Potential hazard to human health from exposure to fragments of lead bullets and shot in the tissues of game animals

Lead is highly toxic to animals. Humans eating game killed using lead ammunition generally avoid swallowing shot or bullets and dietary lead exposure from this source has been considered low. Recent evidence illustrates that lead bullets fragment on impact, leaving small lead particles widely distributed in game tissues. Our paper asks whether lead gunshot pellets also fragment upon impact, and whether lead derived from spent gunshot and bullets in the tissues of game animals could pose a threat to human health.

Which is the Only Game in Town? Minority Rights Issues in Estonia and Slovakia During and after EU Accession:Perspectives on European Politics and Society

Post-communist transition went hand in hand with the European integration process. Much of the literature on EU accession focuses on the rational decision to implement a set of European norms into domestic legislation pre-accession. It is often concluded that once EU membership is achieved, states succumb their rationality and act on the basis of internalised norms. The paper claims that the past literature overlooks the wider framework within which policy-makers operate before and after the accession, namely domestic sovereignty over policy-making and implementation. Tracing the policy dynamics in the area of minority rights in Estonia and Slovakia, we demonstrate that the European integration ushered greater domestic control over policy implementation on minority issues in two states exposed to a heavy dose of conditionality. As we observe, both states have consolidated their state- and nation-building policies referencing EU conditionality in the course of accession and later EU membership to assert centrality of domestic objectives for policy-making and implementation.

Web Services and Incerta Spiriti: A Game Theoretic Approach to Uncertainty

A web-service is a remote computational facility which is made available for general use by means of the internet. An orchestration is a multi-threaded computation which invokes remote services. In this paper game theory is used to analyse the behaviour of orchestration evaluations when underlying web-services are unreliable. Uncertainty profiles are proposed as a means of defining bounds on the number of service failures that can be expected during an orchestration evaluation. An uncertainty profile describes a strategic situation that can be analyzed using a zero-sum angel-daemon game with two competing players: an angel a whose objective is to minimize damage to an orchestration and a daemon d who acts in a destructive fashion. An uncertainty profile is assessed using the value of its angel daemon game. It is shown that uncertainty profiles form a partial order which is monotonic with respect to assessment.

Utilising a computer game as a therapeutic intervention for youth in residential care: Some preliminary findings on use and acceptability

Mental illness is common amongst young people living in residential care, many of whom are reluctant to avail of therapeutic help. The potential value of computer games as therapeutic tools for these young people has received very little attention, despite indications of their potential for promoting engagement in therapeutic work and improving mental health outcomes. This study aimed to fill this research gap through the development, introduction, and preliminary evaluation of a therapeutic intervention in group care settings. The intervention incorporated a commercially available computer game (The SIMS Life Stories™) and emotion regulation skill coaching. Qualified residential social workers were trained to deliver it to young people in three children's homes in Northern Ireland, where therapeutic approaches to social work had been introduced. The research was framed as an exploratory case study which aimed to determine the acceptability and potential therapeutic value of this intervention. The evidence suggests that computer-game based interventions of this type may have value as therapeutic tools in group care settings and deserve further development and empirical investigation to determine their effectiveness in improving mental health outcomes.

An Ambiguity Aversion Framework of Security Game under Ambiguities

Security is a critical concern around the world. Since resources for security are always limited, lots of interest have arisen in using game theory to handle security resource allocation problems. However, most of the existing work does not address adequately how a defender chooses his optimal strategy in a game with absent, inaccurate, uncertain, and even ambiguous strategy profiles' payoffs. To address this issue, we propose a general framework of security games under ambiguities based on Dempster-Shafer theory and the ambiguity aversion principle of minimax regret. Then, we reveal some properties of this framework. Also, we present two methods to reduce the influence of complete ignorance. Our investigation shows that this new framework is better in handling security resource allocation problems under ambiguities.

A Game-Theoretic Approach for Threats Detection and Intervention in Surveillance

Threat prevention with limited security resources is a challenging problem. An optimal strategy is to eectively predict attackers' targets (or goals) based on current available information, and use such predictions to prevent (or disrupt) their planned attacks. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework to address this challenge which encompasses the following three elements. First, we design a method to analyze an attacker's types in order to determine the most plausible type of an attacker. Second, we propose an approach to predict possible targets of an attack and the course of actions that the attackers may take even when the attackers' types are ambiguous. Third, a game-theoretic based strategy is developed to determine the best protection actions for defenders (security resources).

Game-­theoretic Resource Allocation with Real-­time Probabilistic Surveillance Information

Game-theoretic security resource allocation problems have generated significant interest in the area of designing and developing security systems. These approaches traditionally utilize the Stackelberg game model for security resource scheduling in order to improve the protection of critical assets. The basic assumption in Stackelberg games is that a defender will act first, then an attacker will choose their best response after observing the defender’s strategy commitment (e.g., protecting a specific asset). Thus, it requires an attacker’s full or partial observation of a defender’s strategy. This assumption is unrealistic in real-time threat recognition and prevention. In this paper, we propose a new solution concept (i.e., a method to predict how a game will be played) for deriving the defender’s optimal strategy based on the principle of acceptable costs of minimax regret. Moreover, we demonstrate the advantages of this solution concept by analyzing its properties.

Local Conventions in Game Play in an Evolving Dual Social Network Framework

People usually perform economic interactions within the social setting of a small group, while they obtain relevant information from a broader source. We capture this feature with a dynamic interaction model based on two separate social networks. Individuals play a coordination game in an interaction network, while updating their strategies using information from a separate influence network through which information is disseminated. In each time period, the interaction and influence networks co-evolve, and the individuals’ strategies are updated through a modified naive learning process. We show that both network structures and players’ strategies always reach a steady state, in which players form fully connected groups and converge to local conventions. We also analyze the influence exerted by a minority group of strongly opinionated players on these outcomes.