Identity, addressing, authenticity and audit requirements for trust in ERP, analytics and big/open data in a “Cloud” computing environment : a review and proposal

Enterprises, both public and private, have rapidly commenced using the benefits of enterprise resource planning (ERP) combined with business analytics and “open data sets” which are often outside the control of the enterprise to gain further efficiencies, build new service operations and increase business activity. In many cases, these business activities are based around relevant software systems hosted in a “cloud computing” environment. “Garbage in, garbage out”, or “GIGO”, is a term long used to describe problems in unqualified dependency on information systems, dating from the 1960s. However, a more pertinent variation arose sometime later, namely “garbage in, gospel out” signifying that with large scale information systems, such as ERP and usage of open datasets in a cloud environment, the ability to verify the authenticity of those data sets used may be almost impossible, resulting in dependence upon questionable results. Illicit data set “impersonation” becomes a reality. At the same time the ability to audit such results may be an important requirement, particularly in the public sector. This paper discusses the need for enhancement of identity, reliability, authenticity and audit services, including naming and addressing services, in this emerging environment and analyses some current technologies that are offered and which may be appropriate. However, severe limitations to addressing these requirements have been identified and the paper proposes further research work in the area.

De-Identification of health records using Anonym: Effectiveness and robustness across datasets

Objective Evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of Anonym, a tool for de-identifying free-text health records based on conditional random fields classifiers informed by linguistic and lexical features, as well as features extracted by pattern matching techniques. De-identification of personal health information in electronic health records is essential for the sharing and secondary usage of clinical data. De-identification tools that adapt to different sources of clinical data are attractive as they would require minimal intervention to guarantee high effectiveness. Methods and Materials The effectiveness and robustness of Anonym are evaluated across multiple datasets, including the widely adopted Integrating Biology and the Bedside (i2b2) dataset, used for evaluation in a de-identification challenge. The datasets used here vary in type of health records, source of data, and their quality, with one of the datasets containing optical character recognition errors. Results Anonym identifies and removes up to 96.6% of personal health identifiers (recall) with a precision of up to 98.2% on the i2b2 dataset, outperforming the best system proposed in the i2b2 challenge. The effectiveness of Anonym across datasets is found to depend on the amount of information available for training. Conclusion Findings show that Anonym compares to the best approach from the 2006 i2b2 shared task. It is easy to retrain Anonym with new datasets; if retrained, the system is robust to variations of training size, data type and quality in presence of sufficient training data.

Double-authentication-preventing signatures

Digital signatures are often used by trusted authorities to make unique bindings between a subject and a digital object; for example, certificate authorities certify a public key belongs to a domain name, and time-stamping authorities certify that a certain piece of information existed at a certain time. Traditional digital signature schemes however impose no uniqueness conditions, so a trusted authority could make multiple certifications for the same subject but different objects, be it intentionally, by accident, or following a (legal or illegal) coercion. We propose the notion of a double-authentication-preventing signature, in which a value to be signed is split into two parts: a subject and a message. If a signer ever signs two different messages for the same subject, enough information is revealed to allow anyone to compute valid signatures on behalf of the signer. This double-signature forgeability property discourages signers from misbehaving---a form of self-enforcement---and would give binding authorities like CAs some cryptographic arguments to resist legal coercion. We give a generic construction using a new type of trapdoor functions with extractability properties, which we show can be instantiated using the group of sign-agnostic quadratic residues modulo a Blum integer.

Security analysis of the non-aggressive challenge response of the DNP3 Protocol using a CPN Model

Distributed Network Protocol Version 3 (DNP3) is the de-facto communication protocol for power grids. Standard-based interoperability among devices has made the protocol useful to other infrastructures such as water, sewage, oil and gas. DNP3 is designed to facilitate interaction between master stations and outstations. In this paper, we apply a formal modelling methodology called Coloured Petri Nets (CPN) to create an executable model representation of DNP3 protocol. The model facilitates the analysis of the protocol to ensure that the protocol will behave as expected. Also, we illustrate how to verify and validate the behaviour of the protocol, using the CPN model and the corresponding state space tool to determine if there are insecure states. With this approach, we were able to identify a Denial of Service (DoS) attack against the DNP3 protocol.

Secure modular password authentication for the web using channel bindings

Secure protocols for password-based user authentication are well-studied in the cryptographic literature but have failed to see wide-spread adoption on the Internet; most proposals to date require extensive modifications to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, making deployment challenging. Recently, a few modular designs have been proposed in which a cryptographically secure password-based mutual authentication protocol is run inside a confidential (but not necessarily authenticated) channel such as TLS; the password protocol is bound to the established channel to prevent active attacks. Such protocols are useful in practice for a variety of reasons: security no longer relies on users' ability to validate server certificates and can potentially be implemented with no modifications to the secure channel protocol library. We provide a systematic study of such authentication protocols. Building on recent advances in modelling TLS, we give a formal definition of the intended security goal, which we call password-authenticated and confidential channel establishment (PACCE). We show generically that combining a secure channel protocol, such as TLS, with a password authentication protocol, where the two protocols are bound together using either the transcript of the secure channel's handshake or the server's certificate, results in a secure PACCE protocol. Our prototype based on TLS is available as a cross-platform client-side Firefox browser extension and a server-side web application which can easily be installed on deployed web browsers and servers.

A policy model for access control using building information models

Building information models have created a paradigm shift in how buildings are built and managed by providing a dynamic repository for building data that is useful in many new operational scenarios. This change has also created an opportunity to use building information models as an integral part of security operations and especially as a tool to facilitate fine-grained access control to building spaces in smart buildings and critical infrastructure environments. In this paper, we identify the requirements for a security policy model for such an access control system and discuss why the existing policy models are not suitable for this application. We propose a new policy language extension to XACML, with BIM specific data types and functions based on the IFC specification, which we call BIM-XACML.

Multi-ciphersuite security of the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol

The Secure Shell (SSH) protocol is widely used to provide secure remote access to servers, making it among the most important security protocols on the Internet. We show that the signed-Diffie--Hellman SSH ciphersuites of the SSH protocol are secure: each is a secure authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) protocol, the same security definition now used to describe the security of Transport Layer Security (TLS) ciphersuites. While the ACCE definition suffices to describe the security of individual ciphersuites, it does not cover the case where parties use the same long-term key with many different ciphersuites: it is common in practice for the server to use the same signing key with both finite field and elliptic curve Diffie--Hellman, for example. While TLS is vulnerable to attack in this case, we show that SSH is secure even when the same signing key is used across multiple ciphersuites. We introduce a new generic multi-ciphersuite composition framework to achieve this result in a black-box way.