Forgetting as a consequence of retrieval: a meta-analytic review of retrieval-induced forgetting

Retrieving a subset of items can cause the forgetting of other items, a phenomenon referred to as retrieval-induced forgetting. According to some theorists, retrieval-induced forgetting is the consequence of an inhibitory mechanism that acts to reduce the accessibility of non-target items that interfere with the retrieval of target items. Other theorists argue that inhibition is unnecessary to account for retrieval-induced forgetting, contending instead that the phenomenon can be best explained by non-inhibitory mechanisms, such as strength-based competition or blocking. The current paper provides the first major meta-analysis of retrieval-induced forgetting, conducted with the primary purpose of quantitatively evaluating the multitude of findings that have been used to contrast these two theoretical viewpoints. The results largely supported inhibition accounts, but also provided some challenging evidence, with the nature of the results often varying as a function of how retrieval-induced forgetting was assessed. Implications for further research and theory development are discussed.

Contemporary ordinary language philosophy

There is a widespread assumption that ordinary language philosophy was killed off sometime in the 1960s or 70s by a combination of Gricean pragmatics and the rapid development of systematic semantic theory. Contrary to that widespread assumption, however, contemporary versions of ordinary language philosophy are alive and flourishing, but going by various aliases—in particular (some versions of) "contextualism" and (some versions of) "experimental philosophy". And a growing group of contemporary philosophers are explicitly embracing the methods as well as the title of ordinary language philosophy and arguing that it has been unfairly maligned and was never decisively refuted. In this overview, I will outline the main projects and arguments employed by contemporary ordinary language philosophers, and make the case that updated versions of the arguments made by ordinary language philosophers in the middle of the twentieth century are attracting renewed attention.

Letters in cognitive analytic therapy: The patient's experience

Patient perspectives on how therapeutic letters contributed to their experience of cognitive analytic therapy (CAT) were investigated. Eight patients took part in semistructured interviews. A grounded, thematic analysis of their accounts suggested four general processes. First, letters offered a tangible, lasting framework for the assimilation of a new perspective about themselves and their relationships and facilitated coping with a complex range of emotions and risks this awareness required. Second, they demonstrated therapists’ commitment to patients’ growth. Third, they helped to teach participants about the therapy process as an example of an interpersonal exchange. Fourth, they helped participants consider how they wished to share personal information. These data offer a more complex understanding of this standard CAT intervention. Although some findings are consistent with CAT theory, the range of emotional dilemmas associated with letters has not received specific attention. Clinical implications are discussed.

Applied philosophy of language

This chapter explores the extent to which philosophy of language can be considered an applied discipline. I consider, first, ways in which sub-sections of philosophy of language may be considered as applied in terms of their subject matter and/or the kinds of questions being addressed (e.g. philosophy of language which deals with derogatory or inflammatory uses of language, or the role of philosophy of language within feminist philosophy). Then, in the second part of the chapter, I turn to consider a more general (and perhaps more controversial) conception of philosophy of language as applied, which arises from the methodology adopted and the relationship of the discipline to empirical data.

Qualitative tools & experimental philosophy

Experimental philosophy brings empirical methods to philosophy. These methods are used to probe how people think about philosophically interesting things such as knowledge, morality, freedom, etc. This paper explores the contribution that qualitative methods have to make in this enterprise. I argue that qualitative methods have the potential to make a much greater contribution than they have so far. Along the way, I acknowledge a few types of resistance that proponents of qualitative methods in experimental philosophy might encounter, and provide reasons to think they are ill-founded.

Experimental philosophy of language

Experimental philosophy of language uses experimental methods developed in the cognitive sciences to investigate topics of interest to philosophers of language. This article describes the methodological background for the development of experimental approaches to topics in philosophy of language, distinguishes negative and positive projects in experimental philosophy of language, and evaluates experimental work on the reference of proper names and natural kind terms. The reliability of expert judgments vs. the judgments of ordinary speakers, the role that ambiguity plays in influencing responses to experiments, and the reliability of meta-linguistic judgments are also assessed.

The analytic torsion of a cone over an odd dimensional manifold

We study the analytic torsion of a cone over an orientable odd dimensional compact connected Riemannian manifold W. We prove that the logarithm of the analytic torsion of the cone decomposes as the sum of the logarithm of the root of the analytic torsion of the boundary of the cone, plus a topological term, plus a further term that is a rational linear combination of local Riemannian invariants of the boundary. We show that this last term coincides with the anomaly boundary term appearing in the Cheeger Muller theorem [3, 2] for a manifold with boundary, according to Bruning and Ma (2006) [5]. We also prove Poincare duality for the analytic torsion of a cone. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The analytic torsion of a cone over a sphere

We compute the analytic torsion of a cone over a sphere of dimensions 1, 2, and 3, and we conjecture a general formula for the cone over an odd dimensional sphere. (C) 2009 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.

REIDEMEISTER TORSION AND ANALYTIC TORSION OF SPHERES

We provide a simple topological derivation of a formula for the Reidemeister and the analytic torsion of spheres.

Global analytic regularity for structures of co-rank one

We consider real analytic involutive structures V, of co-rank one, defined on a real analytic paracompact orientable manifold M. To each such structure we associate certain connected subsets of M which we call the level sets of V. We prove that analytic regularity propagates along them. With a further assumption on the level sets of V we characterize the global analytic hypoellipticity of a differential operator naturally associated to V. As an application we study a case of tube structures.

Why Implementing History and Philosophy in School Science Education is a Challenge: An Analysis of Obstacles

Teaching and learning with history and philosophy of science (HPS) has been, and continues to be, supported by science educators. While science education standards documents in many countries also stress the importance of teaching and learning with HPS, the approach still suffers from ineffective implementation in school science teaching. In order to better understand this problem, an analysis of the obstacles of implementing HPS into classrooms was undertaken. The obstacles taken into account were structured in four groups: 1. culture of teaching physics, 2. teachers` skills, epistemological and didactical attitudes and beliefs, 3. institutional framework of science teaching, and 4. textbooks as fundamental didactical support. Implications for more effective implementation of HPS are presented, taking the social nature of educational systems into account.

Analytic Methods for the Logic of Proofs

The logic of proofs (lp) was proposed as Gdels missed link between Intuitionistic and S4-proofs, but so far the tableau-based methods proposed for lp have not explored this closeness with S4 and contain rules whose analycity is not immediately evident. We study possible formulations of analytic tableau proof methods for lp that preserve the subformula property. Two sound and complete tableau decision methods of increasing degree of analycity are proposed, KELP and preKELP. The latter is particularly inspired on S4-proofs. The crucial role of proof constants in the structure of lp-proofs methods is analysed. In particular, a method for the abduction of proof constant specifications in strongly analytic preKELP proofs is presented; abduction heuristics and the complexity of the method are discussed.