Popular politics and the Ukrainian presidential elections of 2005

Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004 upset the consensus amongst political scientists about Ukrainian voter behaviour, challenging the notion of voter passivity. Careful pre-election planning that anticipated falsification of the ballot brought protesters to Kyiv rapidly. Sustained and overwhelming pressure from protesters eventually forced through constitutional and electoral reforms that led to the democratic resolution of the crisis.

Invalid ballots and the “crisis of representative democracy”:re-inventing protest at the 2012 Serbian elections

This article examines the ways in which invalidated electoral ballots may be articulated as acts of protest. We argue that some instances of ballot invalidation can be understood as protest and as a reaction to the broader “crises of democracy” which have also spurred on movements such as Occupy. We focus on Serbia’s 2012 elections as a case study, given the high increases in invalid ballots and calls for collective action calling for ballot invalidation. We discuss protest movements which coalesced around this election, calling for electoral ballot invalidation and using social media to frame this activity as protest. Through our case study, we explore the ways in which the ballot can become a tool of contention, and how protest can be expressed through an engagement with extant structures and institutions.

Választókörzetek igazságosan? = Fair apportionment of voting districts in Hungary

Az új választási törvény egyik célja a korábbinál igazságosabb választási körzetek kialakítása. Ezt a Velencei Bizottság választási kódexében megfogalmazott ajánlásokhoz hasonló, bár azoknál némileg megengedőbb szabályok révén biztosítja. A szabályok rögzítik a körzetek számát, illetve hogy a körzetek nem oszthatnak ketté kisebb településeket, és nem nyúlhatnak át a megyehatárokon. Tanulmányunkban belátjuk, hogy a szabályok betartása mellett a körzetek kialakítása matematikailag lehetetlen. Javaslatot teszünk a probléma optimális megoldására elvi alapon is, vizsgáljuk a módszer tulajdonságait, majd az általunk megfogalmazott hatékony algoritmussal, a 2010. évi országgyűlési választások adatainak felhasználásával meghatározzuk a körzetek megyék közti elosztásának legjobb megoldását. Végül kitérünk a demográfiai változások várható hatásaira, és több javaslatot teszünk a korlátok hosszú távú betartására: javasoljuk a választási körzetek számának körülbelül 130-ra növelését; egy-egy felülvizsgálat alkalmával a választási körzetek számának megváltoztathatóságát; illetve a körzetek megyék helyett régiók szerinti szervezését. _______ One of the aims of the new electoral law of Hungary has been to apportion voters to voting districts more fairly. This is ensured by a set of rules rather more permissive than those put forward in the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters issued by the Venice Commission. These rules fix the size of the voting districts, and require voting districts not to split smaller towns and villages and not to cross county borders. The article shows that such an apportionment is mathematically impos-sible, and makes suggestions for a theoretical approach to resolving this problem: determine the optimal apportionment by studying the properties of their approach, and use the authors efficient algorithm on the data for the 2010 national elections. The article also examines the expected effect of demographic changes and formulates recommendations for adhering to the rules over the long term: increase the number of voting districts to about 130, allow the number of voting districts to change flexibly at each revision of the districts, and base the districts on regions rather than counties.

The integrated use of simulation and PRS voting systems

Peer reviewed

The integrated use of simulation and PRS voting systems

Peer reviewed

Macroeconomics, economic crisis and electoral outcomes: A national European pool

An abundance of comparative survey research argues the presence of economic voting as an individual force in European elections, thereby refuting a possible ecological fallacy. But the hypothesis of economic voting at the aggregate level, with macroeconomics influencing overall electoral outcomes, seems less sure. Indeed, there might be a micrological fallacy at work, with the supposed individual economic vote effect not adding up to a national electoral effect after all. Certainly that would account for the spotty evidence linking macroeconomics and national election outcomes. We examine the possibility of a micrological fallacy through rigorous analysis of a large time-series cross-sectional dataset of European nations. From these results, it becomes clear that the macroeconomy strongly moves national election outcomes, with hard times punishing governing parties, and good times rewarding them. Further, this economy-election connection appears asymmetric, altering under economic crisis. Indeed, we show that economic crisis, defined as negative growth, has much greater electoral effects than positive economic growth. Hard times clearly make governments more accountable to their electorates.

The economic voter and economic crisis

Theories of economic voting have a long tradition in political science and continue to inspire a large group of scholars. Classical economic voting theory assumes a reward-and-punishment mechanism (Key, 1966). This mechanism implies that incumbents are more likely to stay in power under a good economy, but are cast out under a bad economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). The economy has repeatedly been shown to be a major determinant of electoral behavior (see especially the recent book by Duch and Stevenson, 2008), but the current economic crisis seems to provide a marked illustration of how the economy affects voting. In recent elections across the Western industrialized world, most ruling coalitions lost their majority. Opposition parties, on the other hand, whether right wing or left wing, have appeared to benefit from the economic downturn.

Institutional Persistence in Eastern Europe: Economic and Political Legacies of Empires and Communism

This dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of the roles that institutions play in economic development. How do institutions evolve? What mechanisms are responsible for their persistence? What effects do they have on economic development?

I address these questions using historical and contemporary data from Eastern Europe and Russia. This area is relatively understudied by development economists. It also has a very interesting history. For one thing, for several centuries it was divided between different empires. For another, it experienced wars and socialism in the 20th century. I use some of these exogenous shocks as quasi-natural social experiments to study the institutional transformations and its effects on economic development both in the short and long run.

This first chapter explores whether economic, social, and political institutions vary in their resistance to policies designed to remove them. The empirical context for the analysis is Romania from 1690 to the 2000s. Romania represents an excellent laboratory for studying the persistence of different types of historical institutional legacies. In the 18th and 19th centuries, Romania was split between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, where political and economic institutions differed. The Habsburgs imposed less extractive institutions relative to the Ottomans: stronger rule of law, a more stable and predictable state, a more developed civil society, and less corruption. In the 20th century, the Romanian Communist regime tried deliberately to homogenize the country along all relevant dimensions. It was only partially successful. Using a regression discontinuity design, I document the persistence of economic outcomes, social capital, and political attitudes. First, I document remarkable convergence in urbanization, education, unemployment, and income between the two former empires. Second, regarding social capital, no significant differences in organizational membership, trust in bureaucracy, and corruption persist today. Finally, even though the Communists tried to change all political attitudes, significant discontinuities exist in current voting behavior at the former Habsburg-Ottoman border. Using data from the parliamentary elections of 1996-2008, I find that former Habsburg rule decreases by around 6 percentage points the vote share of the major post-Communist left party and increases by around 2 and 5 percentage points the vote shares of the main anti-Communist and liberal parties, respectively.

The second chapter investigates the effects of Stalin’s mass deportations on distrust in central authority. Four deported ethnic groups were not rehabilitated after Stalin’s death; they remained in permanent exile until the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This allows one to distinguish between the effects of the groups that returned to their homelands and those of the groups that were not allowed to return. Using regional data from the 1991 referendum on the future of the Soviet Union, I find that deportations have a negative interim effect on trust in central authority in both the regions of destination and those of origin. The effect is stronger for ethnic groups that remained in permanent exile in the destination regions. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey, the chapter also documents a long-term effect of deportations in the destination regions.

The third chapter studies the short-term effect of Russian colonization of Central Asia on economic development. I use data on the regions of origin of Russian settlers and push factors to construct an instrument for Russian migration to Central Asia. This instrument allows me to interpret the outcomes causally. The main finding is that the massive influx of Russians into the region during the 1897-1926 period had a significant positive effect on indigenous literacy. The effect is stronger for men and in rural areas. Evidently, interactions between natives and Russians through the paid labor market was an important mechanism of human capital transmission in the context of colonization.

The findings of these chapters provide additional evidence that history and institutions do matter for economic development. Moreover, the dissertation also illuminates the relative persistence of institutions. In particular, political and social capital legacies of institutions might outlast economic legacies. I find that most economic differences between the former empires in Romania have disappeared. By the same token, there are significant discontinuities in political outcomes. People in former Habsburg Romania provide greater support for liberalization, privatization, and market economy, whereas voters in Ottoman Romania vote more for redistribution and government control over the economy.

In the former Soviet Union, Stalin’s deportations during World War II have a long-term negative effect on social capital. Today’s residents of the destination regions of deportations show significantly lower levels of trust in central authority. This is despite the fact that the Communist regime tried to eliminate any source of opposition and used propaganda to homogenize people’s political and social attitudes towards the authorities. In Central Asia, the influx of Russian settlers had a positive short-term effect on human capital of indigenous population by the 1920s, which also might have persisted over time.

From a development perspective, these findings stress the importance of institutions for future paths of development. Even if past institutional differences are not apparent for a certain period of time, as was the case with the former Communist countries, they can polarize society later on, hampering economic development in the long run. Different institutions in the past, which do not exist anymore, can thus contribute to current political instability and animosity.

The impact of political and economic crisis on the polarization of the Spanish media

In this paper the characteristics of the cyclical political polarization of the Spanish media system are defined. From this study, a prospective analysis raises doubts about this scenario remains unchanged because of the political and economic crisis. It seeks to define the role played by political and media actors in polarization focusing on the two legislatures where the tension reached higher levels (1993-1996 and 2004-2008) and compares it with the developments faced by them in the current economical and political context of crisis. To achieve these aims, it has been performed an analysis of media content (since 1993) and looked through primary sociological sources and the scientific literature about polarization. This is an exploratory, critical and descriptive case analysis.

Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements. Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility of amending them. In this paper, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions and the implications of this institutional procedure for trade negotiations. We describe a simple two-country trade model, in which industries are unevenly distributed across con- stituencies. In the foreign country, trade negotiating authority is delegated to the executive, while in the home country Congress can retain the power to amend trade agreements. We show that legislators’ FTA voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of their own constituencies as well as those of the majority of Congress. Empirical analysis of the determinants of all FTA votes between 1974 (when fast track was first introduced) and 2002 (when it was last granted) provides strong support for the predictions of our model.

Democratic Peace and Electoral Accountability

One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autoc- racies, very rarely fight each other. We examine the sustainability of international peace between democracies and autocracies, where the crucial difference between these two po- litical regimes is whether or not policymakers are subject to periodic elections. We show that the fear of losing office can deter democratic leaders from engaging in military con- flicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can be re-elected, implying that democracies in which the executives are subject to term limits should be more conflict prone. To assess the validity of our predictions, we construct a large dataset on countries with executive term limits. Our analysis of inter-state conflicts for the 1816-2001 period suggests that electoral incentives are indeed behind the democratic peace phenomenon: while democratic dyads are in general less likely to be involved in conflicts than any other dyads, this result does not hold for democracies in which the executive faces binding term limits; moreover, the dispute patterns of democracies with term limits depend on whether the executive is in the last or penultimate mandate.

The New Voter in Western Europe: France and Beyond

This book presents the main results of an electoral panel study which is both unique and innovative not only in French political research but also among Western European electoral studies. The survey was conducted among a sample of 1,846 French voters interviewed on four separate occasions (2007 Presidential and Legislative elections). Electoral trajectories can thus be observed revealing the main trends in electoral behaviour and voting patterns across the electorate. The analysis of such trajectories and patterns mobilizes not only the usual explanatory factors (demographics, political leanings and identifications) but also another set of political variables (issues, the campaign and the media, the candidates' image, how electoral decisions are made, hesitation in voting intentions).This study also provides interesting findings on electoral volatility, including abstention. (Résumé éditeur)