Expression of merlin, NDRG2, ERBB2, and c-MYC in meningiomas: relationship with tumor grade and recurrence

Meningiomas are common, usually benign tumors of the central nervous system that have a high rate of post-surgical recurrence or regrowth. We determined expression of the proteins merlin, NDRG2, ERBB2, and c-MYC in meningiomas using immunohistochemistry and assessed relationships between protein expression and gender, age, tumor grade, and recurrence or regrowth. The study sample comprised 60 patients, (44 women and 16 men) with a mean age of 53.2±12.7 years. Tumors were classified as grade I (n=48) or grades II and III (n=12). Expression of merlin, NDRG2, ERBB2, and c-MYC was not significantly different statistically with relation to gender, age, or meningioma recurrence or regrowth. Merlin was expressed in 100% of the cases. No statistically significant difference between tumor grade and recurrence or regrowth was identified. Statistically significant differences were identified between the mean age of patients with grade I (54.83±11.60) and grades II and III (46.58±15.08) meningiomas (P=0.043), between strong c-MYC expression and grades II and III (P<0.001), and between partial surgical resection and tumor recurrence or regrowth (P<0.001). These findings reveal the lower mean age among grades II and III meningioma patients than grade I patients, the influence of the protein merlin on tumorigenesis, the association of c-MYC with aggressive meningiomas, and that partial surgical resection is associated with tumor recurrence or regrowth.

A volta de Ulisses: anotações sobre a lógica de planos e compromissos

This paper criticizes the conventional theory of choice for being grounded on a minimal set of rationality axioms. We claim that this theory does not take due account of the fact that agents are driven by motives other than the pursuit of material self-interest. Our departure point is logic of commitments and planned action, which helps us to identify some puzzles in the conventional theory of choice. As a way out, we discuss the Kantian perspective and the notions of metapreference and metaranking. We then build a model of choice which points to the possibility of a systematic treatment of higher order preferences and incommensurable objectives.

Can future systemic financial risks be quantified?: ergodic vs nonergodic stochastic processes

Different axioms underlie efficient market theory and Keynes's liquidity preference theory. Efficient market theory assumes the ergodic axiom. Consequently, today's decision makers can calculate with actuarial precision the future value of all possible outcomes resulting from today's decisions. Since in an efficient market world decision makers "know" their intertemporal budget constraints, decision makers never default on a loan, i.e., systemic defaults, insolvencies, and bankruptcies are impossible. Keynes liquidity preference theory rejects the ergodic axiom. The future is ontologically uncertain. Accordingly systemic defaults and insolvencies can occur but can never be predicted in advance.

Incerteza e não ergodicidade: crítica aos neoclássicos

The starting point of this essay is to show that, in our view, the problem of the traditional economics is not in the deductive method nor the mathematical methods used, but to attribute to economic agents "power" on the future and prescribe the existence of ergodic stochastic processes in their economic analyzes. Thus, building a theory on the ground whose bases are not able to sustain a proper understanding of the world, mainstream economics has difficulties in using the modeling for establishing deductions and conclusions that help understanding the system. Thus, the logical-mathematical rigor in economic models and deduction can be used with appropriate axioms, which is not the case of mainstream economics. Our hypothesis is that the inability of the mainstream in predicting economic crisis is due to the non-recognition of some principles that best describe the dynamics of financialized contemporary capitalism, as the principles of non-ergodicity and Keynesian uncertainty.

A System for Models of First Order Theories

If you want to know whether a property is true or not in a specific algebraic structure,you need to test that property on the given structure. This can be done by hand, which can be cumbersome and erroneous. In addition, the time consumed in testing depends on the size of the structure where the property is applied. We present an implementation of a system for finding counterexamples and testing properties of models of first-order theories. This system is supposed to provide a convenient and paperless environment for researchers and students investigating or studying such models and algebraic structures in particular. To implement a first-order theory in the system, a suitable first-order language.( and some axioms are required. The components of a language are given by a collection of variables, a set of predicate symbols, and a set of operation symbols. Variables and operation symbols are used to build terms. Terms, predicate symbols, and the usual logical connectives are used to build formulas. A first-order theory now consists of a language together with a set of closed formulas, i.e. formulas without free occurrences of variables. The set of formulas is also called the axioms of the theory. The system uses several different formats to allow the user to specify languages, to define axioms and theories and to create models. Besides the obvious operations and tests on these structures, we have introduced the notion of a functor between classes of models in order to generate more co~plex models from given ones automatically. As an example, we will use the system to create several lattices structures starting from a model of the theory of pre-orders.

The Axiomatic Approach to Population Ethics

This paper examines several families of population principles in the light of a set of axioms. In addition to the critical-level utilitarian, number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian and number-dampened families and their generalized counterparts, we consider the restricted number-dampened family (suggested by Hurka) and introduce two new families : the restricted critical-level and restricted number-dependent critical-level families. Subsets of the restricted families have nonnegative critical levels and avoid both the repugnant and sadistic conclusions but fail to satisfy an important independence condition. We defend the critical-level principles with positive critical levels.

Population Ethics and the Value of Life

Public policies often involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the composition of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to prenatal care and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess the corresponding feasible choices on normative grounds, criteria for social evaluation that are capable of performing variable-population comparisons are required. We review several important axioms for welfarist population principles and discuss the link between individual well-being and the desirability of adding a new person to a given society.

Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.

Reference Groups and Individual Deprivation

We provide an axiomatization of Yitzhaki’s index of individual deprivation. Our result differs from an earlier characterization due to Ebert and Moyes in the way the reference group of an individual is represented in the model. Ebert and Moyes require the index to be defined for all logically possible reference groups, whereas we employ the standard definition of the reference group as the set of all agents in a society. As a consequence of this modification, some of the axioms used by Ebert and Moyes can no longer be applied and we provide alternative formulations.

Relative Uncertainty and Additively Representable Set Rankings

This paper proposes a definition of relative uncertainty aversion for decision models under complete uncertainty. It is shown that, for a large class of decision rules characterized by a set of plausible axioms, the new criterion yields a complete ranking of those rules with respect to the relative degree of uncertainty aversion they represent. In addition, we address a combinatorial question that arises in this context, and we examine conditions for the additive representability of our rules.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Intertemporal Social Evaluation

Intertemporal social-evaluation rules provide us with social criteria that can be used to assess the relative desirability of utility distributions across generations. The trade-offs between the well-being of different generations implicit in each such rule reflect the underlying ethical position on issues of intergenerational equity or justice. We employ an axiomatic approach in order to identify ethically attractive socialevaluation procedures. In particular, we explore the possibilities of using welfare information and non-welfare information in a model of intertemporal social evaluation. We focus on the individuals’ birth dates and lengths of life as the relevant non-welfare information. As usual, welfare information is given by lifetime utilities. It is assumed that this information is available for each alternative to be ranked. Various weakenings of the Pareto principle are employed in order to allow birth dates or lengths of life (or both) to matter in social evaluation. In addition, we impose standard properties such as continuity and anonymity and we examine the consequences of an intertemporal independence property. For each of the Pareto conditions employed, we characterize all social-evaluation rules satisfying it and our other axioms. The resulting rules are birth-date dependent or lifetime-dependent versions of generalized utilitarianism. Furthermore, we discuss the ethical and axiomatic foundations of geometric discounting in the context of our model.

Fair Allocation of Production Externalities: Recent Results

We survey recent axiomatic results in the theory of cost-sharing. In this litterature, a method computes the individual cost shares assigned to the users of a facility for any profile of demands and any monotonic cost function. We discuss two theories taking radically different views of the asymmetries of the cost function. In the full responsibility theory, each agent is accountable for the part of the costs that can be unambiguously separated and attributed to her own demand. In the partial responsibility theory, the asymmetries of the cost function have no bearing on individual cost shares, only the differences in demand levels matter. We describe several invariance and monotonicity properties that reflect both normative and strategic concerns. We uncover a number of logical trade-offs between our axioms, and derive axiomatic characterizations of a handful of intuitive methods: in the full responsibility approach, the Shapley-Shubik, Aumann-Shapley, and subsidyfree serial methods, and in the partial responsibility approach, the cross-subsidizing serial method and the family of quasi-proportional methods.

Social Norms and Rationality of Choice

Ever since Sen (1993) criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a wide spread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties coping with the existence of external social norms. This paper introduces a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and shows that external social norms can be accommodated so as to be compatible with norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitably modified revealed preference axioms in the theory of rational choice on general domains à la Richter (1966;1971) and Hansson (1968)

Infinite-Horizon Choice Functions

We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple linear technology. Time consistency and efficiency are characterized by stationary consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality condition. In addition, we consider the equity axioms Suppes-Sen, Pigou-Dalton, and resource monotonicity. We show that Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton imply that the consumption and inheritance functions are monotone with respect to time—thus justifying sustainability—while resource monotonicity implies that the consumption and inheritance functions are monotone with respect to the resource. Examples illustrate the characterization results.