Board independence and innovation
Contribuinte(s) |
Ferreira, Miguel |
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Data(s) |
25/08/2015
25/08/2015
01/01/2015
|
Resumo |
Legislation introduced in the U.S. in 2002/2003 significantly changed board composition of public firms by imposing a 50% independent directors’ ratio. Research on the effect of independent directors is not consensual, implying that this exogenous shock is a unique opportunity to study their importance. This study answers the question of whether or not independent directors can effectively mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and the management, having a positive impact on the choice of successful R&D projects. We find that an increase of board independence has a positive impact on patent counts. Hence, the results support that independent directors truly spur innovation and risk taking. UNL - NSBE |
Identificador |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/15344 201476568 |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Direitos |
openAccess |
Palavras-Chave | #Innovation #Corporate governance #Board independence #Patents |
Tipo |
masterThesis |