995 resultados para Multivariate Monitoring
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2012
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Maschinenbau, Diss., 2012
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This work presents the results of an investigation of processes in the melting zone during Electron Beam Welding(EBW) through analysis of the secondary current in the plasma.The studies show that the spectrum of the secondary emission signal during steel welding has a pronounced periodic component at a frequency of around 15–25 kHz. The signal contains quasi-periodic sharp peaks (impulses). These impulses have stochastically varying amplitude and follow each other inseries, at random intervals between series. The impulses have a considerable current (up to 0.5 A). It was established that during electron-beam welding with the focal spot scanning these impulses follow each other almost periodically. It was shown that the probability of occurrence of these high-frequency perturbation increases with the concentration of energy in the interaction zone. The paper also presents hypotheses for the mechanism of the formation of the high-frequency oscillations in the secondary current signal in the plasma.
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2013
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Humanwiss., Diss., 2013
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2015
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2015
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2015
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n.s. no.7(1981)
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v.39:no.3(1978)
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We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.
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We analyze a model where firms chose a production technology which, together with some random event, determines the final emission level. We consider the coexistence of two alternative technologies: a "clean" technology, and a "dirty" technology. The environmental regulation is based on taxes over reported emissions, and on penalties over unreported emissions. We show that the optimal inspection policy is a cut-off strategy, for several scenarios concerning the observability of the adoption of the clean technology and the cost of adopting it. We also show that the optimal inspection policy induces the firm to adopt the clean technology if the adoption cost is not too high, but the cost levels for which the firm adopts it depend on the scenario.