Migraine With Aura and Migraine Without Aura Are Not Distinct Entities: Further Evidence From a Large Dutch Population Study

It is often debated whether migraine with aura (MA) and migraine without aura (MO) are etiologically distinct disorders. A previous study using latent class analysis (LCA) in Australian twins showed no evidence for separate subtypes of MO and MA. The aim of the present study was to replicate these results in a population of Dutch twins and their parents, siblings and partners (N = 10,144). Latent class analysis of International Headache Society (IHS)-based migraine symptoms resulted in the identification of 4 classes: a class of unaffected subjects (class 0), a mild form of nonmigrainous headache (class 1), a moderately severe type of migraine (class 2), typically without neurological symptoms or aura (8% reporting aura symptoms), and a severe type of migraine (class 3), typically with neurological symptoms, and aura symptoms in approximately half of the cases. Given the overlap of neurological symptoms and nonmutual exclusivity of aura symptoms, these results do not support the MO and MA subtypes as being etiologically distinct. The heritability in female twins of migraine based on LCA classification was estimated at .50 (95% confidence intervals [0CI} .27 -.59), similar to IHS-based migraine diagnosis (h(2) = .49, 95% Cl .19-.57). However, using a dichotomous classification (affected-unaffected) decreased heritability for the IHS-based classification (h(2) = .33, 95% Cl .00-.60), but not the LCA-based classification (h(2) = .51, 95% Cl. 23-.61). Importantly, use of the LCA-based classification increased the number of subjects classified as affected. The heritability of the screening question was similar to more detailed LCA and IHS classifications, suggesting that the screening procedure is an important determining factor in genetic studies of migraine.

Is a little sunshine all we need? On the impact of sunshine regulation on profits, productivity and prices in the Dutch drinking water sector

This paper analyzes the performance of Dutch drinking water utilities before and after the introduction of sunshine regulation, which involves publication of the performance of utilities but no formal price regulation. By decomposing profit change into its economic drivers, our results suggest that, in the Dutch political and institutional context, sunshine regulation was effective in improving the productivity of publicly organised services. Nevertheless, while sunshine regulation did bring about a moderate reduction in water prices, sustained and substantial economic profits suggest that it may not have the potential to fully align output prices with economic costs in the long run. In methodological terms, the DEA based profit decomposition is extended to robust and conditional non-parametric efficiency measures, so as to account better for both uncertainty and differences in operating environment between utilities.

Agent-orientated auction mechanism and strategy design

Agent-based technology is playing an increasingly important role in today’s economy. Usually a multi-agent system is needed to model an economic system such as a market system, in which heterogeneous trading agents interact with each other autonomously. Two questions often need to be answered regarding such systems: 1) How to design an interacting mechanism that facilitates efficient resource allocation among usually self-interested trading agents? 2) How to design an effective strategy in some specific market mechanisms for an agent to maximise its economic returns? For automated market systems, auction is the most popular mechanism to solve resource allocation problems among their participants. However, auction comes in hundreds of different formats, in which some are better than others in terms of not only the allocative efficiency but also other properties e.g., whether it generates high revenue for the auctioneer, whether it induces stable behaviour of the bidders. In addition, different strategies result in very different performance under the same auction rules. With this background, we are inevitably intrigued to investigate auction mechanism and strategy designs for agent-based economics. The international Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Ad Auction (AA) competition provides a very useful platform to develop and test agent strategies in Generalised Second Price auction (GSP). AstonTAC, the runner-up of TAC AA 2009, is a successful advertiser agent designed for GSP-based keyword auction. In particular, AstonTAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and selects a set of keyword queries with highest expected profit to bid on to maximise its expected profit under the limit of conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. The TAC CAT tournament provides an environment for investigating the optimal design of mechanisms for double auction markets. AstonCAT-Plus is the post-tournament version of the specialist developed for CAT 2010. In our experiments, AstonCAT-Plus not only outperforms most specialist agents designed by other institutions but also achieves high allocative efficiencies, transaction success rates and average trader profits. Moreover, we reveal some insights of the CAT: 1) successful markets should maintain a stable and high market share of intra-marginal traders; 2) a specialist’s performance is dependent on the distribution of trading strategies. However, typical double auction models assume trading agents have a fixed trading direction of either buy or sell. With this limitation they cannot directly reflect the fact that traders in financial markets (the most popular application of double auction) decide their trading directions dynamically. To address this issue, we introduce the Bi-directional Double Auction (BDA) market which is populated by two-way traders. Experiments are conducted under both dynamic and static settings of the continuous BDA market. We find that the allocative efficiency of a continuous BDA market mainly comes from rational selection of trading directions. Furthermore, we introduce a high-performance Kernel trading strategy in the BDA market which uses kernel probability density estimator built on historical transaction data to decide optimal order prices. Kernel trading strategy outperforms some popular intelligent double auction trading strategies including ZIP, GD and RE in the continuous BDA market by making the highest profit in static games and obtaining the best wealth in dynamic games.

Designing a successful adaptive agent for TAC Ad auction

This paper describes the design and evaluation of Aston-TAC, the runner-up in the Ad Auction Game of 2009 International Trading Agent Competition. In particular, we focus on how Aston-TAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and how it selects a set of keyword queries to bid on to maximise the expected profit under limited conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. © 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Spectrum redistribution for cognitive radios using discriminatory spectrum double auction

With the reformation of spectrum policy and the development of cognitive radio, secondary users will be allowed to access spectrums licensed to primary users. Spectrum auctions can facilitate this secondary spectrum access in a market-driven way. To design an efficient auction framework, we first study the supply and demand pressures and the competitive equilibrium of the secondary spectrum market, considering the spectrum reusability. In well-designed auctions, competition among participants should lead to the competitive equilibrium according to the traditional economic point of view. Then, a discriminatory price spectrum double auction framework is proposed for this market. In this framework, rational participants compete with each other by using bidding prices, and their profits are guaranteed to be non-negative. A near-optimal heuristic algorithm is also proposed to solve the auction clearing problem of the proposed framework efficiently. Experimental results verify the efficiency of the proposed auction clearing algorithm and demonstrate that competition among secondary users and primary users can lead to the competitive equilibrium during auction iterations using the proposed auction framework. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Congestion pricing by priority auction

This paper analyzes a communication network facing users with a continuous distribution of delay cost per unit time. Priority queueing is often used as a way to provide differential services for users with different delay sensitivities. Delay is a key dimension of network service quality, so priority is a valuable resource which is limited and should to be optimally allocated. We investigate the allocation of priority in queues via a simple bidding mechanism. In our mechanism, arriving users can decide not to enter the network at all or submit an announced delay sensitive value. User entering the network obtains priority over all users who make lower bids, and is charged by a payment function which is designed following an exclusion compensation principle. The payment function is proved to be incentive compatible, so the equilibrium bidding behavior leads to the implementation of "cµ-rule". Social warfare or revenue maximizing by appropriately setting the reserve payment is also analyzed.

Price synchronicity:the closing call auction and the London Stock Market

In this paper, we consider the impact of the introduction of a closing call auction on market quality of the London Stock Exchange. We employ the market model, RDD and MEC metrics of market quality. These signify substantial improvements to market quality at both the close and open for migrating stocks.We note that these improvements are larger at the open than the close. An important contribution of our paper is that we show that changes to market quality are stronger in those securities that have the lowest liquidity in the pre-call period. In contrast, market quality changes following the introduction of a closing call auction are approximately neutral for high-liquidity securities. We conclude that the implementation of a closing call auction, for high-liquidity securities may not enhance market quality.

The impact of the closing call auction:an examination of effects in London

This article examines the impact on market quality that the introduction of a closing call auction had at the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Using the market model approach of Cohen et al. (1983a, b) OpenURL Aston University, b) we show that opening and closing market quality improved for those Financial Times and Stock Exchange 100 (FTSE 100) securities participating in the closing call. A control sample of stocks is not characterized by discernable changes to market quality.

How many contracts in an auction sale

Making sense of auction sales, in terms of English contract law, is no easy task. Despite the common perception of hammers hitting blocks, signifying the creation of the basic sale contract,1 a typical auction sale necessarily involves the making of several forms of contract other than the obvious primary sale agreement. The purpose of this article, therefore, is threefold, namely, to (1) examine these various forms of contractual relationship2 which may come into existence as a result of a traditional (face to face) auction sale; (2) consider specifically the selling of land at public auction with a view to advocating a change in the law requiring the formality of writing for sales contracts of land for both private and public auctions, and (3) compare briefly the contractual elements of an online ascending model of auction sale typified by the eBay phenomenon.

Entrepreneurship in the neighborhood:shifting patterns of economic activities in residential neighborhoods in five dutch cities

Cities are oftentimes seen as undergoing a process of "emergence" in the "new economy." However, this process has largely remained empirically underdetermined. This article examines the intra-city geography of emerging businesses in newly dominant sectors of the urban economy. The change in dominant sectors coincides with a shift towards small- and medium-sized businesses, creating new economic opportunities for urban residential areas. The residential neighborhood is introduced as a place where supply and demand side drivers operate to attract or limit such new economic activity. Allen Scott's perspective of the cognitive-cultural economy is used to analyze which neighborhoods are flourishing sites of the cognitive-cultural sectors. His perspective on industries that are on the rise in urban environments and their growth potential proves very valuable. Social demographic characteristics on the level of the neighborhood are used as predictors of the composition of the local economy. The analyses show that in particular wealthy, gentrified neighborhoods are more prone than others to becoming "hubs" of the cognitive-cultural economy. However, disadvantaged neighborhoods may under certain conditions serve as incubators for business start-ups as they offer low-rent office spaces. This has important consequences for their future economic growth potential as well as the distribution of successful businesses in the city. © 2013 Urban Affairs Association.

Optimal Choice of a Firm in Conducting Auction

Силвия К. Баева, Цветана Хр. Недева - Важен аспект в системата на Министерството на регионалното развитие и благоустройство е работата по Оперативна програма “Регионално развитие” с приоритетна ос “Устойчиво и интегрирано градско развитие” по операция “Подобряване на физическата среда и превенция на риска”. По тази програма са включени 86 общини. Финансовият ресурс на тази операция е на стойност 238 589 939 евро, от които 202 801 448 евро са европейско финансиране [1]. Всяка от тези 86 общини трябва да реши задачата за възлагане на обществена поръчка на определена фирма по тази операция. Всъщност, тази задача е задача за провеждане на общински търг за избор на фирма-изпълнител. Оптималният избор на фирма-изпълнител е много важен. Задачата за провеждане на търг ще формулираме като задача на многокритериалното вземане на решения, като чрез подходящо изграждане на критерии и методи може да се трансформира до задача на еднокритериалната оптимизация.