An analysis of the accounting principles applied by the European Farm Accountancy Data Network

In spite of its relative importance in the economy of many countriesand its growing interrelationships with other sectors, agriculture has traditionally been excluded from accounting standards. Nevertheless, to support its Common Agricultural Policy, for years the European Commission has been making an effort to obtain standardized information on the financial performance and condition of farms. Through the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), every year data are gathered from a rotating sample of 60.000 professional farms across all member states. FADN data collection is not structured as an accounting cycle but as an extensive questionnaire. This questionnaire refers to assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses, and seems to try to obtain a "true and fair view" of the financial performance and condition of the farms it surveys. However, the definitions used in the questionnaire and the way data is aggregated often appear flawed from an accounting perspective. The objective of this paper is to contrast the accounting principles implicit in the FADN questionnaire with generally accepted accounting principles, particularly those found in the IVth Directive of the European Union, on the one hand, and those recently proposed by the International Accounting Standards Committee’s Steering Committeeon Agriculture in its Draft Statement of Principles, on the other hand. There are two reasons why this is useful. First, it allows to make suggestions how the information provided by FADN could be more in accordance with the accepted accounting framework, and become a more valuable tool for policy makers, farmers, and other stakeholders. Second, it helps assessing the suitability of FADN to become the starting point for a European accounting standard on agriculture.

What social security: Beveridgean or Bismarckian?

Why are Bismarckian social security systems associated with largerpublic pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension andlower income in-equality than Beveridgean systems? These facts arepuzzling for political economy theories of social security whichpredict that Beveridgean systems, involving intra-generationalredistribution, should enjoy larger support among low-income people andthus be larger. This paper explains these features in a bidimensionalpolitical economy model. In an economy with three income groups,low-income support a large, redistributive system; middle-income favoran earning-related system, while high-income oppose any public system,since they have access to a superior saving technology, a privatesystem. We show that, if income inequality is large, the voting majorityof high-income and low-income supports a (small) Beveridgean system,and a large private pillar arises; the opposite occurs with lowinequality. Additionally, when the capital market provides higherreturns, a Beveridgean system is more likely to emerge.

Financial development, financial fragility and growth

This paper studies the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). The paper accounts for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run impacts of financial intermediation. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). The conclusion from this analysis is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship. The paper further develops an explanation for these contrasting effects by relating them to recent theoretical models, by linking the estimated short-run effects to measures of financial fragility(namely, banking crises and financial volatility), and by jointly analyzing the effects of financial depth and fragility in classic panel growth regressions.

Desenvolvimentos estimados de custo amortizado e imparidade, segundo SNCRF - caso prático

O tema do Trabalho de Fim de Curso - “Desenvolvimentos Estimados de Custo Amortizado e Imparidade segundo SNCRF”, insere-se no âmbito da conclusão da Licenciatura em Contabilidade e Administração – Ramo Administração e Controlo Financeiro ministrada pelo ISCEE – Instituto Superior de Ciências Económicas e Empresariais. O trabalho ora apresentado, espelha uma análise sumária das normas internacionais e do novo normativo nacional no que diz respeito aos instrumentos financeiros com foco em tratamento contabilístico dado pelo método de custo amortizado e reconhecimento de perda por imparidade. Foi preparado com base em consulta de bibliografia especializada e normativos estabelecidos no país, pois permitirá ter acesso tanto a conteúdos teóricos como práticos o que implica um estudo mais abrangente de todos os recursos disponíveis. O desenvolvimento da temática foi orientado numa primeira etapa através de pesquisa necessária a construção do referencial teórico centrado por um lado na evolução teórica das normas internacionais sobre os instrumentos financeiros e consequentemente o tratamento dado pela nossa norma. Na segunda etapa, os casos práticos apresentam os principais casos de contabilização dos instrumentos financeiros utilizando o método de custo amortizado, e reconhecimento de imparidade de acordo com o SNCRF, e a conclusão que se chegou é que o custo amortizado implica a utilização do método de taxa de juro efectiva menos qualquer perda por imparidade, sendo que o método de taxa de juro efectiva distribui os pagamentos e recebimentos dos juros ao longo do período do instrumento financeiro aplicando a taxa de juro efectiva ao valor a transportar do activo ou de passivo de cada período, e uma entidade que usa o método de custo amortizado reconhece os activos financeiros e passivos financeiros pelo seu valor líquido no balanço, e à data de cada relato financeiro deve avaliar a imparidade de todos os activos financeiros e reconhecer perdas por imparidade, visto que, a imparidade representa uma redução no valor de um activo financeiro ou seja reflecte a depreciação (perda permanente) do valor de um activo financeiro e verifica quando a quantia recuperável for superior ao seu valor contabilístico.

Window-dressing in German interwar balance sheets

German accounting rules value assets and liabilities asymmetricallyand thus lead to grossly distorted balance sheets. In the interwardebate on a reform of disclosure regulation, financial expertsconsidered the (undisclosed) tax balance sheet, which had to bedrawn up separately for the corporate tax assessment, as a paradigmfor adequate financial disclosure. However, due to tax secrecy thaywere barred from analyzing tax documents. Using archival evidence,we analyze tax balance sheets from which the reliability of disclosedbalance sheets of the interwar period can be assessed. It emergesthat companies overstated their profits in the middand late 1920s,but grossly understated them in the Nazi economy.

The so-called 'external partners' in the groups of corporations: A model of presentation in the consolidated statements

This paper studies, on the one hand, theories set out around theconsideration of the external partners in the consolidated informationand on the other hand, financial models that discuss the convenience ofthe separation or not of the different elements that form part of theliabilities of the balance sheet of the companies. A Model is proposed,the External Partners Model, which financially argues a certain presentationand processing of such and that, in our opinion, facilitates the analysisof the consolidated financial statements. This model is based on twohypotheses: (1) the economic and financial variables are not independentand (2) the value of the company depends, among other factors, of thetype of sources that constitute their capital. These two hypotheses willimply that a separation should be included in the consolidated balance sheet between equity and liabilities as they are different sources ofcapital and then its separation will give relevant information to itsusers.

Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetarypolicy in a general equilibrium model of securities marketsand banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing theaggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.

An evaluation of the life-cycle effects of minimum pensions on retirement behavior

In this paper we explore the effects of the minimum pension program on welfare andretirement in Spain. This is done with a stylized life-cycle model which provides a convenient analytical characterization of optimal behavior. We use data from the Spanish Social Security to estimate the behavioral parameters of the model and then simulate the changes induced by the minimum pension in aggregate retirement patterns. The impact is substantial: there is threefold increase in retirement at 60 (the age of first entitlement) with respect to the economy without minimum pensions, and total early retirement (before or at 60) is almost 50% larger.

Retirement incentives, individual heterogeneity and labour transitions of employed and unemployed workers

In this paper we analyze the sensitivity of the labour market decisions of workers close toretirement with respect to the incentives created by public regulations. We improve upon the extensiveprior literature on the effect of pension incentives on retirement in two ways. First, bymodeling the transitions between employment, unemployment and retirement in a simultaneousmanner, paying special attention to the transition from unemployment to retirement (which is particularlyimportant in Spain). Second, by considering the influence of unobserved heterogeneity inthe estimation of the effect of our (carefully constructed) incentive variables.Using administrative data, we find that, when properly defined, economic incentives have astrong impact on labour market decisions in Spain. Unemployment regulations are shown to be particularlyinfluential for retirement behaviour, along with the more traditional determinants linked tothe pension system. Pension variables also have a major bearing on both workers reemploymentdecisions and on the strategic actions of employers. The quantitative impact of the incentives, however,is greatly affected by the existence of unobserved heterogeneity among workers. Its omissionleads to sizable biases in the assessment of the sensitivity to economic incentives, a finding thathas clear consequences for the credibility of any model-based policy analysis. We confirm theimportance of this potential problem in one especially interesting instance: the reform of earlyretirement provisions undertaken in Spain in 2002. We use a difference-in-difference approach tomeasure the behavioural reaction to this change, finding a large overestimation when unobservedheterogeneity is not taken into account.

Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility forbanking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated bythe Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macroand microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems areclassified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that theinflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries wherethe Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides,although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them,they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to moresophisticated liabilities as a funding source.The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries.We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulationand supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independentEuropean System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to theESCB.

Social spending and demographics: The role of public policies in the intergenerational redistribution of income. Empirical evidence from Spain and Catalonia

The demographic shift underway in Southern Europe requires a revision of some of thefundamental principles of the traditional welfare state. We analyze the evolution of several aspects of welfare and social expenditure over the last two decades. We find that in the context of the present demographic changes and real estate boom current social and pension policy leads to a new distribution of benefits and burdens which is highly intergenerationally unequal. We argue for a revised definition of public policy based on Musgrave's proposition as a possible rule for an intergenerationally fair distribution.

Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which areincreasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implicationsof all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.

Assessing the wellbeing of the Spanish elderly

In this paper we use a variety of data sources, both micro and macro, time series, crosssection, and panel data to provide an empirical evaluation of the current level of economicwellbeing of the Spanish elderly, and of its determinants. We focus, in particular on the role played by the pension system and its generosity in terms of minimum pension supplements and non-contributive pensions. In an IV context, we find that actual Social Security benefits contribute substantially to explain income and consumption poverty levels and trends of low income and consumption percentiles. Thus we offer support to previous evidence for Spain emphasizing the role of minimum benefit policies.

IPERS 2005 to 2009 Experience Study, June 2010

It is a pleasure to submit this report of our investigation of the experience of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the period of July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2009. The set of assumptions recommended as a result of this study will be used in the June 30, 2010 actuarial valuation of IPERS which will be used to analyze the funding status of the system, calculate the actuarial and statutory employer contribution rates, and disclose employer liabilities for financial statements. The purpose of this report is to communicate the results of our review of the actuarial methods and assumptions to be used in the completion of the upcoming valuation. Our recommendations represent changes from the prior methods or assumptions, which are intended to better anticipate the emerging experience of the System. Actual future experience, however, may differ from these assumptions. In preparing this report, we relied without audit on information supplied by IPERS staff. In our examination, we have found the data to be reasonably consistent and comparable with data used for other purposes. It should be noted that if any data or other information is inaccurate or incomplete, our calculations might need to be revised. We would like to acknowledge the help given by IPERS staff in the preparation of this report. We hereby certify that, to the best of our knowledge and belief, this report is complete and accurate and has been prepared in accordance with generally recognized and accepted actuarial principles and practices which are consistent with the principles prescribed by the Actuarial Standards Board (ASB) and the Code of Professional Conduct and qualification Standards for Public Statements of Actuarial Opinion of the American Academy of Actuaries.