Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

Sequential decisions in allocation problems

[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player

Some fundamental aspects of palentological methodology: its problems and incidence

Two trends which presently exist in relation to the concept of Paleontology are analyzed, pointing out some of the aspects which negative influence. Various reflections are made based on examples of some of the principal points of paleontological method, such as the influence of a punctual sampling, the meaning of size-frequency distribution and subjectivity in the identification of fossils. Topics which have a marked repercussion in diverse aspects of Paleontology are discussed.

A donde vamos ahora? : (where are we going now) : a report on the problems of the Spanish surnamed and migrant population in Iowa,1970.

This is an overview of the United States Commission on Civil Rights and the duties of the Iowa State Advisory Committee. It contains a report concerning problems of the Spanish surnamed and migrant population in Iowa.

Computational problems in perfect phylogeny haplotyping: typing without calling the allele.

A haplotype is an m-long binary vector. The XOR-genotype of two haplotypes is the m-vector of their coordinate-wise XOR. We study the following problem: Given a set of XOR-genotypes, reconstruct their haplotypes so that the set of resulting haplotypes can be mapped onto a perfect phylogeny (PP) tree. The question is motivated by studying population evolution in human genetics, and is a variant of the perfect phylogeny haplotyping problem that has received intensive attention recently. Unlike the latter problem, in which the input is "full" genotypes, here we assume less informative input, and so may be more economical to obtain experimentally. Building on ideas of Gusfield, we show how to solve the problem in polynomial time, by a reduction to the graph realization problem. The actual haplotypes are not uniquely determined by that tree they map onto, and the tree itself may or may not be unique. We show that tree uniqueness implies uniquely determined haplotypes, up to inherent degrees of freedom, and give a sufficient condition for the uniqueness. To actually determine the haplotypes given the tree, additional information is necessary. We show that two or three full genotypes suffice to reconstruct all the haplotypes, and present a linear algorithm for identifying those genotypes.

Internal and external fluctuations around nonequilibrium steady states in one-dimensional heat-conduction problems

Thermal fluctuations around inhomogeneous nonequilibrium steady states of one-dimensional rigid heat conductors are analyzed in the framework of generalized fluctuating hydrodynamics. The effect of an external source of noise is also considered. External fluctuations come from temperature and position fluctuations of the source. Contributions of each kind of noise to the temperature correlation function are computed and compared through the study of its asymptotic behavior.