Prime Property Institutions for a Subprime Era: Exploring Innovative Models of Residential Development and Finance

This paper breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and in other types of public financing schemes, this paper suggests extending institutional and financial strategies such as timeand place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Alongside a for-profit shared equity scheme that would be led by local governments, we also outline a private market shared equity model, one of bootstrapping home buying with purchase options.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Interbank Competition with Costly Screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.

Financial Repression in a Natural Experiment: Loan Allocation and the Change in the Usury Laws in 1714

If financial deepening aids economic growth, then financial repression should be harmful. We use a natural experiment – the change in the English usury laws in 1714 – to analyze the effects of interest rate restrictions. We use a sample of individual loan transactions to demonstrate how the reduction of the legal maximum rate of interest affected the supply and demand for credit. Average loan size and minimum loan size increased strongly, and access to credit worsened for those with little ‘social capital.’ While we have no direct evidence that loans were misallocated, the discontinuity in loan receipts makes this highly likely. We conclude that financial repression can undermine the positive effects of financial deepening.

The Simple Economics of Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs: Separate or Joint Financing?

Which projects should be financed through separate non-recourse loans (or limited- liability companies) and which should be bundled into a single loan? In the pres- ence of bankruptcy costs, this conglomeration decision trades off the benefit of co- insurance with the cost of risk contamination. This paper characterize this tradeoff for projects with binary returns, depending on the mean, variability, and skewness of returns, the bankruptcy recovery rate, the correlation across projects, the number of projects, and their heterogeneous characteristics. In some cases, separate financing dominates joint financing, even though it increases the interest rate or the probability of bankruptcy.

Análise de Crédito e Avaliação de Riscos em Instituições Bancárias

É indubitável que o sistema financeiro é parte integrante de qualquer sociedade. Através da sua função de intermediação, as instituições financeiras recebem recursos dos agentes superavitários e emprestam aos agentes deficitários mediante promessa de pagamento futuro. Num banco, que tem intermediação financeira como sua principal actividade, o crédito consiste em disponibilizar ao cliente recursos em valores sob a forma de financiamento e ou empréstimo mediante uma promessa de pagamento numa data acordada entre as partes. A discussão e implementação dos acordos de BASILEIA, nomeadamente o Basileia II, veio dar uma nova forma a esse relacionamento sector bancário/clientes determinando as regras no que respeita a concessão de crédito e gestão de risco, estabelecendo os limites de crédito associado ao grau de risco das operações. Surge então, por parte das instituições uma maior preocupação em gerir o crédito e os riscos inerentes a cada operação, apostando em ferramentas e metodologias adequadas ao processo creditício. As instituições bancárias passam a criar departamentos de risco, colocando a gestão de crédito e de risco nas mãos de profissionais especializados, agindo sob regras e padrões internacionais uniformizados. There is no doubt that the financial system is an integral part of any society. Through their intermediary role, financial institutions receive funds from surplus agents and lend to deficit agents, with promises of future payment. Banks, with their primary activity being the financial intermediation, the credit is provided to customers in the form of funding or loans and a promise of payment on a date agreed between the parties. The discussion and implementation of the Basel Accord, Basel II in particular, has given a new form to that relationship banking/customer, setting out the rules regarding the granting of credit and risk management, establishing credit limits associated with the degree of risk of operations. Banking institutions got more and more concerned with credit and risk management, in all of their operations, using tools and methodologies that are designed to meet the needs of crediting processes. Banking institutions are creating departments of risk, putting the management of credit risk in the hands of trained professionals, acting under internationally uniform rules and standards

Processos de Reconhecimento, Mensuração e Contabilização do Rédito

O reconhecimento e mensuração do rédito tornaram-se cada vez mais complexos devido a factores como a concorrência internacional e a rápida evolução dos modelos empresariais. O rédito é a componente do rendimento proveniente da actividade operacional da empresa, daí ser de suprema importância determinar-se o momento em que o mesmo deve ser reconhecido bem como os critérios adequados para mensurá-lo. Neste trabalho debruçamo-nos sobre os processos de reconhecimento e mensuração do rédito. Este trabalho foi elaborado em duas partes, na primeira, efectuou-se uma revisão às normas de referência ao tratamento do rédito, com o objectivo de esclarecer algumas questões que suscitam grandes dúvidas, quer no meio académico, quer no meio profissional como é o exemplo do tratamento a dar ao rédito proveniente dos contratos de construção de imóveis numa empresa do ramo imobiliário. Na segunda parte do trabalho, elaborou-se um estudo de caso sobre a empresa TECNICIL Imobiliária, precisamente para verificar na prática o tratamento dado ao rédito proveniente dos acordos de construção levados a cabo por esta entidade. E desse estudo podemos concluir que a entidade não observa o tratamento prescrito pelas normas de referência, particularmente a IFRIC 15 – Acordos para Construção de Imóveis e IAS 18 – Rédito. There is no doubt that the financial system is an integral part of any society. Through their intermediary role, financial institutions receive funds from surplus agents and lend to deficit agents, with promises of future payment. Banks, with their primary activity being the financial intermediation, the credit is provided to customers in the form of funding or loans and a promise of payment on a date agreed between the parties. The discussion and implementation of the Basel Accord, Basel II in particular, has given a new form to that relationship banking/customer, setting out the rules regarding the granting of credit and risk management, establishing credit limits associated with the degree of risk of operations. Banking institutions got more and more concerned with credit and risk management, in all of their operations, using tools and methodologies that are designed to meet the needs of crediting processes. Banking institutions are creating departments of risk, putting the management of credit risk in the hands of trained professionals, acting under internationally uniform rules and standards.

A model of shadow banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, ii) intermediary assets and leverage move together as in Adrian and Shin (2010), and iii) intermediaries increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce their idiosyncratic risk through diversification, as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010). Under rational expectations, the shadow banking system is stable and improves welfare. When investors and intermediaries neglect tail risks, however, the expansion of risky lending and the concentration of risks in the intermediaries create financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity over time.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

2007 Annual Report of the Iowa Railway Finance Authority

The Iowa Railway Finance Authority (IRFA) was created in 1980 by the 68th General Assembly to provide for the financing of rail facilities, and to enhance and continue the operation of essential rail facilities. IRFA was authorized to offer financial assistance for the acquisition, rehabilitation, construction, refinancing, extension, replacement, maintenance, repair or leasing of any rail facility. The 2005 legislative session amended Iowa Code 327H.20 by assigning all repayments of IRFA and other Iowa DOT rail assistance loans to the Rail Revolving Loan and Grant Fund. In 2006, a state appropriation of $235,000 was added to the program. In 2007, $2 million was appropriated to support rail development and job growth.

The impact of interest-rate subsidies on long-term household debt: Evidence from a large program

The responsiveness of long-term household debt to the interest rate is acrucial parameter for assessing the effectiveness of public policies aimedat promoting specific types of saving. This paper estimates the effect ofa reform of Credito Bonificado, a large program in Portugal that subsidizedmortgage interest rates, on long-term household debt. The reform establisheda ceiling in the price of the house that could be financed through theprogram, and provides plausibly exogenous variation in incentives. Usinga unique dataset of matched household survey data and administrative recordsof debt, we document a large decrease in the probability of signing a newloan after the removal of the subsidy.

Prime property institutions for a subprime era: Toward innovative models of homeownership

This Article breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and other types of public financing schemes, we suggest extending institutional and financial strategies such as time- and place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Two new solutions offer a broad theoretical basis for such developments in the economic and legal institution of homeownership: a for-profit shared equity scheme led by local governments alongside a private market shared equity model, one of "bootstrapping home buying with purchase options".

Country portfolios

Capital flows to developing countries are small and are mostly take the form of loans rather than direct foreign investment. We build a simple model of North-South capital flows that highlights the interplay between diminishing returns, production risk and sovereign risk. This model generates a set of country portfolios and a world distribution of capital stocks that resemble those in the data.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Monetary policy shocks and transmission in Italy: A VAR analysis

This paper provides updated empirical evidence about the real and nominal effects of monetary policy in Italy, by using structural VAR analysis. We discuss different empirical approaches that have been used in order to identify monetary policy exogenous shocks. We argue that the data support the view that the Bank of Italy, at least in the recent past, has been targeting the rate on overnight interbank loans. Therefore, we interpret shocks to the overnight rate as purely exogenous monetary policy shocks and study how different macroeconomic variables react to such shocks.