Food habits of some Arctic birds and mammals / by Clarence Cottam and Harold C. Hanson.

v.20:no.31(1932)

The story of food plants / by B. E. Dahlgren, Chief Curator, Dept. of Botany.

no.25(1940)

Abundance, breeding and food of the Little Blue Heron Egretta caerulea (Aves, Ardeidae) in the Patos Lagoon estuary, a recently colonized area in southern Brazil

We document the expansion of the breeding distribution of the Little Blue Heron Egretta caerulea (Linnaeus, 1758) to 850 km beyond its previous southern limit in South America. In addition we present data on abundance, breeding biology and food of the species in the Patos Lagoon estuary, the area which the species recently colonized. The maximum abundance recorded in the breeding colony and in a nocturnal roosting site was 53 and 49 individuals respectively. Nesting occurred from September to March. Birds nested in a mixed breeding colony together with about 3,000 breeding pairs of seven other species of Pelecaniformes, in a swampy forest near the margin of the estuary. Five nests were between 1.5 and 4.3 m from the ground, on the shrub Daphnopsis racemosa (Thymelaeaceae), on the trees Sebastiana brasiliensis (Euphorbiaceae) and Mimosa bimucronata (Leguminosae), or on the bamboo Bambusa sp. (Poaceae). Four nests produced two fledglings each, while one nest was abandoned. Of 13 grouped samples of food regurgitated by five nestlings, Pink Shrimp Farfantepenaeus paulensis (Perez-Farfante, 1967) constituted 70% in mass, while total length of ingested fishes and shrimps varied mostly between 20 and 50 mm. Estuarine prey items represented 99% of the total food mass. The recent southward expansion of the breeding range of the Little Blue Heron in South America may be a response to climate warming of the Patos Lagoon estuary. Degradation of estuaries in the southwestern Atlantic may also be forcing the birds to breed in areas outside previous geographical range.

Trade disclosure and price dispersion

This paper determines the effects of post-trade opaqueness on market performance. We find that the degree of market transparency has important effects on market equilibria. In particular, we show that dealers operating in a transparent structure set regret-free prices at each period making zero expected profits in each of the two trading rounds, whereas in the opaque market dealers invest in acquiring information at the beginning of the trading day. Moreover, we obtain that if there is no trading activity in the first period, then market makers only change their quotes in the opaque market. Additionally, we show that trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices and reduces volatility. Finally, concerning welfare of market participants, we obtain ambiguous results. Keywords: Market microstructure, Post-trade transparency, Price experimentation, Price dispersion.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.

Milk, from medicine to food Mediterranean Europe: Catalonia, 19th-20th centuries

The spread of milk consumption was a significant change in the diet of Europeans, however it is one that has not been greatly studied with regard to the populations of Mediterranean Europe. In this article we shall analyse the ain circumstances that conditioned that process in Catalonia between the middle of the 19th century and 1936. In our study we shall argue that the consumption of milk in this area was only relevant in the 19th century in situations of illness or old age, and that it subsequently increased and acquired a new significance as a result of various factors. In particular, we shall emphasise: (a) the scientific advances in microbiology and nutrition, (b) the activities carried out by doctors and various public institutions to promote the consumption of fresh milk, and (c) the technological innovations in the milk producing sector. In Appendix 1 we show two maps representing the main territorial references that we shall mention.