992 resultados para Efficient estimation
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The relationship between estimated and real motor competences was analyzed for several tasks. Participants were 303 children (160 boys and 143 girls), which had between 6 and 10 years of age (M=8.63, SD=1.16). None of the children presented developmental difficulties or learning disabilities, and all attended age-appropriate classes. Children were divided into three groups according to their age: group 1 (N= 102; age range: 6.48-8.01 years); group 2 (N= 101; age range: 8.02-9.22 years); and group 3 (N=100; age range: 9.24-10.93 years). Children were asked to predict their maximum distance for a locomotor, a manipulative, and a balance task, prior to performing those tasks. Children’s estimations were compared with their real performance to determine their accuracy. Children had, in general, a tendency to overestimate their performance (standing long jump: 56.11%, kicking: 63.37%, throwing: 73.60%, and Walking Backwards (WB) on a balance beam: 45.21%), and older children tended to be more accurate, except for the manipulative tasks. Furthermore, the relationship between estimation and real performance in children with different levels of motor coordination (Köperkoordinationstest für Kinder, KTK) was analyzed. The 75 children with the highest score comprised the Highest Motor Coordination (HMC) group, and the 78 children with the lowest score were placed in the Lowest Motor Coordination (LMC) group. There was a tendency for LMC and HMC children to overestimate their skills at all tasks, except for the HMC group at the WB task. Children with the HMC level tended to be more accurate when predicting their motor performance; however, differences in absolute percent error were only significant for the throwing and WB tasks. In conclusion, children display a tendency to overestimate their performance independently of their motor coordination level and task. This fact may be determinant to the development of their motor competences, since they are more likely to engage and persist in motor tasks, but it might also increase the occurrence of unintended injuries.
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Similarity-based operations, similarity join, similarity grouping, data integration
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2012
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2007
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2010
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Humanwiss., Diss., 2012
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This work describes a test tool that allows to make performance tests of different end-to-end available bandwidth estimation algorithms along with their different implementations. The goal of such tests is to find the best-performing algorithm and its implementation and use it in congestion control mechanism for high-performance reliable transport protocols. The main idea of this paper is to describe the options which provide available bandwidth estimation mechanism for highspeed data transport protocols and to develop basic functionality of such test tool with which it will be possible to manage entities of test application on all involved testing hosts, aided by some middleware.
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2014
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2015
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...Diese Dissertation zeigt, wie wir Datenbankmanagementsysteme bauen können, die heterogene Prozessoren effizient und zuverlässig zur Beschleunigung der Anfrageverarbeitung nutzen können. Daher untersuchen wir typische Entwurfsentscheidungen von coprozessorbeschleunigten Datenbankmanagementsystemen und leiten darauf aufbauend eine generische Architektur für solche Systeme ab. Unsere Untersuchungen zeigen, dass eines der wichtigsten Probleme für solche Datenbankmanagementsysteme die Entscheidung ist, welche Operatoren einer Anfrage auf welchem Prozessor ausgeführt werden sollen...
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We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals.
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This comment corrects the errors in the estimation process that appear in Martins (2001). The first error is in the parametric probit estimation, as the previously presented results do not maximize the log-likelihood function. In the global maximum more variables become significant. As for the semiparametric estimation method, the kernel function used in Martins (2001) can take on both positive and negative values, which implies that the participation probability estimates may be outside the interval [0,1]. We have solved the problem by applying local smoothing in the kernel estimation, as suggested by Klein and Spady (1993).
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We study situations of allocating positions or jobs to students or workers based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of one or several entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for ``undergraduate student placement,'' acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Ergin, 2002). We show that in the presence of couples, which introduces complementarities into the students' preferences, acyclicity is still necessary, but not sufficient (Theorem 4.1). A second necessary condition (Theorem 4.2) is ``priority-togetherness'' of couples. A priority structure that satisfies both necessary conditions is called pt-acyclic. For student placement problems where all quotas are equal to one we characterize pt-acyclicity (Lemma 5.1) and show that it is a sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.1). If in addition to pt-acyclicity we require ``reallocation-'' and ``vacancy-fairness'' for couples, the so-called dictator-bidictator placement mechanism is the unique fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.2). Finally, for general student placement problems, we show that pt-acyclicity may not be sufficient for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Examples 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6). We identify a sufficient condition such that the so-called sequential placement mechanism produces a fair and efficient allocation (Theorem 5.3).
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Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.
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In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.