Chitosan-based nanogels for selective delivery of photosensitizers to macrophages and improved retention in and therapy of articular joints.

Macrophages play key roles in inflammatory disorders. Therefore, they are targets of treatments aiming at their local destruction in inflammation sites. However, injection of low molecular mass therapeutics, including photosensitizers, in inflamed joints results in their rapid efflux out of the joints, and poor therapeutic index. To improve selective uptake and increase retention of therapeutics in inflamed tissues, hydrophilic nanogels based on chitosan, of which surface was decorated with hyaluronate and which were loaded with one of three different anionic photosensitizers were developed. Optimal uptake of these functionalized nanogels by murine RAW 264.7 or human THP-1 macrophages as models was achieved after <4h incubation, whereas only negligible uptake by murine fibroblasts used as control cells was observed. The uptake by cells and the intracellular localization of the photosensitizers, of the fluorescein-tagged chitosan and of the rhodamine-tagged hyaluronate were confirmed by fluorescence microscopy. Photodynamic experiments revealed good cell photocytotoxicity of the photosensitizers entrapped in the nanogels. In a mouse model of rheumatoid arthritis, injection of free photosensitizers resulted in their rapid clearance from the joints, while nanogel-encapsulated photosensitizers were retained in the inflamed joints over a longer period of time. The photodynamic treatment of the inflamed joints resulted in a reduction of inflammation comparable to a standard corticoid treatment. Thus, hyaluronate-chitosan nanogels encapsulating therapeutic agents are promising materials for the targeted delivery to macrophages and long-term retention of therapeutics in leaky inflamed articular joints.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Judicial Voter Guide: A Guide to Iowa’s Judicial Retention Elections, 2006

This guide is a informaitonal guide for judicial voters. Frist PDF verison is condensed, the second PDF verison is full text with biographies of judges.

Efficiency of recombinant human TNF in human cancer therapy.

Recombinant human tumour necrosis factor (TNF) has a selective effect on angiogenic vessels in tumours. Given that it induces vasoplegia, its clinical use has been limited to administration through isolated limb perfusion (ILP) for regionally advanced melanomas and soft tissue sarcomas of the limbs. When combined with the alkylating agent melphalan, a single ILP produces a very high objective response rate. In melanoma, the complete response (CR) rate is around 80% and the overall objective response rate greater than 90%. In soft tissue sarcomas that are inextirpable, ILP is a neoadjuvant treatment resulting in limb salvage in 80% of the cases. The CR rate averages 20% and the objective response rate is around 80%. The mode of action of TNF-based ILP involves two distinct and successive effects on the tumour-associated vasculature: first, an increase in endothelium permeability leading to improved chemotherapy penetration within the tumour tissue, and second, a selective killing of angiogenic endothelial cells resulting in tumour vessel destruction. The mechanism whereby these events occur involves rapid (of the order of minutes) perturbation of cell-cell adhesive junctions and inhibition of alphavbeta3 integrin signalling in tumour-associated vessels, followed by massive death of endothelial cells and tumour vascular collapse 24 hours later. New, promising approaches for the systemic use of TNF in cancer therapy include TNF targeting by means of single chain antibodies or endothelial cell ligands, or combined administration with drugs perturbing integrin-dependent signalling and sensitizing angiogenic endothelial cells to TNF-induced death.

Contagion and efficiency in gross and net interbank payment systems

The increased fragility of the banking industry has generatedgrowing concern about the risks associated with the paymentsystems. Although in most industrial countries differentinterbank payment systems coexist, little is really knownabout their propierties in terms of risk and efficiency. Wetackle this question by comparing the two main types ofpayment systems, gross and net, in a framework whereuncertainty arises from several sources: the time ofconsumption, the location of consumption and the return oninvestment. Payments across locations can be made either bydirectly transferrring liquidity or by transferring claimsagainst the bank in the other location. The two mechanism areinterpreted as the gross and net settlement systems ininterbank payments. We characterize the equilibria in the twosystems and identify the trade-off in terms of safety andefficiency.

Employee referrals and efficiency wages

Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtainingjobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectorsreport using employee referrals because they help provide screening andmonitoring of new employees. This paper develops a matching model thatcan explain the link between inter-industry wage differentials and useof employee referrals. Referrals lower monitoring costs because high-effortreferees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lowerefficiency wages. On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job andapplicant contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads). In equilibrium,the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market becauseof heterogeneity in the size of referral networks. Referrals match good high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods matchless attractive jobs to less-connected workers. Industry-level data show apositive correlation between industry wage premia and use of employeereferrals. Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive andsignificant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the returns to employeereferrals, but insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlledfor. This evidence suggests referred workers earn higher wages not becauseof higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather because theyare hired in high-wage sectors.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.