The Eurasian Economic Union – more political, less economic. OSW Commentary Number 157/20.01.2015

The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.

Petrology and geochemistry of sideromelane glass shards from Pleistocene as layers north and south of Gran Canaria

Major elements, S, F, Cl concentrations and relative proportions of S6+ to total S were analyzed with electron microprobe in sideromelane glass shards from Pleistocene volcaniclastic sediments drilled during ODP Leg 157. Glasses are moderately to strongly evolved and represent a spectrum from alkali basalt, basanite and nephelinite through hawaiite, mugearite and tephrite to phonolitic tephrite. Measured S6+/SumS (0.03±0.98) and calculated Fe2+/Fe3+ (2.5±5.8) ratios in the melt yield preeruptive redox conditions ranging from NNO-1.4 to NNO+2.1. The morphology of the glass shards, variations of S and Cl concentrations (0.010±0.127 wt% S, 0.018±0.129 wt% Cl), calculated preeruptive temperatures (1030±1200 °C) and oxygen fugacities suggest that glasses deposited even within the same ash layers have diverse origin and may have resulted from both submarine and subaerial eruptions. Most vesicle-free glasses are characterized by high concentrations of S and represent undegassed or slightly degassed submarine lavas, whereas vesiculated glasses with low concentrations of S and Cl are strongly degassed and can be ascribed to the eruptions in shallow water or on land. Sideromelane glass shards at Sites 953 are thought to have resulted from submarine eruptions northeast of Gran Canaria, glasses at Site 954 represent mostly volcaniclastic material of shallow water submarine and subaerial eruptions on Gran Canaria and Tenerife, and glasses deposited at Site 956 resulted from submarine or explosive eruptions on Tenerife.