Behaviour and rationality in corporate governance


Autoria(s): Marnet, Oliver
Contribuinte(s)

School of Management & Business

Accounting

Data(s)

07/11/2008

07/11/2008

01/09/2005

Resumo

Marnet, Oliver, 'Behaviour and rationality in corporate governance', Journal of Economic Issues (2005) 39(3) pp.613-632 RAE2008

The agency view of corporate governance requires effective monitors and gatekeepers to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal. One common denominator in recent corporate debacles appears to be the collective failure of gatekeepers and monitors. This paper suggests that conventional proposals to reform corporate governance through legislation, codes of best practice, and the like, are necessary, but underestimate the pressures from conflicts of interest and bias which reputation intermediaries face in their interaction with colleagues and clients. The aim of this paper is to integrate various strands of the literature on corporate governance, cognitive research and behavioural economics to shed light on questions regarding the independence of boards of directors and external auditors.

Peer reviewed

Formato

20

Identificador

Marnet , O 2005 , ' Behaviour and rationality in corporate governance ' International Journal of Behavioural Accounting and Finance , vol 39 , no. 3 , pp. 613-632 . DOI: 10.1504/IJBAF.2008.021027

1753-1969

PURE: 82291

PURE UUID: 44a7deb4-90bb-4b7f-90ce-e5629c3ae88f

dspace: 2160/908

http://hdl.handle.net/2160/908

http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJBAF.2008.021027

Idioma(s)

eng

Relação

International Journal of Behavioural Accounting and Finance

Palavras-Chave #behaviour #rationality #corporate governance #audit #directors #monitoring failure #heuristics #bias #gatekeepers #monitors #conflicts of interest #cognitive research #behavioural economics #independence #boards of directors #external auditors
Tipo

/dk/atira/pure/researchoutput/researchoutputtypes/contributiontojournal/article

Article (Journal)

Direitos