Board independence and innovation


Autoria(s): Coelho, Mariana Campos Carvalho
Contribuinte(s)

Ferreira, Miguel

Data(s)

25/08/2015

25/08/2015

01/01/2015

Resumo

Legislation introduced in the U.S. in 2002/2003 significantly changed board composition of public firms by imposing a 50% independent directors’ ratio. Research on the effect of independent directors is not consensual, implying that this exogenous shock is a unique opportunity to study their importance. This study answers the question of whether or not independent directors can effectively mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and the management, having a positive impact on the choice of successful R&D projects. We find that an increase of board independence has a positive impact on patent counts. Hence, the results support that independent directors truly spur innovation and risk taking.

UNL - NSBE

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/10362/15344

201476568

Idioma(s)

eng

Direitos

openAccess

Palavras-Chave #Innovation #Corporate governance #Board independence #Patents
Tipo

masterThesis