s assessment of the probability of default tended to decrease. Imperial Brazil enjoyed favorable conditions for borrowing, and escaped the strong form of “original sin” stressed by recent work on sovereign debt. The development of vibrant private financial markets did not, however, follow from the enhanced credibility of government debt. Private finance in Imperial Brazil suffered from politicized market interventions that undermined the development of domestic capital markets. Private interest rates remained high, entry into commercial banking was heavily restricted, and limited-liability joint-stock companies were tightly controlled. The Brazilian case provides a powerful counterexample to the general proposition of North and Weingast that institutional changes that credibly commit the government to honor its obligations necessarily promote the development of private finance. The very institutions that enhanced the credibility of sovereign debt permitted the systematic repression of private financial development. In terms of its consequences for domestic capital markets, the liberal Constitution of 1824 represented an “inglorious” revolution.

Endogenous borrowing constraints and default when markets are incomplete

Incomplete markets and non-default borrowing constraints increase the volatility of pricing kernels and are helpful when addressing assetpricing puzzles. However, ruling out default when markets are in complete is suboptimal. This paper endogenizes borrowing constraints as an intertemporal incentive structure to default. It modeIs an infinitehorizon economy, where agents are allowed not to pay their liabilities and face borrowing constraints that depend on the individual history of default. Those constraints trade off the economy's risk-sharing possibilities and incentives to prevent default. The equilibrium presents stationary properties, such as an invariant distribution for the assets' solvency rate.

Debt and default in a growth model

This paper presents a small open economy model with capital accumulation and without commitment to repay debt. The optimal debt contract specifies debt relief following bad shocks and debt increase following good shocks and brings first order benefits if the country's borrowing constraint is binding. Countries with less capital (with higher marginal productivity of capital) have a higher debt-GDP ratio, are more likely to default on uncontingent bonds, require higher debt relief after bad shocks and pay a higher spread over treasury. Debt relief prescribed by the optimal contract following the interest rate hikes of 1980-81 is more than half of the debt forgiveness obtained by the main Latin American countries through the Brady agreements.

Terms of trade, macroeconomic dynamics and default decisions

A evidência empírica aponta que Termos de Troca é uma variável relevante tanto para dinâmica macroeconômica como para o risco de default em países emergentes. No entanto, a literatura de dívida soberana baseada nos trabalhos de Eaton e Gerzovitz (1981) e Arellano (2008) ainda não explorou de forma adequada as conecções entre a dinâmica de termos de troca e incentivos ao default. Nós contribuímos nessa área, introduzindo volatilidade de Termos de Troca no modelo proposto por Mendoza e Yue (2012), no qual as decisões de dívida soberana são vinculadas à um modelo de equilíbrio geral para a economia doméstica. Nós encontramos que uma economia exposta à volatilidade dos termos de troca consegue produzir uma variabilidade do consumo que supera significativamente a variabilidade do produto, característica que constitui um fato estilizado chave de business cycles de países emergentes. Nossos exercícios também mostram que decisões de default são geradas por mudanças bruscas nos termos de troca, mas não necessariamente estão vinculados à estados ruins da economia.

We're Chained: an analysis of systemic risk in finance

This dissertation presents two papers on how to deal with simple systemic risk measures to assess portfolio risk characteristics. The first paper deals with the Granger-causation of systemic risk indicators based in correlation matrices in stock returns. Special focus is devoted to the Eigenvalue Entropy as some previous literature indicated strong re- sults, but not considering different macroeconomic scenarios; the Index Cohesion Force and the Absorption Ratio are also considered. Considering the S&P500, there is not ev- idence of Granger-causation from Eigenvalue Entropies and the Index Cohesion Force. The Absorption Ratio Granger-caused both the S&P500 and the VIX index, being the only simple measure that passed this test. The second paper develops this measure to capture the regimes underlying the American stock market. New indicators are built using filtering and random matrix theory. The returns of the S&P500 is modelled as a mixture of normal distributions. The activation of each normal distribution is governed by a Markov chain with the transition probabilities being a function of the indicators. The model shows that using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the normalized eigenval- ues exhibits best fit to the returns from 1998-2013.

The effect of default risk on trading book capital requirements for public equities : an irc application for the Brazilian market

Esse é um dos primeiros trabalhos a endereçar o problema de avaliar o efeito do default para fins de alocação de capital no trading book em ações listadas. E, mais especificamente, para o mercado brasileiro. Esse problema surgiu em crises mais recentes e que acabaram fazendo com que os reguladores impusessem uma alocação de capital adicional para essas operações. Por essa razão o comitê de Basiléia introduziu uma nova métrica de risco, conhecida como Incremental Risk Charge. Essa medida de risco é basicamente um VaR de um ano com um intervalo de confiança de 99.9%. O IRC visa medir o efeito do default e das migrações de rating, para instrumentos do trading book. Nessa dissertação, o IRC está focado em ações e como consequência, não leva em consideração o efeito da mudança de rating. Além disso, o modelo utilizado para avaliar o risco de crédito para os emissores de ação foi o Moody’s KMV, que é baseado no modelo de Merton. O modelo foi utilizado para calcular a PD dos casos usados como exemplo nessa dissertação. Após calcular a PD, simulei os retornos por Monte Carlo após utilizar um PCA. Essa abordagem permitiu obter os retornos correlacionados para fazer a simulação de perdas do portfolio. Nesse caso, como estamos lidando com ações, o LGD foi mantido constante e o valor utilizado foi baseado nas especificações de basiléia. Os resultados obtidos para o IRC adaptado foram comparados com um VaR de 252 dias e com um intervalo de confiança de 99.9%. Isso permitiu concluir que o IRC é uma métrica de risco relevante e da mesma escala de uma VaR de 252 dias. Adicionalmente, o IRC adaptado foi capaz de antecipar os eventos de default. Todos os resultados foram baseados em portfolios compostos por ações do índice Bovespa.

Transformações da Probabilidade de Default - Do mundo neutro a risco para o mundo real

Este trabalho aborda os fundamentos da relação entre a medida neutra a risco e o mundo físico, apresentando algumas metodologias conhecidas de transformação da medida de probabilidade associada a cada um destes dois contextos. Mostramos como titulos de crédito podem ser utilizados para a estimação da probabilidade de inadimplência de seus emissores, explicitando os motivos que fazem com que ela não reflita, em um primeiro momento, os dados observados historicamente. Utilizando dados de empresas brasileiras, estimamos a razão entre a probabilidade de default neutra a risco e a probabilidade de default real. Tais resultados, quando comparados com outros trabalhos similares, sugerem que a razão do prêmio de risco de empresas brasileiras possui valor maior do que a de empresas americanas.

Why the ‘Rest’ doesn’t need foreign finance

The Rest will be able to catch up and grow faster than the West only if it goes against a “received truth”, namely that capital-rich countries should transfer their capital to capital-poor countries. This intuitive truth is the mantra that the West cites to justify its occupation of the markets of developing countries with its finance and its multinationals. Classical Developmentalism successfully criticized the unequal exchange involved in trade liberalization, but it didn’t succeed in criticizing foreign finance. This task has been recently achieved by New Developmentalism and its developmental macroeconomics, which shows that countries will invest and grow more if they don’t run current account deficits, even when these deficits are financed by foreign direct investment