The European Parliament’s New Role in Trade Policy: Turning power into impact. CEPS Special Report No. 89, 21 May 2014

The power of the European Parliament in EU trade policy has increased significantly with the Lisbon Treaty. Even though it had already acquired a greater informal role, the codification of its involvement enables the EP to have a stronger say in trade policy. Against the background of increased legal competences granted by the Treaty of Lisbon to the European Parliament in EU trade policy, this Policy Brief addresses two important questions. The first concerns the extent to which the EP’s power in trade policy has increased: Has the EP effectively played a bigger role since the end of 2009? The second relates to the substance of the EP’s trade policy preferences: Does the EP attempt to push EU trade relations into a more or less normative and/or protectionist direction? Its main argument is that the Lisbon Treaty not only heralds a major leap forward in legal terms, but that the current EP legislature has also managed to increase its political clout in trade policy-making. Nevertheless, a major challenge for the new EP legislature 2014-2019 will be to turn this into effective influence.

Policy recommendations for the new European Commission: priorities for stabilising EMU. EPC Discussion Paper, 30 September 2014

The euro area crisis exposed substantial structural flaws in the currency area’s architecture. Addressing these flaws this discussion paper explores the ways in which the European Institutions can re-evaluate and overcome challenges for a more positive European future. To do this, Janis A. Emmanouilidis, Jan David Schneider, and Fabian Zuleeg recommend that the coming European Commission should develop a new framework to assess the real returns to growth of public and social investment, which could open the path for more flexibility on deficits in future. In close coordination with the European Parliament, the Commission should also review the Country Specific Recommendations with a stronger focus on a smaller number of key priorities for each country. The construction of a fiscal capacity should be made a priority in the new political cycle to resolve the absence of a mechanism to provide effective ex ante fiscal risk sharing in the Eurozone. Furthermore, to boost growth, there is a need to encourage private, public and social investment through a European Investment Programme (EIP) in the short term. Finally, the Commission should ensure that the implementation of an EIP is compatible with the long term goals of a fiscal capacity.

The beginning of a new political cycle: the results and consequences of a nomination summit. EPC Post-Summit Analysis, 30 June 2014

Despite a broader agenda, the June 2014 European Council was dominated by the decision of EU leaders – taken by qualified majority – to propose to the European Parliament Jean-Claude Juncker as the next Commission President. In this post-summit analysis Janis A. Emmanouilidis argues that recent developments could have four consequences: increasing politicisation at European level; opposition from the side of national governments to what they consider to be an unjustifiable shift of power; further complication, maybe even deterioration of the relationship between London and ‘Brussels; and ‘consolidation’ as the predominant political attitude in the beginning of a new political cycle. Aside from all this, the Summit adopted a Strategic Agenda for the years to come, agreed to new strategic guidelines for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, postponed the decision on a new energy and climate framework to October, concluded the fourth European Semester with the adoption of country-specific recommendations, and, last but not least, EU leaders finally signed the Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine demonstrating that the Union and these countries are ready to deepen political and economic ties.

Priorities for the Juncker Commission: Policy recommendations and advice from the research team at CEPS. CEPS Special Report No. 92, 22 October 2014

In the months leading up to his nomination as President of the European Commission by the European Council in June 2014 through to his approval by the European Parliament in mid-July and finally his approval at a second special summit in August, CEPS’ researchers have closely followed the travails of Jean-Claude Juncker. We have also carefully studied his fundamental restructuring of the College in re-grouping commissioners around seven project teams, each headed by a vice-president. In our view, these changes promise to improve internal coordination, policy-making and transparency of rule-making and hopefully will reduce the personalisation of portfolios. This Special Report brings together under a single cover a series of 14 separate commentaries prepared by senior CEPS researchers, offering their assessment of these profound changes underway and their policy advice to the new commissioners from the perspective of their field of specialisation.

Iceland’s contested European Policy: The Footprint of the Past - A Small and Insular Society. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper 01/2013

Introduction. Iceland’s domestic politics and foreign affairs are undergoing drastic changes. After an economic crash, violent protests on the streets of Reykjavik for the first time in Iceland’s history contributed to the defeat of the government. The party system has been altered. A turn has been taken towards Europe after the United States left the island, first by closing its military base in 2006 and then by its clear stance not to assist the country in its economic difficulties. The former close relations with the superpower are unlikely ever to be restored. The EU membership application is placing severe constraints on political parties which are split on the issue and has put in jeopardy the unity of the first left majority in the Icelandic parliament, the Althingi. Society is in a state of flux after an unprecedented economic downscaling and the collapse of almost its entire financial sector – which had boomed rapidly beginning in the mid-1990s. The credibility of politicians, the parliament and the media is in ruins. Iceland’s smallness and its location on the geographical map – one could also say the geopolitical map – has had a profound influence on its domestic and foreign affairs. Iceland is closely associated with the other Nordic states and has adopted many of their domestic characteristics, with important exceptions. On the other hand, the country has come under American influence – geographically, it straddles the Mid-Atlantic rift – and has limited its participation in the European project. Its geographical location in the middle of the North Atlantic has led to a notion that the country’s culture is unique and should be protected by all available means. Politicians continue to play the ‘nationalistic uniqueness’ card with considerable success even though the country has been swept by globalization. Rapid modernization (which only really began in the Second World War with British and American occupations) and sudden engagement with the outside world (which only extended to the general public in the last quarter of the twentieth century) are still slowly but steadily making their mark on the country’s foreign policy. The country’s political discourse and foreign policy still bear the hallmark of the past, i.e. of a small and insular society This paper will address the political developments in Iceland since the 2008 economic crash and place it in a historical context. The aim is to understand Iceland’s present foreign policy and, in particular, the highly contested decision by its government in 2009 to apply for membership of the European Union. The paper is divided into five sections in addition to this introduction and the concluding remarks. First, it starts by explaining the importance in Iceland of a political discourse based on the concept of independence which dates back to the historical narrative of the settlement period. This section will also examine Iceland’s close relations with the other Nordic states – despite important differences between it and the others. Second, the paper will analyse the importance of the party system, i.e. the dominance of the centre-right in Icelandic politics, and the changed nature of the system. Third, it examines how Iceland further distinguishes itself from the other Nordic states in many important features. Fourthly, the paper analyses the country’s three main foreign policy priorities in the post-war period, i.e. extensions of the Exclusive Economic Zone, firm defence arrangements with the US and membership of NATO, and the drive for better market access for marine products – including a partial engagement in the European project. Fifthly, the paper examines how the country’s smallness, in terms of its central administrative capacity, has affected its domestic and foreign policy-making. The concluding section summarizes the main findings concerning the political and historical obstacles that the Social Democratic Alliance faces in its hard-fought battle to change the country’s European Policy.

Improving decision-making in the EU. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22 - Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014.

The multiple crises the European Union (EU) has experienced in recent years have fundamentally altered decision-making and, more broadly, governance in the EU. Pre-crisis systems and processes were not adequate to react to such critical and systemic challenges, but the speed of the crisis meant that new governance mechanisms have been superimposed on existing processes and structures rather than seeing a fundamental reform of decision-making. Consequently, not all changes have been fully successful. Given the institutional changes this year and the ongoing development of the EMU governance framework, now presents a good opportunity to reform EU decision-making.

Economics of Policy Errors and Learning in the European Union. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 31/2013

Policy errors occur regularly in EU Member States. Learning from these errors can be beneficial. This paper explains how the European Union can facilitate this learning. At present, much attention is given to “best practices”. But learning from mistakes is also valuable. The paper develops the concept of “avoidable error” and examines evidence from infringement proceedings and special reports of the European Court of Auditors which indicate that Member States do indeed commit avoidable errors. The paper considers how Member States may take measures not to repeat avoidable or predictable errors and makes appropriate proposals.

The Italian Parliament and the EU: a slow and gradual Europeanization. ACES Working Papers, August 2009

In this paper we discussed how the literature traces a growing involvement of the national parliaments in EU policy-making. Three phases can be distinguished: limited or no involvement was the trend until the 1980s; after the Single Act (SEA, 1987), national parliaments started to be interested in European affairs and to set up specialized committees; following the Maastricht Treaty (TUE, 1992), the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs became a response to the question of "democratic deficit" in the EU (Norton, 1995). The growing number of policies dealt with at the EU level, the consequently increased influence of EU law in national legislations, the new powers of the Union: all of these worked together to push national legislators to seek a scrutiny role in the drafting of EU legislation. According to Laprat (1995: 1), once the TUE was formally approved, a more parliamentary climate prevailed. In more recent years, national parliaments have distinguished themselves for their increased role in the scrutiny of EU legislation (Raunio and Hix, 200I: !52); more specialized MPs sit in the committees on EU affairs; the amount of work for EU specialists has increased. Also, parliamentary scrutiny, initially only optional and ex post, is now increasingly ex ante and/or mandatory (Maurer and Wessels, 2001: 425-475).

European Union and its member states as a collective actor in WTO decision-making process. ACES Cases No. 2010.3

This paper will outline and analyze the decision-making process in WTO matters. First, the players of the decision-making process -- the Council of the European Union (Council), the Trade Policy Committee, the Commission, and the European Parliament -- will be examined. Then the distinction will be made between decision-making in initiating WTO disputes and decision-making conducting trade agreement negotiations in the WTO. Then, decision-making practices in WTO matters will be assessed against constitutional principles of transparency, accountability, and legitimacy. After this assessment, conclusions will be drawn.

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). CEPS Special Report No. 109/May 2015

This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings (BEEP) 35/2015.

This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.

What do Eurozone academics think about EMU reform? On broad support and German exceptionalism. Bruges Political Research Papers 41/2015.

This paper is an empirical contribution to the literature on the formation of policy preferences on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) reform within its Member States. In the aftermath of the euro crisis, many proposals to ‘complete’ EMU have been tabled. However, discord among Member States has led to a piecemeal restructuring of EMU. For this paper, a survey has been conducted among euro area academic experts, gauging preferences on EMU reform. We find that general consensus masks significant discord among academics from different Member States. Our data indicates the existence of conflicting national epistemic communities, bound by shared causal beliefs on macro-economic policy. Academics within the key creditor Member State, Germany, assume an outlier position. Within the sample of German academics, economists are particularly strongly opposed to all moves in the direction of fiscal or social union. As economists are those academic experts most likely to influence the economic policy beliefs dominant among the German policy elite, these results are highly politically salient. We confront these findings with the literature on the exceptionalism of German economics. We contend that our results substantiate the claim that inadequate EMU reform and, more generally, the EU approach to the Eurozone crisis, can be partially explained by the firm grip these economic doctrines hold over the economics profession and policy-making circles in Germany.

Who is leading the European Union?. European Policy Briefs No. 33, March 2014

The European Union will only be reconciled with its citizens when they will be able to identify leaders at the level of the institutions.

Challenges for the European Union in times of crisis: reactions

Since the beginning of its existence in the form of communities, this entity faced a lot of challenges that could had been stopped the European dream without the fast, prompt and appropriate reaction of the decision makers. There were a lot of difficult times in its history of more than 60 years but the ambition and need of going forward on the way of integration prevailed and today we can talk about European Union as one of the most important global players, having one of the most complex and fascinating political systems. The tenacity and the willing to succeed off the decision makers made this possible. Moments like “The Empty Chair Crisis“, changes with regards to the decision- making process, convenient for ones but inconvenient for the others, lack of consensus with regards to the new accessions, the big changes that Europe went through in the late 80s etc. showed that the decision makers can have an appropriate response whatever the problem would be and that we must stay together and go on dreaming to a united nation in the form of a federation. Nowadays we are facing maybe the most difficult moment in European Union history. Many of the member states were and still are on the edge. A lot of immediate and prompt actions were taken since the start of financial crisis, either political or economic, drove by the need of going on. We are too much into the integration process, too much dependent one of each other so that we cannot stop and simply go back only to the concept of national state.

The EU’s Decision-Making Process Changes in the Constitutive Treaties

Since the beginning of its existence in the form of communities, the European Union’s decision-making process underwent constant evolution. There were continuous adjustments that transformed a pure intergovernmental process into one having rather federal features. Based on the hypothesis that changes have occurred at the decision level in regards to the actors, procedures, influence and ways of taking decisions in order for the new realities, needs and will at the European level to be properly addressed, this paper aims to present the reforms performed through the adoption of new treaties and the modification of the existing ones. The reality is that in order for the European dream and integration to go on and also for further development of the European Union, finally becoming an entity far beyond the founders expectations, decision makers had to constantly and carefully adapt the decision-making process. The purpose of this paper will be achieved by conducting a research based on the qualitative method, analyzing the related researches on this topic and the consolidated versions of the treaties. Thus, we will finally validate our research hypothesis that there was an evolution in what the EU’s decision-making process and decision procedures are concerned.