Ambiguity in election games

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them toincrease the number of voters to whom they appeal when voters have intense preferences for one of the alternatives available. An ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We find conditions under which ambiguous strategies are chosen in equilibrium. These conditions include the case in which there is an outcome that is a majority winner against all other outcomes but is not the most preferred outcome for a majority of voters. It is shown that if the number of candidates or parties increases, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium.

Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games

It is shown that in any affine space of payoff matrices the equilibriumpayoffs of bimatrix games are generically finite.

On p-beauty contest integer games

In this paper we provide a full characterization of the pure-strategyNash Equilibria for the p-Beauty Contest Game when we restrict player schoices to integer numbers. Opposed to the case of real number choices,equilibrium uniqueness may be lost depending on the value of p and thenumber of players: in particular, as p approaches 1 any symmetric profileconstitutes a Nash Equilibrium. We also show that any experimental p-BeautyContest Game can be associated to a game with the integer restriction andthus multiplicity of equilibria becomes an issue. Finally, we show thatin these games the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies maynot lead to a single outcome while the iterated best-reply process alwaysdoes (though the outcome obtained depends on the initial conditions).

Causal assessment in finite extensive-form games

Two finite extensive-form games are empirically equivalent when theempirical distribution on action profiles generated by every behaviorstrategy in one can also be generated by an appropriately chosen behaviorstrategy in the other. This paper provides a characterization ofempirical equivalence. The central idea is to relate a game's informationstructure to the conditional independencies in the empirical distributionsit generates. We present a new analytical device, the influence opportunitydiagram of a game, describe how such a diagram is constructed for a givenextensive-form game, and demonstrate that it provides a complete summaryof the information needed to test empirical equivalence between two games.

Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games

The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments ofstochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal formgames that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained witha fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experimentson rules and games.

The evolution of helping and harming on graphs: the return of the inclusive fitness effect.

Evolutionary graph theory has been proposed as providing new fundamental rules for the evolution of co-operation and altruism. But how do these results relate to those of inclusive fitness theory? Here, we carry out a retrospective analysis of the models for the evolution of helping on graphs of Ohtsuki et al. [Nature (2006) 441, 502] and Ohtsuki & Nowak [Proc. R. Soc. Lond. Ser. B Biol. Sci (2006) 273, 2249]. We show that it is possible to translate evolutionary graph theory models into classical kin selection models without disturbing at all the mathematics describing the net effect of selection on helping. Model analysis further demonstrates that costly helping evolves on graphs through limited dispersal and overlapping generations. These two factors are well known to promote relatedness between interacting individuals in spatially structured populations. By allowing more than one individual to live at each node of the graph and by allowing interactions to vary with the distance between nodes, our inclusive fitness model allows us to consider a wider range of biological scenarios leading to the evolution of both helping and harming behaviours on graphs.

The Relationship between Teachers and Students in the Classroom: Communicative Language Teaching Approach and Cooperative Learning Strategy to Improve Learning

The aim of this research is to to investigate how a supportive relationship between teachers and students in the classroom can improve the learning process. By having a good relationship with students, teachers can offer to students chances to be motivated and feel engaged in the learning process. Students will be engaged actively in the learning instead of being passive learners. I wish to investigate how using communicative approach and cooperative learning strategies while teaching do affect and improve students’ learning performance. To achieve these goals qualitative data collection was used as the primary method. The results show that teachers and students value a supportive and caring relationship between them and that interaction is essential to the teacher-student relationship. This sense of caring and supporting from teachers motivates students to become a more interested learner. Students benefit and are motivated when their teachers create a safe and trustful environment. And also the methods and strategies teachers uses, makes students feel engaged and stimulated to participate in the learning process. The students have in their mind that a positive relationship with their teachers positively impacts their interest and motivation in school which contributes to the enhancement of the learning process.

Iowa’s Cooperative Snow Fence Program, June 2005

While we can’t keep it from blowing, there are ways to influence the wind that carries tons of blowing and drifting snow. Periodically, severe winter storms will create large snow drifts that close roads and driveways, isolate farmsteads and increase snowplowing. Many of these drifting problems happen in the same place year after year. Although there are no foolproof methods of wind and snow control, properly designed and maintained snow fences can reduce or eliminate these problem areas. This publication discusses the benefits of snow fence, then examines the types used by the Iowa Department of Transportation. Finally, it provides information about how you can get involved in the DOT’s Cooperative Snow Fence Program.

Active solubilization and refolding of stable protein aggregates by cooperative unfolding action of individual hsp70 chaperones.

Hsp70 is a central molecular chaperone that passively prevents protein aggregation and uses the energy of ATP hydrolysis to solubilize, translocate, and mediate the proper refolding of proteins in the cell. Yet, the molecular mechanism by which the active Hsp70 chaperone functions are achieved remains unclear. Here, we show that the bacterial Hsp70 (DnaK) can actively unfold misfolded structures in aggregated polypeptides, leading to gradual disaggregation. We found that the specific unfolding and disaggregation activities of individual DnaK molecules were optimal for large aggregates but dramatically decreased for small aggregates. The active unfolding of the smallest aggregates, leading to proper global refolding, required the cooperative action of several DnaK molecules per misfolded polypeptide. This finding suggests that the unique ATP-fueled locking/unlocking mechanism of the Hsp70 chaperones can recruit random chaperone motions to locally unfold misfolded structures and gradually disentangle stable aggregates into refoldable proteins.

On the monotonic core

The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable utility (T.U.-game) is the set formed by all its Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes. In this paper we show that this set always coincides with the core of a certain game associated to the initial game.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Regular population monotonic allocation schemes and the core

A subclass of games with population monotonic allocation schemes is studied, namelygames with regular population monotonic allocation schemes (rpmas). We focus on theproperties of these games and we prove the coincidence between the core and both theDavis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set