954 resultados para variable rate application
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The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic concusions remain valid.
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This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more (or less) severely than negative deviations in the central banker's loss function. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The time-series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from G7 countries. Econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related.
Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem : A Multi-Profile Approach with Variable-Population Extensions
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This paper provides new versions of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem that are formulated in terms of prospects rather than lotteries. Strengthening an earlier result, fixed-population ex-ante utilitarianism is characterized in a multi-profile setting with fixed probabilities. In addition, we extend the social aggregation theorem to social-evaluation problems under uncertainty with a variable population and generalize our approach to uncertain alternatives, which consist of compound vectors of probability distributions and prospects.
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This paper studies the transition between exchange rate regimes using a Markov chain model with time-varying transition probabilities. The probabilities are parameterized as nonlinear functions of variables suggested by the currency crisis and optimal currency area literature. Results using annual data indicate that inflation, and to a lesser extent, output growth and trade openness help explain the exchange rate regime transition dynamics.
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This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically ineffcient and inertial around the previously-agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and provides an explanation for the empirical observation that the nominal interest rate under the central bank’s control is infrequently adjusted.
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Affiliation: CHU Ste-Justine, Université de Montréal
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Affiliation: Pascal Michel : Département de pathologie et microbiologie, Faculté de médecine vétérinaire
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Affiliation: Unité de recherche en Arthrose, Centre de recherche du Centre Hospitalier de l'Université de Montréal, Hôpital Notre-Dame
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