Integrated care organizations in Switzerland.

INTRODUCTION: The Swiss health care system is characterized by its decentralized structure and high degree of local autonomy. Ambulatory care is provided by physicians working mainly independently in individual private practices. However, a growing part of primary care is provided by networks of physicians and health maintenance organizations (HMOs) acting on the principles of gatekeeping. TOWARDS INTEGRATED CARE IN SWITZERLAND: The share of insured choosing an alternative (managed care) type of basic health insurance and therefore restrict their choice of doctors in return for lower premiums increased continuously since 1990. To date, an average of one out of eight insured person in Switzerland, and one out of three in the regions in north-eastern Switzerland, opted for the provision of care by general practitioners in one of the 86 physician networks or HMOs. About 50% of all general practitioners and more than 400 other specialists have joined a physician networks. Seventy-three of the 86 networks (84%) have contracts with the healthcare insurance companies in which they agree to assume budgetary co-responsibility, i.e., to adhere to set cost targets for particular groups of patients. Within and outside the physician networks, at regional and/or cantonal levels, several initiatives targeting chronic diseases have been developed, such as clinical pathways for heart failure and breast cancer patients or chronic disease management programs for patients with diabetes. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS: Swiss physician networks and HMOs were all established solely by initiatives of physicians and health insurance companies on the sole basis of a healthcare legislation (Swiss Health Insurance Law, KVG) which allows for such initiatives and developments. The relevance of these developments towards more integration of healthcare as well as their implications for the future are discussed.

Dynamic Relational Contracts under Complete Information

This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who both undertake a costly action or investment that together produces a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. Two cases are considered: (i) where agents are risk neutral and are subject to limited liability constraints and (ii) where agents are risk averse, have quasi-linear preferences in consumption and actions but where limited liability constraints do not bind. The question asked is how to structure the investments and division of the surplus over time so as to avoid expropriation. In the risk-neutral case, there may be an initial phase in which one agent overinvests and the other underinvests. However, both actions and surplus converge monotonically to a stationary state in which there is no overinvestment and surplus is at its maximum subject to the constraints. In the risk-averse case, there is no overinvestment. For this case, we establish that dynamics may or may not be monotonic depending on whether or not it is possible to sustain a first-best allocation. If the first-best allocation is not sustainable, then there is a trade-off between risk sharing and surplus maximization. In general, surplus will not be at its constrained maximum even in the long run.

Durcissement des lois sociales et santé des migrants forcés: trois ans après (a Loi sur l'asile (LAsi) [Social policy hardening and forced immigrant's health: 3 years after the Asylum Law (LAsi)'s introduction].

In the canton de Vaud, General Practioners (GPs) caring for asylum seekers under the "aide d'urgence" regime can ask for an adaptation of their housing conditions, by filling out a specific form and addressing it to the medical commission responsible for advising the EVAM (the housing institution for asylum seekers) on these issues. The forms addressed to the commission are indicative of a worrisome state of health in this population, especially for mental health. More than 70% report at least one psychiatric diagnosis. Most frequent are anxiety and depressive disorders, as well as many posttraumatic stress disorders, associated with traumatic events both in the country of origin and in Switzerland. Adapting the housing conditions, based on vulnerabilities that the GP has specifically documented, may contribute to improve the health of the most vulnerable asylum seekers.

Memory in contracts: the experience of the EBRD (1991-2003)

The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory as a screening device in repeated contracts with asymmetric information in financial intermediation. We use an original dataset from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We propose a simple empirical method to capture the role of memory using the client's reputation. Our results unambiguously isolate the dominant effect of memory on the bank's lending decisions over market factors in the case of established clients.

Did the cooperative start life as a Joint-Stock company? business law and cooperatives in Spain, 1869–1931

Studies of Spanish cooperatives date their spread from the Law on Agrarian Syndicates of 1906. But the first legislative appearance of cooperatives is an 1869 measure that permitted general incorporation for lending companies. The 1931 general law on cooperatives, which was the first act permitting the formation of cooperatives in any activity, reflects the gradual disappearance of the cooperative’s "business" characteristics. In this paper we trace the Spanish cooperative’s legal roots in business law and its connections to broader questions of the freedom of association, the formation of joint-stock enterprises, and the liability of investors in business and cooperative entities. Our account underscores the similarities of the organizational problems approach by cooperatives and business firms, while at the same time respecting the distinctive purposes cooperatives served.

Optimal coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts in labor Markets

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers differ in ability and their competence is revealed after they have worked as juniors in the market. We study the length of the contractual relationships between firms and workers in an environment where the matching between firms and workers is the result of market interaction. We show that, despite in a one-firm-one-worker set-up long-term contracts are the optimal choice for firms, market forces often induce firms to use short-term contracts. Unless the market only consists of firms with very profitable projects, firms operating highly profitable projects offer short-term contracts to ensure the service of high-ability workers and those with less lucrative projects also use short-term contracts to save on the junior workers' wage. Intermediate firms may (or may not) hire workers through long-term contracts.

Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates a trade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificing managerial selection may be optimal at early stages of economic development and when access to information is limited. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increases the return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, where managerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Better institutions, in the form of a richer contracting environment and less severe informational frictions, speed up the transition to short-term relationships.

Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting

This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent. The principal’s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard.

An approximate solution method for boundary layer flow of a power law fluid over a flat plate

The work in this paper deals with the development of momentum and thermal boundary layers when a power law fluid flows over a flat plate. At the plate we impose either constant temperature, constant flux or a Newton cooling condition. The problem is analysed using similarity solutions, integral momentum and energy equations and an approximation technique which is a form of the Heat Balance Integral Method. The fluid properties are assumed to be independent of temperature, hence the momentum equation uncouples from the thermal problem. We first derive the similarity equations for the velocity and present exact solutions for the case where the power law index n = 2. The similarity solutions are used to validate the new approximation method. This new technique is then applied to the thermal boundary layer, where a similarity solution can only be obtained for the case n = 1.