Botanisches Zentralblatt; referierendes Organ für das Gesamtgebiet der Botanik.

jahrg. 15, bd. 58 (1894)

Botanisches Zentralblatt; referierendes Organ für das Gesamtgebiet der Botanik.

jahrg. 24, bd. 94 (1903)

Botanisches Zentralblatt; referierendes Organ für das Gesamtgebiet der Botanik.

jahrg. 15, bd. 57 (1894)

Botanisches Zentralblatt; referierendes Organ für das Gesamtgebiet der Botanik.

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Botanisches Zentralblatt; referierendes Organ für das Gesamtgebiet der Botanik.

jahrg. 16, bd. 62 (1895)

Botanisches Zentralblatt; referierendes Organ für das Gesamtgebiet der Botanik.

jahrg. 18, bd. 69 (1897)

Botanisches Zentralblatt; referierendes Organ für das Gesamtgebiet der Botanik.

jahrg. 37, bd. 132 (1916)

Botanisches Zentralblatt; referierendes Organ für das Gesamtgebiet der Botanik.

jahrg. 35, bd. 125 (1914)

Botanisches Zentralblatt; referierendes Organ für das Gesamtgebiet der Botanik.

Jg.35:Bd.127 (1914)

Botanisches Zentralblatt; referierendes Organ für das Gesamtgebiet der Botanik.

jahrg. 33, bd. 120 (1912)

Botanisches Zentralblatt; referierendes Organ für das Gesamtgebiet der Botanik.

jahrg. 34, bd. 123 (1913)

Botanisches Zentralblatt; referierendes Organ für das Gesamtgebiet der Botanik.

jahrg. 38, bd. 134 (1917)

Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Labour market frictions, social policies, and barriers to technology adoption

Barriers to technological changes have recently been shown to be a key element in explaining differences in output per worker across countries. This study examines the role that labour market features and institutions have in explaining barriers to technology adoption. I build a model that includes labour market frictions, capital market imperfections and heterogeneity in workers' skills. I found that the unemployment rate together with the welfare losses that workers experiment after displacement are key factors in explaining the existence of barriers to technology adoption. Moreover, I found that none of these factors alone is sufficient to build these barriers. The theory also suggests that welfare policies like the unemployment insurance system may enhance these kinds of barriers while policies like a severance payment system financed by an income tax seem to be more effective in eliminating them.

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.