Islamic corporate financing : does it promote profit and loss sharing?

Islamic financing instruments can be categorised into profit and loss/risk sharing and non-participatory instruments. Although profit and loss sharing instruments such as musharakah are widely accepted as the ideal form of Islamic financing, prior studies suggest that alternative instruments such as murabahah are preferred by Islamic banks. Nevertheless, prior studies did not explore factors that influence the use of Islamic financing among non-financial firms. Our study fills this gap and contributes new knowledge in several ways. First, we find no evidence of widespread use of Islamic financing instruments across non-financial firms. This is because the instruments are mostly used by less profitable firms with higher leverage (i.e., risky firms). Second, we find that profit and loss sharing instruments are hardly used, whilst the use of murabahah is dominant. Consistent with the prediction of moral-hazard-risk avoidance theory, further analysis suggests that users with a lower asset base (to serve as collateral) are associated with murabahah financing. Third, we present a critical discourse on the contentious nature of murabahah as practised. The economic significance and ethical issues associated with murabahah as practised should trigger serious efforts to steer Islamic corporate financing towards risk-sharing more than the controversial rent-seeking practice.

Corporate Responsibility for Crimes - Thinking Outside the Box

Emeseh, Engobo, 'Corporate Responsibility for Crime: Thinking outside the Box' I University of Botswana Law Journal (2005) 28-49 RAE2008

Corporations and corporate governance: what do these concepts mean for multinational corporate power and social responsibility?

International Journal of Liability and Scientific Enquiry 2007 - Vol. 1, No.1/2 pp. 29 - 49 RAE2008

Behaviour and rationality in corporate governance

Marnet, Oliver, 'Behaviour and rationality in corporate governance', Journal of Economic Issues (2005) 39(3) pp.613-632 RAE2008

History repeats itself: The failure of rational choice models in corporate governance

Marnet, Oliver, 'History repeats itself: The failure of rational choice models in corporate governance', Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2005) 18(2) pp.191-210 RAE2008

Which of the three action-oriented corporate social responsibility (CSR) types is the most effective in improving the public attitude toward tobacco companies?

Dissertação apresentada à Universidade Fernando Pessoa como parte dos requisitos para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ciências da Comunicação, ramo de Marketing e Publicidade

The corporate social responsibility movement and law's empire: Is there a conflict?

At the heart of corporate governance and social responsibility discourse is recognition of the fact that the modern corporation is primarily governed by the profit maximisation imperative coupled with moral and ethical concerns that such a limited imperative drives the actions of large and wealthy corporations which have the ability to act in influential and significant ways, shaping how our social world is experienced. The actions of the corporation and its management will have a wide sphere of impact over all of its stakeholders whether these are employees, shareholders, consumers or the community in which the corporation is located. As globalisation has become central to the way we think it is also clear that ‘community’ has an ever expanding meaning which may include workers and communities living very far away from Corporate HQ. In recent years academic commentators have become increasingly concerned about the emphasis on what can be called short-term profit maximisation and the perception that this extremist interpretation of the profit imperative results in morally and ethically unacceptable outcomes.1 Hence demands for more corporate social responsibility. Following Cadbury’s2 classification of corporate social responsibility into three distinct areas, this paper will argue that once the legally regulated tier is left aside corporate responsibility can become so nebulous as to be relatively meaningless. The argument is not that corporations should not be required to act in socially responsible ways but that unless supported by regulation, which either demands high standards, or at the very least incentivises the attainment of such standards such initiatives are doomed to failure. The paper will illustrate by reference to various chosen cases that law’s discourse has already signposted ways to consider and resolve corporate governance problems in the broader social responsibility context.3 It will also illustrate how corporate responsibility can and must be supported by legal measures. Secondly, this paper will consider the potential conflict between an emphasis on corporate social responsibility and the regulatory approach.4 Finally, this paper will place the current interest in corporate social responsibility within the broader debate on the relationship between law and non-legally enforceable norms and will present some reflections on the norm debate arising from this consideration of the CSR movement.

Initial losses, corporate governance and earnings management

This thesis examines the relationship between initial loss events and the corporate governance and earnings management behaviour of these firms. This is done using four years of corporate governance information spanning the report of an initial loss for companies listed on the UK Stock Exchange. An industry- and sizematched control sample is used in a difference-in-difference analysis to isolate the impact of the initial loss event during the period. It is reported that, in general, an initial loss motivates an improvement in corporate governance in those loss firms where a relative weakness existed prior to the loss and that these changes mainly occur before the initial loss is announced. Firms with stronger (i.e. better quality) corporate governance have less need to alter it in response to the loss. It is also reported that initial loss firms use positive abnormal accruals in the year before the loss in an attempt to defer/avoid the loss — the weaker corporate governance the more likely is it that loss firms manage earnings in this manner. Abnormal accruals are also found to be predictive of an initial loss and when used as a conditioning variable, the quality of corporate governance is an important mitigating factor in this regard. Once the loss is reported, loss firms unwind these abnormal accruals although no evidence of big-bath behaviour is found. The extent to which these abnormal accruals are subsequently unwound are also found to be a function of both the quality of corporate governance as well as the severity of the initial loss.

Design history: exploring corporate communities

A design history is a narrative involving a multitude of social groups, interpretive flexibility, and eventual stabilization of shared understanding. Design history surfaces the practices that help shape and define engagements and can increase not only our theoretical understanding of what design is, but also our capacity to realize this understanding in practice. We use a design history perspective to examine how corporate technology initiatives establish and support open source communities and the crafting of relevant design practices that enable their advancement. We foster an evolving expression of design research that treats artifacts not as stable objects to be singularly evaluated, but as evolving systems contingent on historical trajectories.

Bonds between fibronectin and fibronectin-binding proteins on Staphylococcus aureus and Lactococcus lactis.

Bacterial cell-wall-associated fibronectin binding proteins A and B (FnBPA and FnBPB) form bonds with host fibronectin. This binding reaction is often the initial step in prosthetic device infections. Atomic force microscopy was used to evaluate binding interactions between a fibronectin-coated probe and laboratory-derived Staphylococcus aureus that are (i) defective in both FnBPA and FnBPB (fnbA fnbB double mutant, DU5883), (ii) capable of expressing only FnBPA (fnbA fnbB double mutant complemented with pFNBA4), or (iii) capable of expressing only FnBPB (fnbA fnbB double mutant complemented with pFNBB4). These experiments were repeated using Lactococcus lactis constructs expressing fnbA and fnbB genes from S. aureus. A distinct force signature was observed for those bacteria that expressed FnBPA or FnBPB. Analysis of this force signature with the biomechanical wormlike chain model suggests that parallel bonds form between fibronectin and FnBPs on a bacterium. The strength and covalence of bonds were evaluated via nonlinear regression of force profiles. Binding events were more frequent (p < 0.01) for S. aureus expressing FnBPA or FnBPB than for the S. aureus double mutant. The binding force, frequency, and profile were similar between the FnBPA and FnBPB expressing strains of S. aureus. The absence of both FnBPs from the surface of S. aureus removed its ability to form a detectable bond with fibronectin. By contrast, ectopic expression of FnBPA or FnBPB on the surface of L. lactis conferred fibronectin binding characteristics similar to those of S. aureus. These measurements demonstrate that fibronectin-binding adhesins FnBPA and FnBPB are necessary and sufficient for the binding of S. aureus to prosthetic devices that are coated with host fibronectin.

NAFTA and the apparel commodity chain: Corporate strategies, interfirm networks, and industrial upgrading

The apparel industry is one of the oldest and largest export industries in the world, with global trade and production networks that connect firms and workers in countries at all levels of economic development. This chapter examines the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as one of the most recent and significant developments to affect patterns of international trade and production in the apparel and textile industries. Tr ade policies are changing the institutional environment in which firms in this industry operate, and companies are responding to these changes with new strategies designed to increase their profitability and strengthen their control over the apparel commodity chain. Our hypothesis is that lead firms are establishing qualitatively different kinds of regional production networks in North America from those that existed prior to NAFTA, and that these networks have important consequences for industrial upgrading in the Mexican textile and apparel industries. Post-NAFTA crossborder production arrangements include full-package networks that link lead firms in the United States with apparel and textile manufacturers, contractors, and suppliers in Mexico. Full-package production is increasing the local value added provided by the apparel commodity chain in Mexico and creating new opportunities for Mexican firms and workers. The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section uses trade and production data to analyze shifts in global apparel flows, highlighting the emergence and consolidation of a regional trade bloc in North America. The second section discusses the process of industrial upgrading in the apparel industry and introduces a distinction between assembly and full-package production networks. The third section includes case studies based on published industry sources and strategic interviews with several lead companies whose strategies are largely responsible for the shifting trade patterns and NAFTA-inspired cross-border production networks discussed in the previous section. The fourth section considers the implications of these changes for employment in the North American apparel industry. © 2009 by Temple University Press. All rights reserved.

Corporate policies in the EU energy sector

This report examines the corporate policies of the major European energy companies, including the major developments in 2008.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

Profitability and the poor: corporate strategies, innovation and sustainability

Based on empirical evidence, the article looks at the implications of private sector participation (PSP) for the delivery of water supply and sanitation to the urban and peri-urban poor in developing countries, with particular reference to Africa and Latin America. More precisely, the article addresses the impact produced by multinational companies’ (MNCs) strategies, in light of the pursuit of profitability, on the extension of connections to the pipeline network. It does so by questioning the assumptions that greater private sector efficiency and innovation, together with contract design, will enable the sustainable extension of service coverage to low income dwellers. The strategies of the major water MNCs are considered both in relation to the global expansion of their operations and the adjustment of local strategies to commercial considerations. The latter might result in identifying proWtable markets, modifying contractual provisions, attempting to reduce costs and increase income, reducing risks and exiting from non-performing contracts. The evidence reviewed allows for re-assessing the relative roles of the public and private sectors in extending and delivering water services to the poor. First, the most far reaching innovative approaches to extending connections are more likely to come from communities, public authorities and political activity than from MNCs. Secondly, whenever MNCs are liable to exit from non-profitable contracts, the public sector has no other option than to deal with external risks aVecting continuity of provision. Finally, market limitations affecting MNCs’ ability to serve marginal populations and access cheap capital do not apply to well-organised, politically led public sector undertakings