Pandemic preparedness in Asia : a role for law and ethics?

Management of pandemic influenza relies on complex coordination of many different dimensions of the health and social care systems, emergency services, levels of national and local government, civil society, communications and media, and cultural expectations. Law is one small but important component of those arrangements, which touch on fundamental ethical debates. This review demonstrates that the Asian region is actively engaging those issues in diverse ways in light of their varied socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds, but scope remains for prioritising further research into these relationships.

Law, ethics and pandemic preparedness : the importance of cross-jurisdictional and cross-cultural perspectives

Objective To explore social equity, health planning, regulatory and ethical dilemmas in responding to a pandemic influenza (H5N1) outbreak, and the adequacy of protocols and standards such as the International Health Regulations (2005). Approach This paper analyses the role of legal and ethical considerations for pandemic preparedness, including an exploration of the relevance of cross-jurisdictional and cross-cultural perspectives in assessing the validity of goals for harmonisation of laws and policies both within and between nations. Australian and international experience is reviewed in various areas, including distribution of vaccines during a pandemic, the distribution of authority between national and local levels of government, and global and regional equity issues for poorer countries. Conclusion This paper finds that questions such as those of distributional justice (resource allocation) and regulatory frameworks raise important issues about the cultural and ethical acceptability of planning measures. Serious doubt is cast on a ‘one size fits all’ approach to international planning for managing a pandemic. It is concluded that a more nuanced approach than that contained in international guidelines may be required if an effective response is to be constructed internationally. Implications The paper commends the wisdom of reliance on ‘soft law’, international guidance that leaves plenty of room for each nation to construct its response in conformity with its own cultural and value requirements.

Open access to infinite content (or "in praise of law reviews")

This Article is about legal scholarly publication in a time of plenitude. It is an attempt to explain why the most pressing questions in legal scholarly publishing are about how we ensure access to an infinity of content. It explains why standard assumptions about resource scarcity in publication are wrong in general, and how the changes in the modality of publication affect legal scholarship. It talks about the economics of open access to legal material, and how this connects to a future where there is infinite content. And because student-edited law reviews fit this future better than their commercially-produced, peer-refereed cousins, this Article is, in part, a defense of the crazy-beautiful institution that is the American law review.

Teaching and using analogy in law

Analogy plays a central role in legal reasoning, yet how to analogize is poorly taught and poorly practiced. We all recognize when legal analogies are being made: when a law professor suggests a difficult hypothetical in class and a student tentatively guesses at the answer based on the cases she read the night before, when an attorney advises a client to settle because a previous case goes against him, or when a judge adopts one precedent over another on the basis that it better fits the present case. However, when it comes to explaining why certain analogies are compelling, persuasive, or better than the alternative, lawyers usually draw a blank. The purpose of this article is to provide a simple model that can be used to teach and to learn how analogy actually works, and what makes one analogy superior to a competing analogy. The model is drawn from a number of theories of analogy making in cognitive science. Cognitive science is the “long-term enterprise to understand the mind scientifically.” The field studies the mechanisms that are involved in cognitive processes like thinking, memory, learning, and recall; and one of its main foci has been on how people construct analogies. The lessons from cognitive science theories of analogy can be applied to legal analogies to give students and lawyers a better understanding of this fundamental process in legal reasoning.

Health governance : law, regulation and policy

This special issue of Public Health is devoted to health governance, examining the role of law, regulation and policy in safeguarding the public's health. Each of us has devoted a career to thinking carefully about the role of law as a tool to prevent injury and disease and to promote the population's health and wellbeing. 1, 2, 3 and 4 In this Guest Editorial we first explain what we mean by the term ‘governance’, as well as the role of law in a well-regulated society. Next, we explore the increasingly important, and challenging, concept of what we call national and global federalism—the inter-relationships among the various levels of governance (local, national, supranational and transnational) and among various actors in national and global health. Third, we explain the origins of this journal symposium, which arises from three conferences on the topic in Hong Kong and Sydney. Finally, we offer a brief introduction to the articles that follow.

Health Law's Kaleidoscope : Health Law Rights in a Global Age

Within contemporary society the themes of globalization, health and regulation interlock in complex patterns, changing in response to the mix of cultural differences, regulatory preferences and available resources. To turn the kaleidoscope and to change the mix is to change the pattern. This book is about those patterns as they arise in the contemporary legal, health and ethical context, exploring the transformations and challenges brought by technological change and the regulatory options in the contemporary global village.

Reason is too large : analogy and precedent in law

Hunter argues that cognitive science models of human thinking explain how analogical reasoning and precedential reasoning operate in law. He offers an explanation of why various legal theories are so limited and calls for greater attention to what is actually happening when lawyers and judges reason, by analogy, with precedent.

Globalisation and Health : Challenges for Health Law and Bioethics

This timely collection explores ethical and legal dilemmas in healthcare arising from globalization. Conflicts between public interests and individual rights, the challenge of regulating professionals and access to health services, and the effects of a global market all feature prominently in contemporary debates in this area. As a result of globalization, issues in health law and bioethics can no longer be understood solely within political boundaries that define traditional notions of individuals and communities. Rather, solutions for emerging problems require a global conception of rights and obligations, including the re-evaluation of ethical frameworks and legal regimes that currently govern exchanges in healthcare. Leading scholars in bioethics, law, medicine and philosophy from various jurisdictions engage these themes in this volume, and demonstrate the need for transnational solutions in a global age of healthcare.

Near knowledge : inductive learning systems in law

Induction is an interesting model of legal reasoning, since it provides a method of capturing initial states of legal principles and rules, and adjusting these principles and rules over time as the law changes. In this article I explain how Artificial Intelligence-based inductive learning algorithms work, and show how they have been used in law to model legal domains. I identify some problems with implementations undertaken in law to date, and create a taxonomy of appropriate cases to use in legal inductive inferencing systems. I suggest that inductive learning algorithms have potential in modeling law, but that the artificial intelligence implementations to date are problematic. I argue that induction should be further investigated, since it has the potential to be an extremely useful mechanism for understanding legal domains.