Compensability index for compensation radiotherapy after treatment interruptions

Background The goal of our work was to develop a simple method to evaluate a compensation treatment after unplanned treatment interruptions with respect to their tumour- and normal tissue effect. Methods We developed a software tool in java programming language based on existing recommendations to compensate for treatment interruptions. In order to express and visualize the deviations from the originally planned tumour and normal tissue effects we defined the compensability index. Results The compensability index represents an evaluation of the suitability of compensatory radiotherapy in a single number based on the number of days used for compensation and the preference of preserving the originally planned tumour effect or not exceeding the originally planned normal tissue effect. An automated tool provides a method for quick evaluation of compensation treatments. Conclusions The compensability index calculation may serve as a decision support system based on existing and established recommendations.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Executive compensation and the performance of the firm

A sample of large industrial corporations is examined to determine whether there is a relationship between the levels of compensation received by the senior executives of those firms and the firms' economic performances. We find consistent evidence of such a relationship, with differences across firms in the total compensation of their three highest-paid officers being positively related to differences in both the common stock returns and operating profitability of the firms. The implication is that compensation packages are designed to reduce agency costs.

Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysis

The question of whether the design of the corporate executive pay package reflects an attempt to reduce agency costs between shareholders an managers is adressed. The components of senior executive pay are found to vary systematically across firms in a manner that cannot easily be explained by tax effects, and which would indicate that individual elements of pay are aimed at controlling for limited horizon and risk exposure problems. Managerial decisions and the structure of managerial pay therefore appear to be interrelated.

Biomass and Stored Carbohydrate Compensation after Above-Ground Biomass Removal in a Perennial Herb: Does Environmental Productivity Play a Role?

Many plant species are able to tolerate severe disturbance leading to removal of a substantial portion of the body by resprouting from intact or fragmented organs. Resprouting enables plants to compensate for biomass loss and complete their life cycles. The degree of disturbance tolerance, and hence the ecological advantage of damage tolerance (in contrast to alternative strategies), has been reported to be affected by environmental productivity. In our study, we examined the influence of soil nutrients (as an indicator of environmental productivity) on biomass and stored carbohydrate compensation after removal of aboveground parts in the perennial resprouter Plantago lanceolata. Specifically, we tested and compared the effects of nutrient availability on biomass and carbon storage in damaged and undamaged individuals. Damaged plants of P. lanceolata compensated neither in terms of biomass nor overall carbon storage. However, whereas in the nutrient-poor environment, root total non-structural carbohydrate concentrations (TNC) were similar for damaged and undamaged plants, in the nutrient-rich environment, damaged plants had remarkably higher TNC than undamaged plants. Based on TNC allocation patterns, we conclude that tolerance to disturbance is promoted in more productive environments, where higher photosynthetic efficiency allows for successful replenishment of carbohydrates. Although plants under nutrient-rich conditions did not compensate in terms of biomass or seed production, they entered winter with higher content of carbohydrates, which might result in better performance in the next growing season. This otherwise overlooked compensation mechanism might be responsible for inconsistent results reported from other studies.

What Makes a Family Firm Innovative? CEO Risk-Taking Propensity and the Organizational Context of Family Firms

Investigating the new product portfolio innovativeness of family firms connects two important topics that have recently received considerable attention in innovation and family firm research. First, new product portfolio innovativeness has been identified as a critical determinant of firm performance. Second, research on family firms has focused on the questions of if and why family firms are more or less innovative than other organizational forms. Research investigating the innovativeness of family firms has often applied a risk-oriented perspective by identifying socioemotional wealth (SEW) as the main reference that determines firm behavior. Thus, prior research has mainly focused on the organizational context to predict innovation-related family firm behavior and neglected the impact of preferences and the behavior of the chief executive officer (CEO), which have both been shown to affect firm outcomes. Hence, this study aims to extend the previous research by introducing the CEO's disposition to organizational context variables to explain the new product portfolio innovativeness of small and medium-sized family firms. Specifically, this study explores how the organizational context (i.e., ownership by top management team [TMT] family members and generation in charge of the family firm) of family firms interacts with CEO risk-taking propensity to affect new product portfolio innovativeness. Using a sample of 114 German CEOs of small and medium-sized family firms operating in manufacturing industries, the results show that CEO risk-taking propensity has a positive effect on new product portfolio innovativeness. Moreover, the analyses show that the organizational context of family firms impacts the relationship between CEO risk-taking propensity and new product portfolio innovativeness. Specifically, the relationship between CEO risk-taking propensity and new product portfolio innovativeness is weaker if levels of ownership by TMT family members are high (high SEW). Additionally, the effect of CEO risk-taking propensity on new product portfolio innovativeness is stronger in family firms at earlier generational stages (high SEW). This result suggests that if SEW is a strong reference, family firm-specific characteristics can affect individual dispositions and, in turn, the behaviors of executives. Therefore, this study helps extend the knowledge on the determinants of new product portfolio innovativeness of family firms by considering an individual CEO preference and the organizational context variables of family firms simultaneously.

The Taxation of Bonuses and its Effect on Executive Compensation - Evidence from the UK Experience

This paper explores the reaction of compensation components awarded to executive directors of UK financial institutions following the adoption of the bonus tax in December 2009. Excessive bonuses are blamed for encouraging risk taking and are regarded as one of the pull factors of the financial crisis. The British government attempted to reduce bonuses and accordingly corporate risk-taking by means of a special tax on cashbased bonuses. Using a comprehensive dataset on executive compensation we show that the introduction of the bonus tax decreased the net cash bonuses awarded to directors by about 43%, accompanied however by a simultaneous increase in other compensation components leaving both variable as well as total compensation unaffected. Hence, the incidence of the bonus tax was borne by the firms which compensated their managers for the decrease in cash-based compensation by awarding them different forms of pay. Consistent with this finding our data also suggests that firms reduced dividend pay-outs as a consequence of the bonus tax.