Protection of Farmers’ Rights in India-Challenges for Law in the Context of Plant Breeders’ Rights

School of Legal Studies, Cochin University of Science and Technology

Legal Control of Industrial Pollution

Industries constitute the main spring of development. Without industrial development no country could reach a stage in which a decent living for its citizens would be achieved. Increasing production to meet the basic needs of society augmented scientific invention and machine oriented industrial order.Environmental pollution ls a burning global issue. It is more serious and dangerous than terrorism. Started with the discovery of fire and development of civilization. Pollution went unnoticed throughout the centuries of human growth until its adverse effects on human environment become explicit.National concern tor environment started in our country only atter the cause of protection of environment received global attention. At present legal control ot industrial pollution is in a scattered framework of piece meal processes with overlapping provisions and authorities.Environmental protection- should be an item not only in the concurrent list of schedule 7 to the Constitution but also in the list of matters entrusted to the panchayati institutions in the Schedule 11. It is heartening to note that so far as municipalities are concerned the Constitution of India lives up to the expectation. In the wake of New Industrial Policy based on liberalisation a long list of small scale industries fall outside the purview of environmental clearance. The Indian concept of environmental im»act assessment introduced under the Environment Act by notification excludes the entire gamut of small scale industries and r.elates only to scheduled industries covered by the notifica~ion. Most of them are subjected to ETA only it the investment goes above ~.50 crores. This provision dilutes the impact assessment considerably A mandatory impact assessment with public partiCipation and with provision for a review by specialized environmental courts will eliminate the possible evils of this judicial passiveness.

¿Punto final al limbo legal de las actividades de inteligencia en Colombia?

Los servicios de inteligencia en Colombia han operado durante casi sesenta años sin una regulación integral que demarque sus funciones y sus límites. Recientemente fue aprobado en el Congreso de la República, y en gran parte avalado por la Corte Constitucional, un proyecto de ley que pretende poner fin a esta omisión histórica. El presente artículo tiene como propósito revisar qué tan adecuada resulta la regulación que este proyecto de ley hace de dos aspectos relacionados con los servicios de inteligencia –el alcance del secreto y los controles a su funcionamiento– de cara a la protección de derechos como la intimidad, el acceso a la información y la verdad. La tesis que se defiende es que este proyecto de ley prevé aspectos positivos con relación a los dos temas mencionados, pero deja abiertos vacíos importantes que pueden llevar a que los servicios de inteligencia se aparten de sus funciones y sean utilizados para desconocer los derechos de las personas.

No asylum for “Infiltrators”: the legal predicament of Eritrean and Sudanese nationals in Israel

This article explores the precarious status of Eritrean and Sudanese nationals in Israel. Having crossed the Israeli-Egyptian border without authorisation and not through an official border crossing, Israeli law defines such individuals as ‘infiltrators’, a charged term which dates back to border-crossings into Israel by Palestinian Fedayeen in the 1950s. Eritreans and Sudanese nationals constitute over 90 percent of ‘infiltrators’ in Israel. Their livelihood is curtailed through hostility, sanctions, and detention, while (at the time of writing) Israel refrains from deporting them to their respective countries of origin, recognising that such forced removal could expose them to risks to their lives and/or freedom. Israel was the 10th state to ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention, and has acceded to its 1967 Protocol which removed the 1951 Convention’s temporal and geographic restrictions, yet it has not incorporated these treaties into its domestic law not has it enacted primary legislation that sets eligibility criteria for ‘refugee’ status and regulates the treatment of asylum-seekers. Israeli law also fails to accord subsidiary protection status to persons that the state considers to be non-removable, whether or not they satisfy the definition of a ‘refugee’ under the 1951 Convention. Absent legal recognition of ‘refugee’, ‘asylum-seeker’, and ‘beneficiary of subsidiary protection’ statuses, Eritreans and Sudanese nationals are left in legal limbo for an indefinite period qua irregular non-removable persons. This article takes stock of their legal predicament.

Creditor's protection and bank loans: lack of competition hamprers bankruptcy reform's effects

This dissertation investigates how credit institutions’ market power limits the effects of creditor protection rules on the interest rate and the spread of bank loans. We use the Brazilian Bankruptcy Reform of June/2005 (BBR) as a legal event affecting the institutional environment of the Brazilian credit market. The law augments creditor protection and aims to improve the access of firms to the credit market and to reduce the cost of borrowing. Either access to credit or the credit cost are also determined by bank industry competition and the market power of suppliers of credit. We derive a simple economic model to study the effect of market power interacting with cost of lending. Using an accounting and operations dataset from July/2004 to December/2007 provided by the Brazilian Central Bank, we estimate that the lack of competition in the bank lending industry hinders the potential reducing effect of the BBR on the interest rate of corporate loans by approximately 30% and on the spread by approximately 23%. We also find no statistical evidence that the BBR affected the concentration level of the Brazilian credit market. We present a brief report on bankruptcy reforms around the world, the changes in the Brazilian legislation and on some recent related articles in our introductory chapter. The second chapter presents the economic model and the testable hypothesis on how the lack of competition in the lending market limits the effects of improved creditor protection. In this chapter, we introduce our empirical strategy using a differences-in-differences model and we estimate the limiting effect of market power on the BBR’s potential to reduce interest rates and on the spread of bank loans. We use the BBR as an exogenous event that affects collateralized corporate loans (treatment group) but that does not affect clean consumer loans (control group) to identify these effects, using different concentration measures. In Chapter 3, we propose a two-stage empirical strategy to handle the H–Statistics proposed by Panzar and Rosse as a measure of market competition. We estimate the limiting effects of the lack of competition in replacing the concentration statistics by the H–Statistics. Chapter 4 presents a structural break test of the concentration index and checks if the BBR affects the dynamic evolution of the concentration index.

Birth, Development and Progressive Institutionalization of the Ombudsman in the Russian Legal and Political System

One of the current trends in governance and legal development in Russia is aimed at establishing a modern, efficient and internationally harmonised system of safeguards of human rights and civil liberties. A fairly recent addition to this system has been the institution of ombudsman as a public authority specialised in promoting and protecting human rights and civil liberties. The introduction of this institution as well as its formalisation at the constitutional and legislative levels has been increasingly relevant and important, as it raises the dealings between the state and the individual to a new level. As an independent public institution resolving conflicts between citizens and government authorities, the ombudsman makes steps, within the scope of his jurisdiction, to restitute individual rights, and helps to enhance the reputation of government. The present work describes and assesses the birth, development and institutionalization process of the Ombudsman Office in the Russian Federation, at federal and regional levels, with a particular emphasis on the role of international references and cooperation for institution building. Ombudsmen have done a magnificent job in demonstrating value with the resolution of individual and systemic complaints; subsequent improvements to government; and economic savings by mitigating litigation costs.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Regulations on E-Commerce Consumer Protection Rules in China and Europe Compared – Same Same but Different?

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the regulations on e-commerce protection rules in China and the European Union. It starts by giving a general overview of different approaches towards consumer protection in e-commerce. This article then scrutinizes the current legal system in China by mainly focusing on SAIC’s “Interim Measures for the Administration of Online Commodity Trading and Relevant Service Activities”. The subsequent chapter covers the supervision of consumer protection in e-commerce in China, which covers both the regulatory objects of online commodity trading and the applied regulatory mechanisms. While the regulatory objects include operating agents, operating objects, operating behavior, electronic contracts, intellectual property and consumer protection, the regulatory mechanisms for e-commerce in China combines market mechanism and industry self-discipline under the government’s administrative regulation. Further, this article examines the current European legal system in online commodity trading. It outlines the aim and the scope of EU legislation in the respective field. Subsequently, the paper describes the European approach towards the supervision of consumer protection in e-commerce. As there is no central EU agency for consumer protection in e-commerce transactions, the EU stipulates a framework for Member States’ institutions, thereby creating a European supervisory network of Member States’ institutions and empowers private consumer organisations to supervise the market on their behalf. Moreover, the EU encourages the industry to self- or co-regulate e-commerce by providing incentives. Consequently, this article concludes that consumer protection may be achieved by different means and different systems. However, even though at first glance the Chinese and the European system appear to differ substantially, a closer look reveals tendencies of convergence between the two systems.

With or without you...judging politically in the field of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? Research Papers in Law, 3/2007

From the Introduction. The study of the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law of the regarding the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) is fascinating in many ways.1 First, almost the totality of the relevant case law is extremely recent, thereby marking the first ‘foundational’ steps in this field of law. This is the result of the fact that the AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999.2 Second, as the AFSJ is a new field of EU competence, it sets afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its member states, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) measure of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions beg for answers which should take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.3 Third, and as a consequence of the above, the vast majority of the ECJ’s judgments relating to the AFSJ are a) delivered by the Full Court or, at least, the Grand Chamber, b) with the intervention of great many member states and c) often obscure in content. This is due to the fact that the Court is called upon to set the foundational rules in a new field of EU law, often trying to accommodate divergent considerations, not all of which are strictly legal.4 Fourth, the case law of the Court relating to the AFSJ, touches upon a vast variety of topics which are not necessarily related to one another. This is why it is essential to limit the scope of this study. The content of, and steering for, the AFSJ were given by the Tampere European Council, in October 1999. According to the Tampere Conclusions, the AFSJ should consist of four key elements: a) a common immigration and asylum policy, b) judicial cooperation in both civil and penal matters, c) action against criminality and d) external action of the EU in all the above fields. Moreover, the AFSJ is to a large extent based on the Schengen acquis. The latter has been ‘communautarised’5 by the Treaty of Amsterdam and further ‘ventilated’ between the first and third pillars by decisions 1999/435 and 1999/436.6 Judicial cooperation in civil matters, mainly by means of international conventions (such as the Rome Convention of 1981 on the law applicable to contractual obligations) and regulations (such as (EC) 44/20017 and (EC) 1348/20008) also form part of the AFSJ. However, the relevant case law of the ECJ will not be examined in the present contribution.9 Similarly, the judgments of the Court delivered in the course of Article 226 EC proceedings against member states, will be omitted.10 Even after setting aside the above case law and notwithstanding the fact that the AFSJ only dates as far back as May 1999, the judgments of the ECJ are numerous. A simple (if not simplistic) categorisation may be between, on the one hand, judgments which concern the institutional setting of the AFSJ (para. 2) and, on the other, judgments which are related to some substantive AFSJ policy (para. 3).

Casual but Smart: The Court’s new clothes in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) after the Lisbon Treaty. Research Papers in Law, 2/2008

Introduction. Unintended as it was, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court, the Court of the EU) has played an extremely important role in the construction of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). The AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999. The fact that this is a new field of EU competence, poses afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its Member States, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) extent of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions have prompted judicial solutions which take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.1 The ECJ is the body whose institutional role is to benefit most from this upcoming ‘depilarisation’, possibly more than that of the European Parliament. This structure is on the verge of being abandoned, provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force.2 However spectacular this formal boost of the Court’s competence, the changes in real terms are not going to be that dramatic. This apparent contradiction is explained, to a large extent, by the fact that the Court has in many ways ‘provoked’, or even ‘anticipated’, the depilarisation of its own jurisdictional role, already under the existing three-pillar structure. Simply put, under the new – post Treaty of Lisbon – regime, the Court will have full jurisdiction over all AFSJ matters, as those are going to be fully integrated in what is now the first pillar. Some limitations will continue to apply, however, while a special AFSJ procedure will be institutionalised. Indeed, if we look into the new Treaty we may identify general modifications to the Court’s structure and jurisdiction affecting the AFSJ (section 2), modifications in the field of the AFSJ stemming from the abolition of the pillar structure (section 3) and, finally, some rules specifically applicable to the AFSJ (section 4).

The Second Phase of the Common European Asylum System: A Step Forward in the Protection of Asylum Seekers? IES WORKING PAPER 7/2013

The aim of this paper is to analyse what is the impact of the second phase of the creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in the protection of rights of Asylum Seekers in the European Union. The establishment of a CEAS has been always a part of the development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Its implementation was planned in two phases: the first one, focused on the harmonisation of internal legislation on minimum common standards; the second, based on the result of an evaluation of the effectiveness of the agreed legal instruments, should improve the effectiveness of the protection granted. The five instruments adopted between 2002 and 2005, three Directives, on Qualification, Reception Conditions and Asylum Procedures, and two Regulations, the so-called “Dublin System”, were subjected to an extensive evaluation and modification, which led to the end of the recasting in 2013. The paper discusses briefly the international obligations concerning the rights of asylum seekers and continues with the presentation of the legal basis of the CEAS and its development, together with the role of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in asylum matters. The research will then focus on the development in the protection of asylum seekers after the recasting of the legislative instruments mentioned above. The paper will note that the European standards result now improved, especially concerning the treatment of vulnerable people, the quality of the application procedure, the effectiveness of the appeal, the treatment of gender issues in decision concerning procedures and reception. However, it will be also highlighted that Member States maintained a wide margin of appreciation in many fields, which can lead to the compression of important guarantees. This margin concerns, for example, the access to free legal assistance, the definition of the material support to be granted to each applicant for international protection, the access to labour market, the application of the presumptions of the “safety” of a third country. The paper will therefore stress that the long negotiations that characterised the second phase of the CEAS undoubtedly led to some progress in the protection of Asylum Seekers in the EU. However, some provisions are still in open contrast with the international obligations concerning rights of asylum seekers, while others require to the Member State consider carefully its obligation in the choice of internal policies concerning asylum matters.

An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Re-writing the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht. IHS Political Science Series No. 136, February 2014

At a time of crisis – a true state of emergency – both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Federal Constitutional Court have failed the rule of law in Europe. Worse still, in their evaluation of the ersatz crisis law, which has been developed in response to financial and sovereign debt crises, both courts have undermined constitutionality throughout Europe. Each jurisdiction has been implicated within the techocratisation of democratic process. Each Court has contributed to an incremental process of the undermining of the political subjectivity of European Citizens. The results are depressing for lawyers who are still attached to notions of constitutionality. Yet, we must also ask whether the Courts could have acted otherwise. Given the original flaws in the construction of Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the politically pre-emptive constraints imposed by global financial markets, each Court might thus be argued to have been forced to suspend immediate legality in a longer term effort to secure the character of the legal jurisdiction as a whole. Crisis can and does defeat the law. Nevertheless, what continues to disturb is the failure of law in Europe to open up any perspective for a return to normal constitutionality post crisis, as well as its apparent inability to give proper and honest consideration to the hardship now being experienced by millions of Europeans within crisis. This contribution accordingly seeks to reimagine each Judgment in a language of legal honesty. Above all, this contribution seeks to suggest a new form of post-national constitutional language; a language which takes as its primary function, proper protection of democratic process against the ever encroaching powers of a post-national executive power. This contribution forms a part of an on-going effort to identify a new basis for the legitimacy of European Law, conducted jointly and severally with Christian Joerges, University of Bremen and Hertie School of Government, Berlin. Differences do remain in our theoretical positions; hence this individual essay. Nevertheless, the congruence between pluralist and conflict of law approaches to the topic are also readily apparent. See, for example, Everson & Joerges (2013).

EU-Turkey plan for handling refugees is fraught with legal and procedural challenges. CEPS Commentary, 10 March 2016

EU-Turkey relations in the scope of the ongoing refugee crisis were at the heart of the European Council meeting of 7 March 2016. Among the set of initiatives proposed, the following two have attracted the most attention: First, for every Syrian readmitted by Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian from Turkey would be resettled in an EU member state. This has come to be known as the ‘one for one’ resettlement approach. Second, all new irregular migrants and asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands would be returned to Turkey without offering any guarantee of protection.

La protection de la vie privée au temps de la biosécurité

Cette thèse s’intéresse à la protection de la vie privée informationnelle dans le contexte de la biosécurité. La biosécurité se définit comme le processus qui vise à prendre en charge, dans une optique de sécurité nationale, les menaces et dangers que représentent les épidémies de maladies infectieuses pour la santé des populations humaines et la sécurité de l’État. Notre projet remet en question l’idée selon laquelle la conduite des activités de surveillance de la santé publique implique nécessairement une diminution de la protection offerte aux renseignements personnels sur la santé. Nos recherches tendent à démontrer que la conciliation de la surveillance de la santé et la protection de la vie privée est non seulement possible, mais qu’elle est surtout nécessaire. Nous portons plus précisément notre attention sur le cas de la collecte et de l’utilisation de renseignements dépersonnalisés sur la santé par les systèmes de surveillance syndromique. Bien calibrée et soigneusement réglementée, cette forme novatrice et particulière de surveillance offrirait le double avantage de réduire les risques d’atteintes à la vie privée des individus et d’augmenter de manière considérable l’efficacité des capacités étatiques en matière de détection des épidémies.

Media diversity as a guarantee to cultural diversity: the promotion of identities from an international law approach

This article deals with several international instruments which provide legal guarantees for media diversity, which is essential for the promotion of cultural diversity. Based on several articles of the Convention of cultural diversity, the General Comment of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights No. 21 on the right to take part in cultural life, as well as the work of the UN Independent Expert on Cultural Rights, this article aims to identify legal tools for the establishing of measures promoting cultural diversity in the media. This article looks at the case study of Honduran Garifuna community radios. It emphasizes the importance of taking into account the economic aspects of cultural and communicational rights.