O regime do contrato individual de trabalho da Administração Pública e a Constituição Portuguesa

In, Lusíada – Direito, II Série, nº 3 de 2005

Do social factors matter for innovation, and do they influence innovation in Aeronautics Industry?

Based on the report for the course on “Social Factors of Innovation” of the PhD Program on Technology Assessment, supervised by Prof. António Brandão Moniz, Monte de Caparica, University NOVA Lisbon, Faculty of Sciences and Technology, July 2013

Board independence and innovation

Legislation introduced in the U.S. in 2002/2003 significantly changed board composition of public firms by imposing a 50% independent directors’ ratio. Research on the effect of independent directors is not consensual, implying that this exogenous shock is a unique opportunity to study their importance. This study answers the question of whether or not independent directors can effectively mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and the management, having a positive impact on the choice of successful R&D projects. We find that an increase of board independence has a positive impact on patent counts. Hence, the results support that independent directors truly spur innovation and risk taking.

Overcoming the “European Paradox”: The role of Regional Innovation Systems (RIS) in translating R&D investments into economic and employment growth

The emergence of the so-called “European Paradox” shows that R&D investment is not maximally effective and that increasing the scale of public R&D expenditures is not sufficient to generate employment and sustained economic growth. Increasing Governmental R&D Investment is far from being a “panacea” for stagnant growth. It is worth noting that Government R&D Investment does not have a statistically significant impact on employment, indicating the need to assess the trade-offs of policies that could lead to significant increases in government expenditure. Surprisingly, Governmental R&D Employment does not contribute to “mass-market” employment, despite its quite important role in reducing Youth-Unemployment. Despite the negative side-effects of Governmental R&D Employment on both GVA and GDP, University R&D Employment appears to have a quite important role in reducing Unemployment, especially Youth-Unemployment, while it also does not have a downside in terms of economic growth. Technological Capacity enhancement is the most effective instrument for reducing Unemployment and is a policy without any downside regarding sustainable economical development. In terms of wider policy implications, the results reinforce the idea that European Commission Research and Innovation policies must be restructured, shifting from a transnational framework to a more localised, measurable and operational approach.

Responsible research and innovation: a global perspective

Based on the paper presented at the Doctorate Conference on Technologogy Assessment in July 2013 at the University Nova Lisboa, Caparica campus

Measuring impact with the social return on investment: the case of the social innovation hub

There is a growing interest in social impact assessment across the private, the public and the nonprofit sector. However, there is still limited academic research produced in this area, particularly in what concerns to the application of the Social Return of Investment (SROI) methodology. The goal of this Work Project is to give an overview of the social impact measurement literature and apply the Social Return on Investment, a flagship methodology to measure impact, to the specific case of the Social Innovation Hub (SIH). The findings suggest that each 1€ invested on the SIH generates 1,21€ in terms of social value. While this value seems very appealing to use, there are some risks in monetizing impact in such way, mainly due to the lack of reliable data available for benchmarking purposes.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

The role of individual ability and structural embeddedness on entrepreneurial success

In the present thesis I analyse the roles of individual ability and structural embeddedness on entrepreneurial success. The results retrieved from a matched employer-employee longitudinal data set show prior worker productivities and environmental embeddedness to have a persistent positive impact on the size and growth rates of new firms. What is more, embeddedness facilitates the impact of ability on start-up performance with outsiders of comparable abilities starting smaller and slower growing firms. Those in higher ability categories are more likely to transfer and also, albeit to a lesser extent, close their ventures, an effect attributed to the higher opportunity costs associated with the group. Firms managed by embedded agents enjoy longer longevities and have better chances of finding a new owner after the departure of the previous one. Finally, higher ability types show evidence of specialisation in serial entrepreneurship.

Responsible research and innovation: a global perspective

Based on the paper presented at the Doctorate Conference on Technologogy Assessment in July 2013 at the University Nova Lisboa, Caparica campus

Lag-user method: Using laggards to leverage user innovation

Laggards are the last users to adopt a product. Prior literature on user-led innovation ignores laggards’ impact on innovation. In this paper, we develop the Lag-User Method, through which laggards can generate new ideas. Through six studies with 62 teams in three countries, we apply the method to different technologies and services and present our findings to executives to get managerial insights. Findings reveal that laggards who generate new ideas (lag-users) have different perceptions of user-friendly products and different unfulfilled needs. They prefer simple products. We propose that by involving lag-users in NPD, firms can improve the effectiveness of NPD.

Banco Invest understanding how to grow in the Portuguese individual clients segment the client analysis

Field lab: Business project

Decisions of technology innovation: the role of indicators

This work presents research conducted to understand the role of indicators in decisions of technology innovation. A gap was detected in the literature of innovation and technology assessment about the use and influence of indicators in this type of decision. It was important to address this gap because indicators are often frequent elements of innovation and technology assessment studies. The research was designed to determine the extent of the use and influence of indicators in decisions of technology innovation, to characterize the role of indicators in these decisions, and to understand how indicators are used in these decisions. The latter involved the test of four possible explanatory factors: the type and phase of decision, and the context and process of construction of evidence. Furthermore, it focused on three Portuguese innovation groups: public researchers, business R&D&I leaders and policymakers. The research used a combination of methods to collect quantitative and qualitative information, such as surveys, case studies and social network analysis. This research concluded that the use of indicators is different from their influence in decisions of technology innovation. In fact, there is a high use of indicators in these decisions, but lower and differentiated differences in their influence in each innovation group. This suggests that political-behavioural methods are also involved in the decisions to different degrees. The main social influences in the decisions came mostly from hierarchies, knowledge-based contacts and users. Furthermore, the research established that indicators played mostly symbolic roles in decisions of policymakers and business R&D&I leaders, although their role with researchers was more differentiated. Indicators were also described as helpful instruments to conduct a reasonable interpretation of data and to balance options in innovation and technology assessments studies, in particular when contextualised, described in detail and with discussion upon the options made. Results suggest that there are four main explanatory factors for the role of indicators in these decisions: First, the type of decision appears to be a factor to consider when explaining the role of indicators. In fact, each type of decision had different influences on the way indicators are used, and each type of decision used different types of indicators. Results for policy-making were particularly different from decisions of acquisition and development of products/technology. Second, the phase of the decision can help to understand the role indicators play in these decisions. Results distinguished between two phases detected in all decisions – before and after the decision – as well as two other phases that can be used to complement the decision process and where indicators can be involved. Third, the context of decision is an important factor to consider when explaining the way indicators are taken into consideration in policy decisions. In fact, the role of indicators can be influenced by the particular context of the decision maker, in which all types of evidence can be selected or downplayed. More importantly, the use of persuasive analytical evidence appears to be related with the dispute existent in the policy context. Fourth and last, the process of construction of evidence is a factor to consider when explaining the way indicators are involved in these decisions. In fact, indicators and other evidence were brought to the decision processes according to their availability and capacity to support the different arguments and interests of the actors and stakeholders. In one case, an indicator lost much persuasion strength with the controversies that it went through during the decision process. Therefore, it can be argued that the use of indicators is high but not very influential; their role is mostly symbolic to policymakers and business decisions, but varies among researchers. The role of indicators in these decisions depends on the type and phase of the decision and the context and process of construction of evidence. The latter two are related to the particular context of each decision maker, the existence of elements of dispute and controversies that influence the way indicators are introduced in the decision-making process.

Banco invest: Understanding how to grow in teh portuguese individual clients segment competitors analysis

Field lab: Business project

Banco invest: Understanding how to grow in the portuguese individual clients segment benchnarking

Field lab: Business project