Improving Remote Voting Security with Code Voting

One of the major problems that prevents the spread of elections with the possibility of remote voting over electronic networks, also called Internet Voting, is the use of unreliable client platforms, such as the voter's computer and the Internet infrastructure connecting it to the election server. A computer connected to the Internet is exposed to viruses, worms, Trojans, spyware, malware and other threats that can compromise the election's integrity. For instance, it is possible to write a virus that changes the voter's vote to a predetermined vote on election's day. Another possible attack is the creation of a fake election web site where the voter uses a malicious vote program on the web site that manipulates the voter's vote (phishing/pharming attack). Such attacks may not disturb the election protocol, therefore can remain undetected in the eyes of the election auditors. We propose the use of Code Voting to overcome insecurity of the client platform. Code Voting consists in creating a secure communication channel to communicate the voter's vote between the voter and a trusted component attached to the voter's computer. Consequently, no one controlling the voter's computer can change the his/her's vote. The trusted component can then process the vote according to a cryptographic voting protocol to enable cryptographic verification at the server's side.

EVIV: An end-to-end verifiable Internet voting system

Traditionally, a country's electoral system requires the voter to vote at a specific day and place, which conflicts with the mobility usually seen in modern live styles. Thus, the widespread of Internet (mobile) broadband access can be seen as an opportunity to deal with this mobility problem, i.e. the adoption of an Internet voting system can make the live of voter's much more convenient; however, a widespread Internet voting systems adoption relies on the ability to develop trustworthy systems, i.e. systems that are verifiable and preserve the voter's privacy. Building such a system is still an open research problem. Our contribution is a new Internet voting system: EVIV, a highly sound End-to-end Verifiable Internet Voting system, which offers full voter's mobility and preserves the voter's privacy from the vote casting PC even if the voter votes from a public PC, such as a PC at a cybercafe or at a public library. Additionally, EVIV has private vote verification mechanisms, in which the voter just has to perform a simple match of two small strings (4-5 alphanumeric characters), that detect and protect against vote manipulations both at the insecure vote client platform and at the election server side. (c) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Este luminoso e magnifico céu azul

Num texto de cariz jornalístico, escrito na plena maturidade da sua vida literária, em 1895, Eça de Queirós reflecte irónica e liricamente sobre a chamada ―influência‖ do clima sobre a mentalidade, a cultura e a economia dos povos europeus. É seu pretexto uma cómica palinódia dos seus sarcasmos juvenis acerca de um romântico desabafo poético-político de um ex-primeiro-ministro português, o qual enaltecia, como principal riqueza nacional, ―o luminoso e magnífico céu azul que nos cobre!‖. Já desde a década de 1870, no advento da sua vida de escritor, que, para Eça, é tema recorrente uma espécie de ―mitologia do sul‖, em que impera a tutela benfazeja e doce do céu meridional. Nesta crónica, no fim da sua vida, Eça de Queirós retoma e desenvolve, definitivamente, uma representação cultural e psicológica do clima meridional, pretexto para uma magnífica síntese contrastiva sobre o Norte e o Sul da Europa, uma enternecida apologia do sol, do calor e da luz dos climas ―ricos‖, saudosamente evocados durante um Inverno sombrio em Paris. É justamente a coerência exemplar deste motivo – associada, não obstante, à natural e estratégica evolução estético-ideológica do autor – que será objecto de reflexão deste texto: porque o signo climático e a oposição Norte/ Sul podem funcionar como noções heurísticas de uma obra e de um autor sobre os quais (como sobre Flaubert) já se disse muito, mas nunca se diz o suficiente.

An Ethos Theory of Party Positions on European Integration: Poland and Beyond

Since 1989, five parliamentary elections have been the stage for the foundation and demise of political parties aspiring to govern the new democratic Polish state. The demise of the AWS before the 2001 elections after ten years of attempts to create a centre-right core party resulted in a new splintering of the right-wing, and the centre-right became again devoid of a pivotal formation. While Eurosceptic parties in average gain 8 percent of the vote, in the 2001 Polish parliamentary elections Eurosceptic parties gained around 20 percent of the vote. In Poland right-wing parties show an unusual propensity for Euroscepticism. The persistence and increased importance of nationalism in Poland, which has prevented the development of a strong Christian democratic party, effectively explains the levels of Euroscepticism on the right. After the autumn 2005 parliamentary elections the national conservative party, Law and Justice, formed a governing coalition with the national Catholic League of Polish Families, creating one of the first Eurosceptic governments. Although this work does not intend to provide a theorisation of party systems development, it shows that the context of European integration fostered nationalists’ divisiveness of, and provoked the splitting of the right the unusual propensity of parties for Euroscepticism makes Poland a paradigmatic case of the kind of conflicts over European integration emerging in Central and Eastern European party systems.

Clinical Outcome and Morphologic Analysis after Endovascular Aneurysm Repair Using the Excluder Endograft

OBJECTIVE: Long-term follow-up after endovascular aneurysm repair (EVAR) is very scarce, and doubt remains regarding the durability of these procedures. We designed a retrospective cohort study to assess long-term clinical outcome and morphologic changes in patients with abdominal aortic aneurysms (AAAs) treated by EVAR using the Excluder endoprosthesis (W. L. Gore and Associates, Flagstaff, Ariz). METHODS: From 2000 to 2007, 179 patients underwent EVAR in a tertiary institution. Clinical data were retrieved from a prospective database. All patients treated with the Excluder endoprosthesis were included. Computed tomography angiography (CTA) scans were retrospectively analyzed preoperatively, at 30 days, and at the last follow-up using dedicated tridimensional reconstruction software. For patients with complications, all remaining CTAs were also analyzed. The primary end point was clinical success. Secondary end points were freedom from reintervention, sac growth, types I and III endoleak, migration, conversion to open repair, and AAA-related death or rupture. Neck dilatation, renal function, and overall survival were also analyzed. RESULTS: Included were 144 patients (88.2% men; mean age, 71.6 years). Aneurysms were ruptured in 4.9%. American Society of Anesthesiologists classification was III/IV in 61.8%. No patients were lost during a median follow-up of 5.0 years (interquartile range, 3.1-6.4; maximum, 11.2 years). Two patients died of medical complications ≤ 30 days after EVAR. The estimated primary clinical success rates at 5 and 10 years were 63.5% and 41.1%, and secondary clinical success rates were 78.3% and 58.3%, respectively. Sac growth was observed in 37 of 142 patients (26.1%). Cox regression showed type I endoleak during follow-up (hazard ratio, 3.74; P = .008), original design model (hazard ratio, 3.85; P = .001), and preoperative neck diameter (1.27 per mm increase, P = .006) were determinants of sac growth. Secondary interventions were required in 32 patients (22.5%). The estimated 10-year rate of AAA-related death or rupture was 2.1%. Overall life expectancy after AAA repair was 6.8 years. CONCLUSIONS: EVAR using the Excluder endoprosthesis provides a safe and lasting treatment for AAA, despite the need for maintained surveillance and secondary interventions. At up to 11 years, the risk of AAA-related death or postimplantation rupture is remarkably low. The incidences of postimplantation sac growth and secondary intervention were greatly reduced after the introduction of the low-permeability design in 2004.

The influence of traditional authority on voting behavior in Mozambique

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

e-ESPOIR: uma aplicação web de suporte à avaliação médica de pessoas com deficiência

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores

Determinants of reelection in Portuguese municipal elections

This Work Project investigates the determinants of reelection using data on the 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities for the period 1976-2009. We implement a logit fixed effect model to control for the municipalities’ unobserved characteristics that remain constant over time. Political variables, such as the vote share of the incumbent’s party in previous election, the number of mayor’s consecutive mandates and abstention rate, are found to be relevant in explaining incumbent’s reelection. Moreover, as to the mayor’s individual characteristics, age and education contribute to explain reelection prospects. We also provide weak evidence that a higher degree of fiscal autonomy increases political turnover and that the good economic prospects of the municipality positively affect reelection. Finally, the residents’ level of education and the size of the municipal population have an explanatory power on mayor’s reelection. We perform several robustness checks to confirm these results.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Application of wavelets to the study of political history

\The idea that social processes develop in a cyclical manner is somewhat like a `Lorelei'. Researchers are lured to it because of its theoretical promise, only to become entangled in (if not wrecked by) messy problems of empirical inference. The reasoning leading to hypotheses of some kind of cycle is often elegant enough, yet the data from repeated observations rarely display the supposed cyclical pattern. (...) In addition, various `schools' seem to exist which frequently arrive at di erent conclusions on the basis of the same data." (van der Eijk and Weber 1987:271). Much of the empirical controversies around these issues arise because of three distinct problems: the coexistence of cycles of di erent periodicities, the possibility of transient cycles and the existence of cycles without xed periodicity. In some cases, there are no reasons to expect any of these phenomena to be relevant. Seasonality caused by Christmas is one such example (Wen 2002). In such cases, researchers mostly rely on spectral analysis and Auto-Regressive Moving-Average (ARMA) models to estimate the periodicity of cycles.1 However, and this is particularly true in social sciences, sometimes there are good theoretical reasons to expect irregular cycles. In such cases, \the identi cation of periodic movement in something like the vote is a daunting task all by itself. When a pendulum swings with an irregular beat (frequency), and the extent of the swing (amplitude) is not constant, mathematical functions like sine-waves are of no use."(Lebo and Norpoth 2007:73) In the past, this di culty has led to two di erent approaches. On the one hand, some researchers dismissed these methods altogether, relying on informal alternatives that do not meet rigorous standards of statistical inference. Goldstein (1985 and 1988), studying the severity of Great power wars is one such example. On the other hand, there are authors who transfer the assumptions of spectral analysis (and ARMA models) into fundamental assumptions about the nature of social phenomena. This type of argument was produced by Beck (1991) who, in a reply to Goldstein (1988), claimed that only \ xed period models are meaningful models of cyclic phenomena".We argue that wavelet analysis|a mathematical framework developed in the mid-1980s (Grossman and Morlet 1984; Goupillaud et al. 1984) | is a very viable alternative to study cycles in political time-series. It has the advantage of staying close to the frequency domain approach of spectral analysis while addressing its main limitations. Its principal contribution comes from estimating the spectral characteristics of a time-series as a function of time, thus revealing how its di erent periodic components may change over time. The rest of article proceeds as follows. In the section \Time-frequency Analysis", we study in some detail the continuous wavelet transform and compare its time-frequency properties with the more standard tool for that purpose, the windowed Fourier transform. In the section \The British Political Pendulum", we apply wavelet analysis to essentially the same data analyzed by Lebo and Norpoth (2007) and Merrill, Grofman and Brunell (2011) and try to provide a more nuanced answer to the same question discussed by these authors: do British electoral politics exhibit cycles? Finally, in the last section, we present a concise list of future directions.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Weighted approval voting

To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure.

The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters

This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard.

A Foundation System and a State System - Private-School Implications on Welfare and Education Expenditure

This paper examines the effects of two different education - financing systems: a foundation system and a state system on the level and distribution of resources devoted to education in the presence of private schools. We use political economy approach where households differ in their level of income, and the central tax rate used to nance education is determined by a majority vote. Our analysis focuses on implications of allowing for a private-school option. To evaluate the importance of private schools we develop a computational model and calibrate it using USA data. The results reveal that the private school option is very important quantitatively in terms of welfare, total resources spent on education and equity.

La responsabilité civile et pénale des organes dirigeants de sociétés anonymes

But et structure du travail La responsabilité civile des dirigeants sociaux fait déjà l'objet d'une littérature considérable; on constate néanmoins que les auteurs romands qui se sont intéressés à cette question sont finalement assez peu nombreux. D'ailleurs, à notre connaissance, aucun travail de recherche juridique approfondie n'a été récemment consacré en français à cette matière. Pourtant, plusieurs aspects de la responsabilité civile des organes dirigeants demeurent très controversés en doctrine. Parmi d'autres, on pense, par exemple, à la nature juridique de l'action en responsabilité ou à sa mise en oeuvre. Pour ces raisons, il nous paraît souhaitable de procéder, dans une première partie, à un examen approfondi des art. 754 ss CO. A cet égard, nous nous appuierons sur un appareil référentiel aussi complet que possible ; nous tenterons aussi de trancher les points qui ne cessent de diviser les auteurs. La première partie de l'étude compte sept titres. Le premier d'entre eux renferme des considérations tout à fait générales, notamment historiques, destinées à offrir au lecteur certains points de repère préalables, utiles à une bonne compréhension de la matière. Dans le deuxième titre, nous définirons le cercle des personnes légitimées à agir en responsabilité sur la base des art. 754 ss CO. Encore faut-il savoir quels sont les individus contre lesquels l'action en justice peut être intentée ou, en d'autres termes, ce qu'il faut entendre par «organes dirigeants ». C'est précisément la question à laquelle nous nous proposons de répondre dans le troisième titre de cette première partie. Cela étant, la responsabilité civile des dirigeants sociaux obéit à des conditions strictes : le demandeur doit établir un dommage, une violation des devoirs, un lien de causalité adéquate et une faute. Ces quatre conditions cumulatives feront l'objet d'un examen successif dans le quatrième titre. Il arrive aussi que ces conditions soient réunies, mais que, nonobstant, l'action en responsabilité n'aboutisse que partiellement, voire pas du tout. La raison doit être recherchée dans les causes de limitation ou d'exclusion de la responsabilité, en particulier la décharge votée par l'assemblée générale, le consentement du lésé (« volenti non fit injuria»), la prescription ou encore la compensation. C'est l'objet du titre cinquième. L'on relèvera encore que les actions en responsabilité sont généralement dirigées simultanément contre plusieurs dirigeants. On soulève ici la question essentielle de la solidarité entre les défendeurs et du règlement de leurs rapports internes ; nous y reviendrons au titre sixième. Enfin, pour que l'action du demandeur soit recevable, le demandeur doit agir devant le tribunal compétent ratione loci. Les problèmes de for seront donc abordés dans le titre septième. A la lecture de la doctrine, l'on est frappé de constater à quel point les auteurs qui, à ce jour, se sont risqués à rapprocher la responsabilité civile de la responsabilité pénale des organes dirigeants, sont rares. Pourtant, la lutte contre une criminalité économique toujours plus redoutable devrait tendre, ces prochaines années, à augmenter considérablement l'importance pratique du droit pénal des affaires. Dans ces conditions, il paraît impossible de faire abstraction du régime de responsabilité pénale encouru par les dirigeants sociaux. Nous y avons consacré la seconde partie de notre travail. Celle-ci se compose de quatre titres distincts, dont la numérotation s'inscrit dans le prolongement de la première partie. Le titre huitième contient des considérations générales, en particulier sur le rôle que le droit pénal est amené à jouer aujourd'hui dans la vie des affaires. Nous enchaînerons, dans un titre neuvième, avec l'examen des deux fondements envisageables de la responsabilité pénale des dirigeants. Nous traiterons d'abord de leur responsabilité à raison des infractions qu'ils commettent personnellement. Nous nous intéresserons ensuite à leur responsabilité pénale du fait d'autrui. Ces deux sources de responsabilité devront être illustrées. A ce titre, nous examinerons leur portée à la lumière du droit de la société anonyme, eu égard en particulier aux devoirs que le droit commercial met à la charge des dirigeants sociaux. C'est l'objet du titre dixième. Dans le titre onzième, nous procéderons à un bref examen de la responsabilité pénale de l'entreprise. Tout en rappelant les dispositions légales applicables en la matière, nous essayerons de mettre le doigt sur certaines incohérences que présente le système tel qu'il a été adopté par les Chambres fédérales. Nous traiterons ensuite de l'articulation probable entre la responsabilité pénale de l'entreprise et le régime de responsabilité pénale applicable à ses dirigeants physiques. Nous terminerons par rappeler, sous forme de synthèse, les principaux éléments qui se dégagent de notre travail.