An empirical comparison of forward-rate and spot-rate models for valuing interest-rate options

Our main goal is to investigate the question of which interest-rate options valuation models are better suited to support the management of interest-rate risk. We use the German market to test seven spot-rate and forward-rate models with one and two factors for interest-rate warrants for the period from 1990 to 1993. We identify a one-factor forward-rate model and two spot-rate models with two faetors that are not significant1y outperformed by any of the other four models. Further rankings are possible if additional cri teria are applied.

The forward and the equity premium puzzles: two symptoms of the same illness?

The Forward Premium Puzzle (FPP) is how the empirical observation of a negative relation between future changes in the spot rates and the forward premium is known. Modeling this forward bias as a risk premium and under weak assumptions on the behavior of the pricing kernel, we characterize the potential bias that is present in the regressions where the FPP is observed and we identify the necessary and sufficient conditions that the pricing kernel has to satisfy to account for the predictability of exchange rate movements. Next, we estimate the pricing kernel applying two methods: i) one, du.e to Araújo et aI. (2005), that exploits the fact that the pricing kernel is a serial correlation common feature of asset prices, and ii) a traditional principal component analysis used as a procedure 1;0 generate a statistical factor modeI. Then, using on the sample and out of the sample exercises, we are able to show that the same kernel that explains the Equity Premi um Puzzle (EPP) accounts for the FPP in all our data sets. This suggests that the quest for an economic mo deI that generates a pricing kernel which solves the EPP may double its prize by simultaneously accounting for the FPP.

Informal labor contracts: an analysis of the Brazilian experience

For representing an expressive souree of labor absorption, the jobs with informal labor eontraet have been reeeiving a eonsiderable attention among the speeialists in the Brazilian labor rnarket. This paper presents, eoneisely, some stylized faets about this labor rnarket segment, as well as some oftheir most eommon interpretations. We argue that sue h interpretations are, in general, not very integrated and a model trying to make them eompatible is developed. The model ineorporates both segmentation and workers with heterogeneity in qualifieation. The results of the analysis are shown to be eompatible with most of the observed faets.

Incomplete contracts and the problem of social harm

We construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative extemality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. We analyze several kinds of rights, including damages, injunctions, and rights to exclude (arising from covenants or land ownership). There are cases in which allocating any of these basic rights to the first mover-i.e., first-party rights-is dominated by second-party rights, and cases in which the reverse is true. A Coasian result (efficiency regardless of the rights allocation) only holds under a limited set of conditions. As corollaries of a theorem ranking the basic rights regimes, a number of results emerge contradicting conventional wisdom, including the relative inefficiency of concentrated land ownership and the relevance of the generator's identity. We conclude with a mechanism and a new rights regime that each yield the first best in all cases.

Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.

Workplace diversity and incentive contracts : theory and evidence

This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

Information asymmetry and transaction costs in a cross-cultural business transaction

The intent of this paper is to provide a practitioners insight into the present and foreseeable future of problem of transaction cost economics related to culture and business etiquette that may increase the of complexity of business communication. We will also explore whether it impacts participant's mindsets regarding opportunistic or passive aggressive behavior. We will study the role of culture, ethics, information asymmetry, and legal systems regarding their importance towards the business contracts and lack of knowledge in local environments. We will make connections to contract theory strategies and objectives and recommend business practices. Furthermore, economic theory explores the role of the impossibility of the perfect contract. Historical and present day operational factors are examined for the determination of forward-looking contract law indications worldwide. This paper is intended provide a practitioners view with a global perspective of a multinational, mid-sized and small corporations giving consideration in a non-partisan and non-nationalistic view, yet examines the individual characteristics of the operational necessities and obligations of any corporation. The study will be general, yet cite specific articles to each argument and give adequate consideration to the intricacies of the global asymmetry of information. This paper defends that corporations of any kind and size should be aware of the risk of international business etiquette and cultural barriers that might jeopardize the savings you could obtain from engaging international suppliers.

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.

Exclusivity contracts and competition : the case of the Brazilian fuels market

Exclusivity contracts can help stations by providing brand-value that allows them to obtain higher profits, relative to unbranded retailers. However, branded retailers may have a stronger negative effect over its competitors’ profits. It is not clear which one of these two effects dominates (brand-value vs competition effect). Therefore, the impact of exclusivity over the number of participants in the downstream market is not determined. In this paper, I empirically study the effects of exclusivity agreements on competition in the Brazilian gasoline sector. In order to do so, I estimate an entry model of endogenous product-type choices using data of retailers’ locations and contract choices along with data from the 2010 Brazilian Census. I use my estimates to simulate entry decisions under two counterfactual scenarios: i) mandatory exclusivity and ii) no exclusivity.

Fast-forward/fast-backward substitutions on vector computers

This paper deals with approaches for sparse matrix substitutions using vector processing. Many publications have used the W-matrix method to solve the forward/backward substitutions on vector computer. Recently a different approach has been presented using dependency-based substitution algorithm (DBSA). In this paper the focus is on new algorithms able to explore the sparsity of the vectors. The efficiency is tested using linear systems from power systems with 118, 320, 725 and 1729 buses. The tests were performed on a CRAY Y MP2E/232. The speedups for a fast-forward/fast-backward using a 1729-bus system are near 19 and 14 for real and complex arithmetic operations, respectively. When forward/backward is employed the speedups are about 8 and 6 to perform the same simulations.

gamma p and gamma gamma scattering from (p)over-bar-p, pp forward amplitudes in a QCD eikonal model with a dynamical gluon mass

We examine the gamma p photoproduction and the hadronic gamma gamma total cross sections by means of a QCD eikonal model with a dynamical infrared mass scale. In this model, where the dynamical gluon mass is the natural regulator for the tree level gluon-gluon scattering, the gamma p and gamma gamma total cross sections are derived from the pp and (p) over barp forward scattering amplitudes assuming vector meson dominance and the additive quark model. We show that the validity of the cross section factorization relation sigma(pp)/sigma(gamma p)=sigma(gamma p)/sigma(gamma gamma) is fulfilled depending on the Monte Carlo model used to unfold the hadronic gamma gamma cross section data, and we discuss in detail the case of sigma(gamma gamma -> hadrons) data with W-gamma gamma> 10 GeV unfolded by the Monte Carlo generators PYTHIA and PHOJET. The data seems to favor a mild dependence with the energy of the probability (P-had) that the photon interacts as a hadron.

Measurement of the forward-backward charge asymmetry in top-quark pair production

We present the first measurement of the integrated forward-backward charge asymmetry in top-quark-top-antiquark pair (t (t) over bar) production in proton-antiproton (p (p) over bar) collisions in the lepton+jets final state. Using a b-jet tagging algorithm and kinematic reconstruction assuming t (t) over bar +X production and decay, a sample of 0.9 fb(-1) of data, collected by the D0 experiment at the Fermilab Tevatron Collider, is used to measure the asymmetry for different jet multiplicities. The result is also used to set upper limits on t (t) over bar +X production via a Z' resonance.

Measurement of the Forward-Backward Charge Asymmetry and Extraction of sin(2)theta(eff)(W) in pp -> Z/gamma(*)+X -> e(+)e(-)+X Events Produced at s=1.96 TeV

We present a measurement of the forward-backward charge asymmetry (A(FB)) in pp -> Z/gamma(*)+X -> e(+)e(-)+X events at a center-of-mass energy of 1.96 TeV using 1.1 fb(-1) of data collected with the D0 detector at the Fermilab Tevatron collider. A(FB) is measured as a function of the invariant mass of the electron-positron pair, and found to be consistent with the standard model prediction. We use the A(FB) measurement to extract the effective weak mixing angle sin(2)theta(eff)(W)=0.2326 +/- 0.0018(stat)+/- 0.0006(syst).