Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

The story of … the military jacket

Fashion and war don’t seem an obvious pairing, but the military jacket is a fashion staple. It may take the form of a double-breasted dress uniform with brass buttons and epaulettes, trimmed in rock star braid, or it may be a khaki combat jacket, worn with Doc Martens and a scowl. Here I explore how these two forms of the military jacket were frogmarched into fashion...

Context-sensitive evaluation: Determining the context surrounding the implementation of a government policy

This article explains the essence of the context-sensitive parameters and dimensions in play at the time of an intervention, through the application of Rog’s (2012) model of contextual parameters. Rog’s model offers evaluators a structured approach to examine an intervention. The initial study provided a systematic way to clarify the scope, variables, timing, and appropriate evaluation methodology to evaluate the implementation of a government policy. Given that the government implementation of an educational intervention under study did not follow the experimental research approach, nor the double cycle of action research approach, the application of Rog’s model provided an in-depth understanding of the context-sensitive environment; it is from this clear purpose that the broader evaluation was conducted. Overall, when governments or institutions implement policy to invoke educational change (and this intervention is not guided by an appropriate evaluation approach), then program evaluation is achievable post-implementation. In this situation, Rog’s (2012) model of contextual parameters is a useful way to achieve clarity of purpose to guide the program evaluation.

"Re-thinking" the influence of regulatory capture in the development of government regulation

On 30 March 2015 the Australian Federal Government launched its "Re-Think" initiative with the objective of achieving a better tax system which delivers taxes that are lower, simpler and fairer. The discussion paper released as part of the "Re:think" initiative is designed to start a national conversation on tax reform. However, inquiries into Australia's future tax system, subsequent reforms and the introduction of new taxes are nothing new. Unfortunately, recent history also demonstrates that reform initiatives arising from reviews of the Australian tax system are often deemed a failure. The most prominent of these failures in recent times is the Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT), which lasted a mere 16 months before its announced repeal. Using the established theoretic framework of regulatory capture to interpret publically observable data, the purpose of this article is to explain the failure of this arguably sound tax. It concludes that the MRRT legislation itself, through the capture by the mining companies, provided internal subsidization in the form of reduced tax and minimal or no rents. In doing so, it offers an opportunity to understand and learn from past experiences to ensure that recommendations coming out of the Re:think initiative do not suffer the same fate.

Portrait of Surgeon Major Dr. Meyer of Dueren (Rhineland) in military uniform Portraits Men

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Portrait of Surgeon Major Dr. Bing of Nuernberg in his military uniform Portraits Men

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Regulation beyond government: Weber, Foucault and the liberal governance of media content

This paper steps back from the question of how regulation of digital media content occurs, and whether it can be effective, to consider the rationales that inform regulation, and the ethics and practices associated with content regulation. It will be argued that Max Weber's account of bureaucratic expertise remains relevant to such discussions, particularly insofar as it intersects with Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality, and contemporary applications of the notion of 'governing at a distance'. The nature of the challenges to media regulators presented by online environments, and by digital and social media, are considered in depth, but it is argued that the significance of regulatory innovations that respond to such challenges should not be underestimated, nor should the continuing national foundations of media regulation. It will also discuss the relevance of the concept of 'soft law' to contemporary regulatory practice.

Reproduction of portrait of field chaplain Rabbi Dr. Sali Levi Military; World War I; Portraits

Feldrabbiner Dr. Sali Lewi, Breslau

Portrait of Ernst Gottschalk (seated second row center) with eight unidentified soldiers; Rendsburg, Germany. Military Portraits groups

Morgen hat Reserve Ruh / Auf Wiedersehen / Beste Gruesse; postcard signer Gottschalk; addressee: L Nurzinsky, Altona-Othmarschen, Aidikes Str.

Portrait of Leopold Meyerhof in his World War I officer's uniform Military; World War I; Portraits

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Portrait of Leo Baeck as military chaplain Military; World War I; Portraits

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Leo Baeck with unidentified soldiers Military; World War I; Portraits Groups

Center May 2000