The evolution of international output differences (1960-2000) : from factor to productivity

This article presents a group of exercises of leveI and growth decomposition of output per worker using cross-collntry data from 1960 to :2000. It is shown that at least llntil 197.5 factors of production (capital anel education) ",ere the main source of output dispersion across ecoIlomies and that productivity variance was considerably srnaller than in late years. Qnly after this date the prominence of productivity started to sho\\' up in the data. as the majority of the litcrature has found. The gro\\'th decomposition exercises showecl that t he reversal of relative irnportance of proeluctivity vis-a-\'is factors is explainecl by the very good (bad) performance of procluctivity of fast (slow) growing cconomies. Although growth in the pcriod, on avcragc. is mostly clue to factors accumulation. its variance is explained by productivity.

A competitive growth model with endogenous fertility

This paper investigates the interaction between endogenous fertility behavior and the distribution of income and wealth arnong farnilies in a competitive market economy. We construct a growth model in which altruistic dynasties are heterogeneous in their initial stocks of physical capital. Dynasties make choices of farnily size along with decisions about consumption and intergenerational transfers. We show that if the rate of time preference is increasing in the number of children and preferences over nurnber of children satisfy a norrnality assumption, all steady states are characterized by equality of capital stocks and consumption arnong families. We also provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the steady state. In order to illustrate these results, we present an example in which preferences over number of children are logarithrnic and the technology is Cobb-Douglas. For this combination of preferences and technology, there exists a unique egalitarian steady state. Moreover, the economy converges to this steady state in only one generation .

A pricing model for sovereign bonde

Similar to the modeling used to evaluate ccnporate boncls, where it is a put optioo. 011 corporate assets, we modeled sovereign bonds. Instead of company's assets as underlining assets, we used foreign excbange reserves. The results show a fundamental pricing model for sovereign bond and an optimum relation between the debt size, term, mix between floating and fixed interest payments, and size of reserves. The model is tested with a Brazilian BradyBond.

Improved combinations of parametric and nonparametric Regression estimators

This paper provides a systematic and unified treatment of the developments in the area of kernel estimation in econometrics and statistics. Both the estimation and hypothesis testing issues are discussed for the nonparametric and semiparametric regression models. A discussion on the choice of windowwidth is also presented.

Toward a theory of international currency : a step further

We generalize the two-country, two-currency model of Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui to resolve two "shortcomings" in their approach. First, we endogenize prices and excb.ange rates. Second, we introduce monetary policy. We then use the model to address the following new questions: How does the fact that a currency circulates intemationally affect its purcb.asing power? Where does an intemational currency purcb.ase more? What are the effects on seignorage and welfare when a currency becomes intemational? How is policy affected by concems of currency substitution? How are national monetary policies connected, and what is the scope for international cooperation?

Multiple equilibria and protectionism

In a nonnative approach, I analyze trade policies when the industrial sector genentes positive extemalities in production, and there are adjustments costs to changing production from one sector to the other. Protectionist trade policy can make workers intemalize the benetits from moving into the industrial sector, but it is a second best policy as it also causes consumption distortions. I show that if the govemment is able to fully commit to its tariff schedule for the future, the welfare maximizing policy is to maintain a positive tariff forever, even after all adjustment has already taken place . However, if the govemment is not able to commit at all, the only time consistent policy is zero tariff at any point in time. The time inconsistency of the full commitment policy is derived from the fact that in the model only production needs interference, and the production distortion is lagged one period with respect to the tariff wbile the consumption distortion is simultaneous to the tariff. In the intermediary case, i.e., when the government can commit for a limited period of time, the time consistent optimal tariff will be positive but lower than the "full commitment" tariff. This result indicates that some institutions that have always been considered pure sources of inefficiency, such as protectionist lobbying, may in fact be welfare improving in some cases!

Estimating economic interactions of financial suppliers in Thailand

This paper presents a methodology to estimate and identify different kinds of economic interaction, whenever these interactions can be established in the form of spatial dependence. First, we apply the semi-parametric approach of Chen and Conley (2001) to the estimation of reaction functions. Then, the methodology is applied to the analysis financial providers in Thailand. Based on a sample of financial institutions, we provide an economic framework to test if the actual spatial pattern is compatible with strategic competition (local interactions) or social planning (global interactions). Our estimates suggest that the provision of commercial banks and suppliers credit access is determined by spatial competition, while the Thai Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives is distributed as in a social planner problem.

Can unobserved heterogeneity in farmer ability explain the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity?

The well-known inverse relationship between farm-size and productivity is usually explained in terms of diminishing returns with respect to land and other inputs coupled with various types of market frictions that prevent the efficient allocation of land across farms. We show that even if in the absence of diminishing returns one can provide an alternative explanation for this phenomenon using endogenous occupational choice and heterogeneity with respect to farming skills.

Pricing and hedging of oil futures : a unifying approach

We develop and empirically test a continuous time equilibrium model for the pricing of oil futures. The model provides a link between no-arbitrage models and expectation oriented models. It highlights the role of inventories for the identification of different pricing regimes. In an empirical study the hedging performance of our model is compared with five other one- and two-factor pricing models. The hedging problem considered is related to Metallgesellschaft´s strategy to hedge long-term forward commitments with short-term futures. The results show that the downside risk distribution of our inventory based model stochastically dominates those of the other models.

Political budget cycles in a fiscal federation : the effect of partisan voluntary transfers

This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.

Electoral control in the presence of gridlocks

This article presents a game-theoretic partisan model of voting and political bargaining. In a two-period setup, voters ¯rst elect an executive incumbent and the legislators from a pool of candidates belonging to di®erent parties. Once elected, the executive and the legislature bargain over a budget. Party origin and a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world, in°uence the bargaining cost, such that political gridlocks may occur. At the end of the ¯rst period voters observe the outcome of bargaining but do not observe the true estate of the world, and decide whether or not to reelect the same parties for the Executive and the Legislature. The model con¯rms the very recent literature by showing that voters tend to have more °exible reelection criteria when they believe the true state of the world is likely to be unfavorable. On the other hand, when voters believe the true state of the world is likely to be favorable, they become more demanding in order to reelect the incumbents. In particular, there will be government shutdown with positive probability in equilibrium. Gridlocks occur due to the imperfect information of voters and they constitute indeed an information revelation mechanism that improves electoral control in the second period.

The Taylor rule under inquiry: Hidden states

This work empirically evaluates the Taylor rule for the US and Brazil using Markov-Switching Regimes. I find that the inflation parameter of the US Taylor rule is less than one in many periods, contrasting heavily with Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), and the same happens with Brazilian data. When the inflation parameter is greater than one, it encompasses periods that these authors considered they should be less than one. Brazil is used for comparative purposes because it experienced a high level inflation until 1994 and then a major stabilization plan reduced the growth in prices to civilized levels. Thus, it is a natural laboratory to test theories designed to work in any environment. The findings point to a theoretical gap that deserves further investigation and show that monetary policy in Brazil has been ineffective, which is coherent with the general attitude of population in relation to this measure.

Taylor rule with hidden states

This work evaluates empirically the Taylor rule for the US and Brazil using Kalman Filter and Markov-Switching Regimes. We show that the parameters of the rule change significantly with variations in both output and output gap proxies, considering hidden variables and states. Such conclusions call naturally for robust optimal monetary rules. We also show that Brazil and US have very contrasting parameters, first because Brazil presents time-varying intercept, second because of the rigidity in the parameters of the Brazilian Taylor rule, regardless the output gap proxy, data frequency or sample data. Finally, we show that the long-run inflation parameter of the US Taylor rule is less than one in many periods, contrasting strongly with Orphanides (forthcoming) and Clarida, Gal´i and Gertler (2000), and the same happens with Brazilian monthly data.

Dynamic hedging with stocastic differential utility

In this paper we study the dynamic hedging problem using three different utility specifications: stochastic differential utility, terminal wealth utility, and we propose a particular utility transformation connecting both previous approaches. In all cases, we assume Markovian prices. Stochastic differential utility, SDU, impacts the pure hedging demand ambiguously, but decreases the pure speculative demand, because risk aversion increases. We also show that consumption decision is, in some sense, independent of hedging decision. With terminal wealth utility, we derive a general and compact hedging formula, which nests as special all cases studied in Duffie and Jackson (1990). We then show how to obtain their formulas. With the third approach we find a compact formula for hedging, which makes the second-type utility framework a particular case, and show that the pure hedging demand is not impacted by this specification. In addition, with CRRA- and CARA-type utilities, the risk aversion increases and, consequently the pure speculative demand decreases. If futures price are martingales, then the transformation plays no role in determining the hedging allocation. We also derive the relevant Bellman equation for each case, using semigroup techniques.