A vegetação do município de Ilhéus, Estado da Bahia: III - caracterização da vegetação pelo valôr dos índices das espécies

The indices found are analysed as a whole and general conclusions are drawn from them which may be of use in understanding many of the problems offered by the local flora (Ilhéus). The first column of the tables presented indicates the biological form of the species, showing the nature of the flora and the constitution of the climax. A total of 200 species of phanerophyta were found; 69 macrophanerophyta (trees), 54 are mesophanerophyta (treelets) and 77 are nanophanerophyta (shrubs). The macrophanerophyta are consequently considered as dominants and the meso-and nanophanerophyta as codominants (the biological forms: chamaephyta, hemicriptophyta, criptophyta, geophyta, therophyta, epiphyta and hydrophyta are subdominants), the more so as the first cover 80% and the others more or less 50%. This points to a climax of trees and a local vegetation mainly composed of trees also. The smaller forms are left out as they are beyond the present scope of this sort of wort in Brazil. The third column of ecological formulae indicates the reaction of the constituent species to light (C = sciophilous, F = photophilous and I = indifferents), the biological types of vegetation (H = hygrophytes, X = xerophytes and M = mesophytes) and the fidelity of the species to the climax. Of the species studied: 25 are pioneers (P. Table I), 63 are accidentals (A. Table II), 35 are companion species (O. Table III), 19 show preferences (E. Table with vitality Vn), 44 are selective (S. Table V) and 13 exclusive species (L. Table VI). This leads to the conclusion that the vegetation of the region is in full reconstitution. As to the ecological characteristics of the 200 species studied, 89 are either pioneers (a class separated by the author) or accidentals; this means that the devastated zones are being reconstituted in the subsere both with members of the prisere and alien species. Of the remaining species, 54 are companion, or accompanying species, which appear in most subclimax, serclímax and quasiclimax associations, and 57 are real constituents of the local climax. As all the species except the pioneers, selectives and exclusives (xerophytes and mesophytes) may be considered as hygrophytes this type evidently predominantes in the region and may constitute a hygrophilous serclimax and quasiclímax. In regard to light 101 are sciophilous, 32 indiferents and 67 photophilous. This leads to the conclusion that the vegetation comprises mainly tolerant species, showing the hygrophilous and mesophilous character of the region with a vegetation composed mostly of trees. The presence a large number of sciophilous species is easy to understand as the hygrophilous and mesophilous habitats and the dominance of trees favour the germination and growth of tolerant species. The last two columns analyse the percentage of individuals present and the occurrent classes to which they belong: 92 species vary between 1 and 9%; 50 between to 10 and 19%; 36 between 20 and 29%; 14 between 30 and 39%; and 8 between 40 and 49%. Only 8 species belong to occurrence class V; 14 to classe IV; 36 to class III; 50 to class II; and 92 to class I. This leads to the conclusion that the local formation is very unsociable and very complex, though the median coverture is 80% and the number of species is very large. The analysis of the data also shows that the climax is being reconstituted in the subsere with elements drawn from the prisere and alien species introduced either by man (following desvastation) or by other consequent factors (such as brusque changes of microclimates due to total or partial destruction). This modifies the subclimax appreciably and apparently also the climax of the local regional subsere. As a final conclusion it is suggested that as in the subsere the pioneer formation is xerophilous, the prisere also beging as a xerosere; but as there are and probably always were hydrophilous formation evolving in the same climate, the local climax is composed of species with medium exactions, that is of relative mesophites.

Remarque sur la destruction des plantes indigènes au Brésil et sur le moyen de les en préserver / par Ladislaü Netto ; suivies d'une note sur le même sujet par M. Naudin.

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