Impacto da poluição luminosa nas aves marinhas da ilha Terceira

Dissertação de Mestrado em Gestão e Conservação da Natureza.

Acompanhamento da III fase do aterro sanitário da Meia Serra

Trabalho Final de Mestrado para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Civil na Área de Especialização de Hidráulica

A Ocidente do Imenso Brasil: as conquistas dos rios Paraguai e Guaporé (1680-1750)

Tese apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Doutor em História da Expansão e dos Descobrimentos Portugueses

A sacristia e a encomenda episcopal portuguesa no período da reforma católica. O caso da Sé de Coimbra e o patrocínio do bispo D. Afonso de Castelo Branco

Tese de Doutoramento em História de Arte Moderna

Levantamento e Caracterização de Projectos Musicais Implementados em Estabelecimentos Prisionais Femininos Portugueses (2005 a 2010)

Tese apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Doutor em Ciências Musicais na especialidade de Ensino e Psicologia da Música

Synchronization properties of multi-oscillator circadian systems

Dissertation presented to obtain the Ph.D degree in Computational Biology

O Porto Grande e a Urbe Mindelense na Aurora da Contemporaneidade (1850-1914)

Este trabalho, que obedece aos requisitos parciais para a obtenção do grau de mestre em História Contemporânea na Universidade Nova de Lisboa, enquadra-se no campo da História Local, incidindo sobre o Porto Grande na Ilha de S. Vicente de Cabo Verde, no período compreendido entre 1850 a 1914. Procurar-se-á, à luz da documentação disponível, analisar a importância do porto para a afirmação da urbe, numa altura em que por força da Revolução Industrial o barco a vapor entrou nos mares do mundo e revolucionou o sistema de transportes. Nessa altura, S. Vicente, que até então mantinhase deserta de gente, é elegida por hidrógrafos ingleses que procuravam um porto seguro onde pudessem instalar as suas companhias carvoeiras para abastecer os seus navios na rota do Atlântico Médio. Foi só por essa altura que o povoamento da ilha tornou-se possível, e a dinâmica do seu crescimento uma realidade, impulsionada pelo porto e sob uma forte influência inglesa. Este ritmo de desenvolvimento começou, porém, a decair nos finais do séc. XIX, altura em que o Porto Grande começa a sofrer uma forte concorrência por parte dos portos de Las Palmas e de Santa Cruz de Tenerife, no Arquipélago das Canárias, agravada ainda mais no inicio do séc. XX, quando, por altura da 1ª Grande Guerra, o Porto Grande do Mindelo também é sulcado por navios das potências beligerantes, envolvidas no conflito.

The protein phosphatase 7 regulates phytochrome signaling in Arabidopsis.

The psi2 mutant of Arabidopsis displays amplification of the responses controlled by the red/far red light photoreceptors phytochrome A (phyA) and phytochrome B (phyB) but no apparent defect in blue light perception. We found that loss-of-function alleles of the protein phosphatase 7 (AtPP7) are responsible for the light hypersensitivity in psi2 demonstrating that AtPP7 controls the levels of phytochrome signaling. Plants expressing reduced levels of AtPP7 mRNA display reduced blue-light induced cryptochrome signaling but no noticeable deficiency in phytochrome signaling. Our genetic analysis suggests that phytochrome signaling is enhanced in the AtPP7 loss of function alleles, including in blue light, which masks the reduced cryptochrome signaling. AtPP7 has been found to interact both in yeast and in planta assays with nucleotide-diphosphate kinase 2 (NDPK2), a positive regulator of phytochrome signals. Analysis of ndpk2-psi2 double mutants suggests that NDPK2 plays a critical role in the AtPP7 regulation of the phytochrome pathway and identifies NDPK2 as an upstream element involved in the modulation of the salicylic acid (SA)-dependent defense pathway by light. Thus, cryptochrome- and phytochrome-specific light signals synchronously control their relative contribution to the regulation of plant development. Interestingly, PP7 and NDPK are also components of animal light signaling systems.

Les paiements pour services environnementaux de la Fondation Natura Bolivia entre logiques réciprocitaires, redistributives et marchandes

La diffusion internationale des paiements pour services environnementaux (PSE) a été interprétée en 2010 par le gouvernement bolivien d'Evo Morales comme une réponse strictement néolibérale à la nécessité d'assurer une gestion durable des ressources naturelles. Supposée amener à terme à l'éviction de toute régulation autre que marchande - qu'elle s'applique à la nature ou aux rapports entre personnes -, la mise en place de PSE n'a pas été encouragée par les autorités nationales boliviennes. Des projets de PSE ont toutefois été lancés, dont les Acuerdos Reciprocos por el Agua (ARA), issus d'un partenariat public-privé dans le département de Santa Cruz. En analysant leur conception et leur fonctionnement au prisme du référentiel polanyien, nous montrons que, contrairement aux craintes gouvernementales, ces PSE ne font pas abstraction des logiques organisationnelles réciprocitaires et redistributives, ajustant au contexte local un objet global. The international dissemination of payments for ecosystem services (PES) has been interpreted in 2010 by the Bolivian government of Evo Morales as a strictly neo-liberal response to the need to ensure a sustainable management of natural resources. Supposed to contribute to the crowding-out of any other regulation than market - applied to the nature or the relationship between people - the implementation of PES was not encouraged by the Bolivian national authorities. However some PES projects stemming from a public-private partnership have been initiated at local level, as the Acuerdos Reciprocos por el Agua (ARA), in the department of Santa Cruz. Analysing their design and operating through the Polanyian framework, we show that, contrary to the government fears, these PES do not ignore the reciprocal and redistributive organisational logics, adjusting a global object to the local context.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Explicación compendiada del símbolo de los apóstoles

UANL

Meditaciones sobre la pasión Sma. de N. Sr. Jesucristo

UANL

Étude sur la validité et la fiabilité d'un questionnaire sur l'activité physique de personnes âgées de 65 à 74 ans, du Québec et du Brésil

La mesure de l’activité physique des personnes âgées dans des études populationnelles est un défi. Peu des outils de mesure trouvés dans la littérature sont jugés suffisamment valides ou fiables pour être utilisés dans une étude internationale et longitudinale sur les déterminants de perte de mobilité de personnes âgées. Une étude pilote a été conduite en 2009 pour déterminer la meilleure forme d’évaluation. Les objectifs de ce mémoire sont l’étude des validité, fiabilité et capacité prédictive des données d’un accéléromètre (gold standard), de deux questionnaires choisis (PAQ, IPAQ 7d-recall). Le but est de combiner des éléments des questionnaires dans un seul pour une étude longitudinale projetée au Canada, au Brésil et en Colombie. Le PAQ évalue la fréquence et la durée d’activités de loisirs, l’IPAQ 7d-recall évalue la durée et l’intensité perçue des activités et le temps assis. La collecte de données s’est faite auprès de participants de Saint-Bruno (n=64) et de Santa Cruz (n=60), de 65 à 74 ans. Le PAQ, l’IPAQ-7d-recall et un test de performance (SPPB) ont été complétés puis des accéléromètres remis. À Saint-Bruno, la validité de critère pour l’IPAQ et le PAQ, et la validité de construit pour l’IPAQ sont bonnes. Le refus de l’accéléromètre à Santa Cruz a empêché les analyses de validité. Le PAQ présente une bonne fiabilité mais ajoute peu d’amélioration au pouvoir de prédiction de la dépense énergétique de l’IPAQ. La recherche populationnelle, voulant estimer la dépense énergétique par l’activité physique des personnes âgées, devrait utiliser des instruments mesurant l’intensité perçue (IPAQ) plutôt que les fréquence et durée d’activités concrètes (PAQ).

Éticas indígenas en discursos coloniales de los Andes y de Quebec : análisis, interpretación y perspectivas

Cette thèse est une étude analytique et comparative des conceptions éthiques autochtones, à travers des discours coloniaux de deux régions de l'Amérique : le Pérou et le Québec. Le but ultime de cette étude est permettre de découvrir les principes de ces éthiques des communautés autochtones et de les faire participer au débat et à la création d'éthiques interculturelles et écologiques pertinentes pour le monde contemporain. À cette fin, ce travail se consacre à l'étude des traditions orales autochtones, et plus particulièrement à la littérature de source orale coloniale. Plus précisément, nous étudions deux chroniques coloniales autochtones des Andes : le Manuscrit de Huarochirí et la Relation de Joan Santa Cruz Pachacuti, ainsi que les relations de deux missionnaires jésuites en Nouvelle-France : Paul Lejeune et Jean de Brébeuf. Étant donné que ces textes ne peuvent être considérés comme des transcriptions littérales des traditions orales autochtones, nous optons pour une méthodologie qui prend en compte à la fois les locus de l'énonciation, les traditions discursives et les processus de textualisation de la mémoire, ainsi que les relations contextuelles (référentielles, intertextuelles et interpersonnelles) et les instances d’une analyse « éthicologique ». Du côté des textes des Andes, des dynamiques éthiques synthétisées comme une « éthique de la réciprocité » sont dégagées. Cette dernière se veut hautement écologique, prend en considération la cohabitation avec toutes les entités de l’environnement (humaines et non humaines) et, par conséquent, peut être considérée comme un effort pour répondre aux défis imposés par le contexte dans lequel elles vivent. En ce qui concerne les textes québécois, leurs principes éthiques se résument en une « éthique du respect », celle-ci pouvant également être considérée comme une éthique écologique. De fait, on y observe l’absence d’une réelle séparation entre l’être humain et les autres entités de son milieu, remplacée par une continuité fluide de relations entre celles-ci, formant un « cercle sacré » de relations. À partir de ces résultats, un bilan comparatif est dressé et montre que les différences sont pour la plupart de nature formelle. En effet, les éthiques sont ancrées dans des réalités sociohistoriques différentes puisqu’elles se réfèrent à différents environnements et aux coutumes qui y sont reliés. En termes de similitudes, celles-ci se résument au concept de « cosmoéthique du cercle » qui révèle une conception de l'éthique comme un processus dynamique mettant en jeu non seulement les humains, mais aussi l'environnement et ce qui échappe à l’appréhension palpable du monde. Enfin, une tentative est faite, celle de donner une perspective à certains principes dégagés lors des analyses, montrant qu’elles peuvent impliquer une complexité parfois niée ou écartée par certains philosophes occidentaux contemporains. Ainsi, ce travail montre que l’étude de discours proprement autochtones est une porte d’accès à leurs manières de concevoir l’éthique et peut donc contribuer au travail interculturel de la philosophie et, plus précisément de l’éthique.